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In the mid-fourteenth century the branch of the Mongol empire in China, the Yuan dynasty 
(1279-1368), collapsed. In its wake arose a new political order, the Ming dynasty (1368-1644), 
the last imperial state in China founded by Chinese. The cultural and ethnic differences between 
the rulers and courts of these two dynasties suggests stark differences between them, and the 
rhetoric of early Ming rulers, when read at face value, indicates that the Ming represented the 
resurgence of native sovereignty and the rejection of Mongol Yuan administrative practices, 
military endeavors, and expansive models of imperial rule. Over the last two decades, innovative 
research has questioned these assumptions, but there remain unappreciated connections between 
the Yuan and Ming that reveal the complex ways in which Ming rulers adapted Yuan state-
building practices and understood the Ming dynasty’s relationship with its Mongol past. 
Building on world historical methodology and recent work in the field of Yuan-Ming 
studies, this dissertation argues that early Ming rulers and statesmen viewed their empire as the 
successor of the Yuan and readily incorporated Mongol-generated imperial language, practices, 
and state-building methods into the new Ming polity. Early Ming emperors consciously 
redeployed steppe state-building traditions. They sought to re-establish Yuan patterns of 
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hegemony over continental East Asia, and in pursuit of these goals, designed strategic policies 
and commissioned representations that mirrored Yuan imperial visions. When discussing 
Mongol subjects of the Ming and relations with Mongol groups in the steppe, Ming court 
language carefully distinguished between cultural and political identities. It was not until the 
1440s that Ming rulers, facing military disaster in conflict with Mongols, curtailed their broad 
ideas of empire, a strategic decision that culminated in the construction of what we know today 
as the Great Wall. In a larger Eurasian context, this study places the Ming dynasty closer to other 
contemporary post-Mongol empires, including Muscovite Russia and the Ottomans. In China, as 
elsewhere in Eurasia, the late fourteenth and fifteenth centuries witnessed the adaptation and 
modification of Mongol imperial ideas rather than the rejection of the Mongol past. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
The relationship between the Yuan and Ming dynasties in China presents unique problems to 
historians. The Yuan (1279-1368) was the branch of the Mongol empire in China, established 
along classic Chinese dynastic patterns but built and ruled with Mongol methods. The Ming 
(1368-1644) appears to be the last native Chinese dynasty, succeeding the Mongol Yuan and 
preceding the Manchu-founded Qing (1644-1911). The Yuan and Ming on the surface appear to 
be very different imperial formulations whose legitimating structures shared little, and whose 
patterns of empire seem to be wildly different in size, scope, and vision. I believe, however, that 
given the profound impact of the Mongols on Eurasian history, the legacy of the Yuan in the 
imperial self-imagination and state-building practices of early Ming rulers was much greater than 
recent scholarship has supposed. While important work has been done to overturn antiquated 
notions of the Yuan as an aberration of Chinese dynastic history and draw meaningful 
connections between the Yuan and Ming, this project reframes the Yuan-Ming transition era as 
one that requires mutual understanding – that is, one cannot understand the early Ming without 
understanding the Yuan. I argue that early Ming rulers and statesmen imagined their empire as 
the successor of the Yuan dynasty, endeavored to recapture Yuan territory and aimed to 
reestablish Yuan patterns of hegemony over East Asia. They did this for a variety of reasons, 
including the maintenance of Ming state security and to mimic Yuan prestige. While the 
recorded rhetoric of early Ming rulers, notably the Hongwu emperor, suggests that he viewed his 
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new Ming state as a restoration of Chinese customs, institutions, and styles of rule, such rhetoric 
was just that: grandiloquence designed to imprint upon the Ming realm the image of a new order 
after the collapse of the old. Taking these observations further by working around the heavy 
Confucian rhetoric of Ming court records (a methodology I detail below), I reveal how Ming 
attitudes towards the Yuan past, as well as the Ming dynasty’s relationship to the Mongol Yuan, 
experienced complex changes, negotiations, and input from many voices, ultimately arguing that 
historians should view the Yuan and Ming as a single, formative period of China’s late imperial 
history, and that the Ming was part of a larger Eurasian world, contemporary to other post-
Mongol Eurasian empires both in time and in terms of imperial state-building practices. 
My assertions conjure several questions. How did the bureaucrats and emperors of the 
early Ming dynasty imagine their state in relation to its predecessor, the Mongol-founded Yuan 
dynasty? How did Mongol state-building practices influence those of the early Ming? Did Ming 
rulers, as scholars have argued, see the establishment of the Ming as the expulsion of polluting 
Mongol influences?1 Did they believe they were delivering what we call “China” back into the 
hands of the descendants of the Song dynasty (960-1279)? Perhaps most importantly, did they 
see the Ming empire as a proper successor and inheritor of the Yuan legacy, or something wholly 
different, untainted by and divorced from Yuan institutions, models, and imperial visions? Here I 
define the “early Ming” as the period beginning with the formal foundation of the polity in 1368 
and ending with the Tumu Crisis of 1449, when military disaster curtailed Ming imperial 
ambitions into the steppe.  
                                                 
1 Jiang Yonglin, The Mandate of Heaven and the Great Ming Code (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2011), 
p. 103; Edward Farmer, Zhu Yuanzhang and Early Ming Legislation: Reordering Chinese Society following the Era 
of Mongol Rule (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1995). 
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On a practical level, of course, Ming rulers modeled Ming military and political 
institutions on Yuan precedents, and echoed Mongol diplomatic practices and language in 
relations with other states. They did denigrate Mongol culture and customs, citing these as 
“polluting” influences on the cultured people of the North China Plain, but took intellectual steps 
to distinguish between the Mongols themselves and the Yuan state. In Ming state records, rulers 
imparted nuanced judgements of dynastic history that reveal complex attitudes towards the place 
of the Yuan in China’s past. The Yuan dynasty was, to be sure, a proper dynasty by the 
reckoning of court historians: the swift compilation of the History of the Yuan (Yuan shi 元史) 
by the first Ming court indicates that incorporating the Yuan into dynastic annals was paramount 
for the legitimation of the Ming. As the Ming state matured and faced administrative and 
logistical challenges, Ming rulers looked to history for lessons, and were as willing to cite the 
failures of the Song as well as the Yuan. The first Ming ruler, the Hongwu emperor 洪武 (r. 
1368-98), faulted the Song for its military weakness and praised the Yuan for its strength. He 
pointed to the Yuan dynasty’s first emperor, Khubilai Khan, as a template of strong central 
authority. Hongwu was willing to examine the reasons for the fall of the Song and Yuan, and 
find those same faults in his own administration in order to dig them out. We can see further 
evidence of these influences in Song, Yuan, and Ming maps, and the changing ways in which 
maps across these three dynasties depicted steppe-agricultural divides, the Eurasian landmass, 
and the political units upon them. 
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A. HISTORIOGRAPHY 
 
 
These observations matter because the historiographical gap between the Yuan and Ming has not 
been fully bridged. For much of the early and middle twentieth century, historians sidelined the 
Yuan dynasty, considering it a breach of an otherwise unbroken line of Chinese dynasties from 
the Qin (221 – 206 BCE) to the Qing (1644 CE – 1911). Over the past three decades, scholars 
have revisited the Yuan-Ming era and realized that Ming rulers did not simply adopt Yuan 
military institutions but adapted other Mongol state-building practices as well for both military 
and non-military purposes. Historians since have produced numerous studies that reveal the 
multitude of ways in which the Ming dynasty was shaped by its immediate Yuan past, and 
observed that early Ming rulers did not unilaterally reject Mongol influence in China, but were 
simply making political statements intended to placate their most ardent Confucian supporters, 
all the while freely modeling the Ming empire on the undeniably grand precedent that the 
Mongols had created. However, a gap between the Yuan and Ming remains. The Yuan still sits 
uneasily between the Tang-Song and Ming-Qing eras, belonging to neither and relegated to, at 
best, ambiguous periodization and, at worst, being little more than a representative of the 
“Mongol moment” in China’s history. The established threads between the Yuan and Ming are 
fascinating studies, to be sure, but they remain just that: threads that make connections between 
specific observations or phenomena, not tapestries that weave the Yuan-Ming era into a coherent 
period, and even less bridges that might stitch early Ming China onto a larger Eurasian world in 
unappreciated ways. 
On periodization: the most common comprehensive periodization of Chinese history that 
survives to the modern day is that of the standard histories, or the zhengshi 正史. Beginning in 
the Tang dynasty (618-907 CE), the idea that a single authorized historical account should exist 
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for each dynasty had become prevalent among scholars and bureaucrats. By the Qing, the term 
zhengshi had solidified as the descriptor for these histories, known as “official” or “orthodox” 
histories, usually compiled by a new dynasty for its predecessor (a process detailed below in this 
introduction’s discussion of sources). Regardless of the original purpose of the zhengshi, they 
form a common basis for periodizing Chinese history. The gap that emerged between the Yuan 
and Ming, however, can trace its twentieth-century origins to the work of Naitō Konan (内藤湖
南, 1866-1934), who is credited as the first modern-day historian to reject the idea that 
modernity in China began with the arrival of the West.2 In his essays, Naitō suggested that the 
profound changes China experienced between the Tang and Song periods (called the Tang-Song 
transition) mark a pivotal moment in Chinese history: the shift from antiquity/medieval times to 
a form of modernity characterized primarily by the decline of the aristocracy, the rise of a state-
serving bureaucracy, the increasingly centralized power of the emperor, and the 
social/economic/cultural changes that stemmed from these transformations.3 However, in Naitō’s 
periodization, the Yuan is an aberrant exception whose Mongol rulers “dominated China by 
force” and whose culture “was on the same level as that of primeval China.”4 Modernity died 
with the arrival of the Mongols.5 With some exceptions, historians through the 1970s continued 
to view the Mongol Yuan as a disruptive era in otherwise neat periodizations of Chinese history. 
Henry Serruys is one such exception. He meticulously documented the official records on early 
                                                 
2 Hisayuki Miyakawa, “An Outline of the Naitō Hypothesis and its Effects on Japanese Studies of China,” in The 
Far Eastern Quarterly 14.4 (1955): p. 533. 
3 Ibid, p. 537-8; and Naitō, “Gaikatsuteki Tō-Sō jidai kan,” in Rekishi to chiri 9.5 (1922): pp. 1-12. 
4 Hisayuki, “An Outline of the Naitō Hypothesis”, p. 538. 
5 Paul J. Smith, “Introduction: Problematizing the Song-Yuan-Ming Transition,” in The Song-Yuan-Ming Transition 
in Chinese History (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003), p. 3; Joshua Fogel, Politics and Sinology: The 
Case of Naitō Konan (1866-1934),(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984); and William T Rowe, 
“Approaches to Modern Chinese Social History,” in Reliving the Past: The Worlds of Social History, ed. Oliver 
Kunz (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1985). 
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Ming relations with the Mongols, providing a window into the nuanced interaction and 
diplomacy among multiple parties on China’s northern steppe frontier, and revealed a Ming state 
that carefully considered its relationship to the Mongols instead of outright rejecting that 
relationship, but his work did not overturn the Naitō hypothesis.6 In the early 1970s, Mark 
Elvin’s work perhaps embodies the classic scholarly views on the Ming dynasty’s relationship 
with its Mongol past and the rest of the world. The Mongols and the Yuan dynasty were 
responsible for the arrest of China’s “medieval economic revolution,” and the following Ming 
era was one of isolationism and retraction from contact with the rest of Eurasia, a trend that 
stifled trade and innovation.7 
Following this, historians laid the first real strikes against the pillars of the “arrested 
modernity” thesis, a historiography adroitly laid out by Paul Smith and Richard von Glahn.8 In 
opposition to the idea that the era after the Song collapse was one of economic stagnation, 
Evelyn Rawski argued that significant economic growth, couched by institutional continuity, 
characterized the Ming-Qing era, while G. William Skinner traced the long-term development of 
China’s economy as a transition from densely clustered cities to widespread integration of urban 
centers and market towns.9 Beyond the economic argument, beginning in the 1980s and early 
1990s, Edward Dreyer and Edward Farmer began to take seriously the finer points of the 
relationship between the Yuan and Ming. Dreyer knew that “Hung-wu was a man of the Yüan 
dynasty,” and observed that the early Ming drew more inspiration from the Yuan than the Song, 
                                                 
6 Henry Serruys, Sino-Mongol Relations During the Ming, I-III, in Mélanges chinois et bouddhiques, volumes 11, 
14, and 17, (Brussels: l’Institut belge des hautes études chinoises, 1959, 1967, and 1975). 
7 Mark Elvin, The Pattern of the Chinese Past (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1973), pp. 203-34. 
8 See: Smith, “Introduction,” in The Song-Yuan-Ming Transition in Chinese History. 
9 Rawski, “Economic and Social Foundations of Late Imperial Culture;” in The City in Late Imperial China, ed. G. 
William Skinner (Taipei: SMC Publishing Inc., 1977), p. 24. 
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particularly in the Ming military and administrative institutions.10 However, the impression that 
the Ming rejected its Mongol past remains strong in modern historiography. Jiang Yonglin 
dissected the purpose of many early Ming laws that appeared to be anti-Mongol (i.e. laws with 
the intent of removing “polluted” Mongol influences), and, important for this discussion, 
carefully distinguished between modern views on Chinese-Mongol relations and the rhetoric 
deployed in Ming records, but I believe he does not go far enough. For Jiang, “[t]he ‘barbarian’ 
Mongol legal legacy… became an essential component of the ‘Chinese’ anti-‘barbarian’ 
discourse in the Ming.” Jiang’s use of quotations indicates his awareness that historians cannot 
view Ming legal code in terms of a strict Chinese-Mongol (or Han-barbarian) dichotomy – an 
awareness prevalent in the rest of his analysis – but he stops there. By understanding these laws 
in a broader Yuan-Ming imperial and historical context (as detailed under methodology, below), 
we can go beyond a simple observation of the words of legal texts and understand that these 
codes suggested Ming rulers were confronting a complex social, cultural, ethnic, and imperial 
reality. 
Since the late 1990s, more historians have launched invaluable studies into the political, 
economic, cultural, and social relationships between the Yuan and Ming. Richard von Glahn and 
Paul Jakov Smith attempt to bring structure to several standing questions in the longue durée of 
Chinese history as it relates to the tenth through fourteenth centuries. First, how do we periodize 
the ambiguous temporal place of the Yuan dynasty?11 Is it medieval or early modern, thus fitting 
in a European historical context? Or is it closer to the Sinologists’ label of “late imperial”, a term 
that describes the advanced imperial institution-building and vibrant economies of the Ming and 
                                                 
10 Edward Dreyer, Early Ming China: A Political History, 1355-1435 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1982), 
pp. 2, 155 
11 Richard von Glahn, “Imagining Pre-Modern China,” in Smith and von Glahn, The Song-Yuan-Ming Transition in 
Chinese History, p. 36. 
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Qing (1644-1911)? Is it one or both of these? Second, how do we move beyond Mark Elvin’s 
antiquated model of the fourteenth century as a “turning point,” in which, as Elvin argued, the 
invading Mongols destroyed the economic vibrancy of the Song? While historians today do not 
consider the Mongol Yuan a purely destructive or disruptive force, Smith and von Glahn rightly 
observe that no alternative to Elvin’s turning point argument has emerged. And third, how can 
Sinologists “re-approach” Chinese history from a world-historical perspective in ways that might 
reveal heretofore unappreciated connections between the Eurasian-wide “Mongol moment” and 
the comparatively truncated region over which the Ming exerted political influence?12 When 
taken as a whole, these essays establish the threads connecting the Yuan and Ming: beautiful and 
fascinating threads that hint at a larger story, but not yet part of a more thorough understanding 
of the era as a coherent period. 
Ming historian Timothy Brook has offered a more detailed Yuan-Ming link in his book 
The Troubled Empire: China in the Yuan and Ming Dynasties. He takes the point that the 
Mongol conquest dramatically changed the course of Chinese history, and looks at one specific 
phenomenon: the interpretation of calamitous weather events in Yuan and Ming dynastic annals. 
Brook begins by discarding old notions of the Yuan as a “self-contained unit of time” or a “break 
in continuity from which the Ming recovered to set China on its course to the present.” Instead 
he views the Yuan and Ming as “component parts of a single period.”13 Some of the most 
common items in the imperial records of both empires are references to natural disasters and 
strange weather events that, in classical Confucian cosmology, indicate a disruption between 
heaven and earth caused by the poor conduct of earthly rulers. By investigating how Yuan and 
                                                 
12 Ibid, p. 56. 
13 Timothy Brook, The Troubled Empire: China in the Yuan and Ming Dynasties (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 2010), pp. 1-2. 
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Ming records treat these events, Brook finds patterns that “shaped life and memory… as strongly 
as any other factor,” from the cosmological consequences of dynastic infighting to the 
relationship between nature and agrarian economies.14 
Formal military and political institutions constitute the most thoroughly-studied area of 
Yuan-Ming continuity. Dreyer, Dardess, Waldron, and Hucker all observed that the Ming 
dynasty copied or adapted many of its early institutions from Yuan models.15 The Ming military-
farming system drew from Yuan systems, as did Ming military organization methods and 
preference for officers and officials to have practical military skills.16 In more recent years, early 
Ming military ideals and traditions, and not just institutions, have received more attention. David 
Robinson’s Martial Spectacles of the Ming Court identifies the practices of the royal hunt, 
archery, and the visual portrayal of Ming emperors as strategies of imperial legitimation shared 
with other Eurasian empires and the Mongols.17 Robinson goes a step further and contends that 
these shared ideas extended through the fifteenth century, and that the Ming did not become 
culturally or politically isolated in the middle of the 1400s as Morris Rossabi and Wang Gungwu 
have argued.18 
                                                 
14 Ibid, p. 2. 
15 Dreyer, Early Ming China, pp. 76-87; John Dardess, Confucianism and Autocracy: Professional Elites in the 
Founding of the Ming Dynasty (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), pp. 194-5; Arthur Waldron, The 
Great Wall of China: From History to Myth (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 81-2, 91; Charles 
O. Hucker, “Ming government,” in The Cambridge History of China, Volume 8: The Ming Dynasty, 1368-1644, 
Part 2, eds. Denis Twitchett and Frederick W. Mote (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 62-76. 
16 Foon Ming Liew, Tuntian Farming System of the Ming Dynasty, 1368-1644 (Hamburg: Gesellschaft für Natur- 
und Völkerkunde Ostasiens, 1984), p. 82; Romeyn Taylor, “Yuan origins of the Wei-suo system,” in Chinese 
Government in Ming Times: Seven Studies, ed. Charles O. Hucker (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), p. 
24; Edward Dreyer, “Military origins of Ming China,” in The Cambridge History of China, Volume 7: The Ming 
Dynasty, 1368-1644, Part 1, eds. Denis Twitchett and Frederick W. Mote (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1988), p. 104; Dardess, Confucianism and Autocracy, p. 195. 
17 See: David Robinson, Martial Spectacles of the Ming Court (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2013). 
18 Robinson, Martial Spectacles, p. 15; Morris Rossabi, “The Ming and Inner Asia,” in The Cambridge History of 
China, Volume 8, pp. 246-58; and Wang Gungwu, “Wubai nianqian de Zhongguo yu shijie,” in Ershiyi shiji No. 2 
(1990): p. 98. 
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Yet gaps remain, and even some of the most recent scholarship limits Yuan-Ming 
connections to simple legitimating rhetoric.19 In my interpretation, historians of the Ming 
sometimes still take its rhetorically-charged court records at face value, especially on the matter 
of the northern frontier. Zhao Xianhai makes teleological arguments about the nature, purpose, 
and existence of the Great Wall, citing it decades before it truly existed in its final form, and thus 
suggesting a far more closed Ming attitude towards the steppe than the Ming actually 
expressed.20 In early Ming times, the fortifications that did exist on the northern frontier were 
called the Nine Garrisons, indicating a concern for steppe security but not the isolationist and 
exclusively defensive posture that the Great Wall brings to mind.21 Arthur Waldron’s argument 
that the Great Wall did not exist in any form until the late fifteenth century may require more 
nuance and precision, but as this dissertation will demonstrate, Ming ideas of empire were much 
broader than we have supposed, and drew more readily from Yuan precedents than Confucian 
court language would suggest. 
 
 
 
B. SOURCES 
 
Understanding the thoughts and motivations of these Ming rulers and statesmen, perhaps the 
most institutionally and academically privileged body of elites on the planet in the fourteenth and 
fifteenth centuries, is a significant challenge. We only have formal court documents and a few 
                                                 
19 See, for example, Hodong Kim, “Chinese Legitimation of the Mongol Regime and the Legacy of ‘Unification,’” 
in Sacred Mandates: Asian International Relations Since Chinggis Khan, eds. Timothy Brook, Michael van Walt 
van Praag, and Miek Boltjes, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2018), p. 56n100. 
20 Wei Zhanbin, “Zhu Yuanzhang de fangbian sixiang jiqi dui Mingdai fangbian de yingxiang,” in Handan Xueyuan 
Xuebao, 15.4 (2005); Shih-Shan Henry Tsai, Perpetual Happiness: The Ming Emperor Yongle (Seattle: University 
of Washington Press, 2001), p. 156; Zhao Xianhai, Mingdai jiubian changcheng junzhen shi: Zhongguo bianjiang 
jiashuo shiye xia de changcheng zhidu shi yanjiu (Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2012), p. 46. 
21 Wang Yuan-kang, Harmony and War: Confucian Culture and Chinese Power Politics, (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2011), p. 122. 
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personal journals to uncover how they viewed the Ming empire and its immediate past. 
Particularly for the early Ming era, the politically sterilized entries on court affairs in the Ming 
Shilu 明實錄 constitute the largest body of political documentation we have on the matter. The 
entries in the Ming Shilu (also known as the Veritable Records of the Ming) are made up of 
official transcripts of state affairs discussed in the emperor’s court, compiled and organized after 
the death of an emperor under the supervision of the daxue shi 大學士, the grand secretary. The 
Ming Taizu Shilu 明太祖實錄 are the records transcribed and compiled after the Hongwu 
emperor’s death in 1398, while the Ming Taizong Shilu 明太宗實錄 are those compiled after the 
Yongle emperor’s death in 1424. Subsequent emperors also have their own similar entries in the 
Shilu. Some are more thorough than others, and all are thoroughly edited to eliminate 
embarrassing details and unfavorable accounts. The Yongle emperor, for example, ordered the 
Shilu of his father, the Hongwu emperor, rewritten thrice to ensure his own legitimacy was 
secure after he had taken the throne from his nephew by force in a civil war. 
The other major source of Ming documents is the Ming Shi 明史, or the History of the 
Ming, part of the zhengshi “official histories” that formally coalesced as the “twenty-four 
histories” during the Qing dynasty. Compiled in the early years of the Qing dynasty (1644-1911), 
the Ming Shi is organized into some three hundred volumes and includes biographical entries and 
historical documents from the Ming dynasty. The decision of the new Qing state to compile the 
Ming Shi was, quite naturally, a legitimating process that helped cement some level of validity in 
the fledgling Qing government while it was still undertaking the processes of conquest and 
consolidation of former Ming territories. This means that early Qing officials, rulers, and 
statesmen had the opportunity to pick and choose which documents the Ming Shi would retain, 
and which they would discard. This does not mean that the Ming Shi is without value, because 
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there are documents and books in the Ming Shi that did not survive elsewhere, but it does mean 
historians must be conscious of the problems inherent in relying too heavily on these filtered 
writings. 
This dissertation does not rely heavily on the Ming Shi for several reasons. The first is 
that I am primarily interested in how Ming state actors filtered and coded – or did not filter and 
code – their own attitudes towards the Mongol Yuan. By including items from the Qing-
compiled Ming Shi, I risk viewing Ming attitudes towards the Mongols through a second Qing 
filter, and the Qing state had a very different and more direct historiographical and state-building 
relationship with the Mongols, the Mongol empire, and the Yuan dynasty. The Ming Shilu is, in a 
sense, one step closer to the complicated ways in which Ming state actors viewed their Mongol 
Yuan past. Note that I am not arguing that the Ming Shilu is somehow more accurate or less 
biased; after all, as mentioned above, it is also a sterilized court document. Rather, I insist that 
scrutinizing the Ming Shilu and identifying its rhetoric, biases, and filters makes circumventing 
rhetoric/bias/filter easier for the purposes of this dissertation’s goals. Indeed, scrutinizing 
rhetoric/bias/filter is necessary for the methodology of this dissertation, which I detail in the next 
section. 
The other major textual sources this dissertation uses are the Yuan Shi 元史, the Da Ming 
Lü 大明律, and the Huang Ming Zuxun 皇明祖訓. Chapter 2 examines several maps from the 
Song (Lidai Dili Zhizhang Tu 歷代地理指掌圖), Yuan (Yuan Jingshi Dadian 元經世大典), and 
Ming (Da Ming Hunyi Tu 大明混一圖) and Guang Yu Tu 廣與圖), the historiography of which I 
unpack in that part of the dissertation. I use the Yuan Shi (History of the Yuan) for precisely the 
same reason I have chosen to forgo the Ming Shi: it was compiled in the early years of the Ming 
dynasty at the direction of the founding emperor and under the supervision of his officials. 
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Therefore, anything included in the Yuan Shi is necessarily something that the Hongwu emperor, 
his officials, and the members of his court were willing to include for the sake of legitimation 
and posterity. Similarly, the first Ming emperor ordered the creation of the Great Ming Code and 
personally wrote and frequently revised the Ancestral Injunctions, both of which detail laws, 
regulations, customs, and proscriptions to state officials and commoners (in the case of the Great 
Ming Code), as well as his own male offspring and their royal descendants (in the case of the 
Ancestral Injunctions). These codices offer insight into the logic behind the early Ming 
administration, including its methods of maintaining internal order, its measures to ensure 
dynastic security, and its major domestic and international concerns. 
 
 
 
C. METHODOLOGY 
 
 
Arguing this paper’s thesis using these sources, all written and compiled for various reasons, 
requires a particular approach. I have already mentioned that I will scrutinize the rhetoric, biases, 
and filters that the authors of Ming state sources used to describe their attitudes towards the 
Mongol Yuan empire. This process involves examining the relationship between early Ming 
rhetoric and state-building strategies, including historiographical strategies, legitimating 
strategies, and military strategies. For instance, how do we interpret early-Ming anti-Mongol 
rhetoric when other sources (or the very same sources) include positive historical judgements of 
the Mongol-founded Yuan dynasty? 
One answer is that these sources and comments were written for different audiences, for 
different purposes, and/or at different times. This would mean that early Ming state actors were 
willing to present a more positive relationship between the Yuan and Ming when it was 
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politically expedient to do so. Taking politically expedient routes for the sake of state-building is 
not unique to the Ming, but in the case of the Yuan-Ming transition, it suggests that Ming rulers 
sometimes had reason to incorporate (rather than unilaterally reject) the Mongol Yuan legacy 
into early Ming state-building. Identifying the specific circumstances and times at which Ming 
records take wildly different attitudes towards the Mongols/Yuan helps locate the purpose of 
each instance of rhetoric. For example, in later entries of the Ming Shilu the Hongwu emperor 
frequently praised Yuan military preparedness and denigrated Song weakness, while in other 
entries he took fully antagonistic attitudes towards the Mongol conquest of China. In many cases, 
three spaces of contradiction or alignment suggest the seriousness – or flimsiness – of the 
rhetoric: 1) contradictory rhetoric between different entries in early Ming records, 2) 
contradictions between that rhetoric and Ming empire-building actions, and 3) contradictions and 
alignment between Ming imperial visions and pre-Ming (notably Yuan and Song) imperial 
visions. 
Another answer to the question of anti-Mongol rhetoric is to look at the precise language 
that Ming state actors used in each rhetorical circumstance, and how that language changed over 
time. Ming rulers used very specific language when discussing the Mongols and the Yuan, both 
in terms of the Yuan past and more recent problems with Mongols on the Ming northern frontier. 
They often differentiated between the Mongols and the Yuan. When the Yongle emperor (r. 
1402-1424) used peculiar language to describe the establishment of the Yuan dynasty (元以胡人
主中夏 “The Yuan used the Mongols to rule China”), he was deliberately suggesting that the 
Mongols were only one part of an overall legitimate dynastic empire, and thus a perfectly 
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acceptable period within China’s dynastic past.22 Ming rulers during the later part of the early 
period (from about 1424 to 1449) used a variety of language to describe their attitudes towards 
the Mongols, or towards different Mongol groups, or towards the political status of the Mongols 
in the Ming ecumene, a phenomenon examined in Chapter 4. The evolution of this language, and 
the circumstances of its use, help reveal the true purpose of the rhetoric, which often reveals that 
Ming state-building strategies followed in Yuan footsteps. 
Any study of the connections between the Yuan and Ming must include an analysis of 
military organization, for reasons I detailed in the historiography section above. While Hucker 
and others observed the wholesale re-application of Yuan military systems under the early Ming 
government, I go a step further and suggest there are also striking similarities between the 
strategic goals behind Yuan and Ming military actions, as well as the methods both states used in 
their attempts to accomplish those goals. This suggests that the Yuan had brought to China a 
whole new understanding of the northern frontier’s place within an empire, and introduced new 
methods for managing it. In order to make the case for these similarities, I will rely on the 
sources and modern literature to examine the strategic purpose behind the relocation of capitals 
in the Yuan and Ming, the organization of military fiefdoms under members of the imperial 
lineage, and the organization of soldiers and campaigns along the steppe frontier. 
This study is focused on northern China primarily because this is the area in which the 
Mongol legacy, and particularly Mongol Yuan state-building practices, were most keenly felt 
and had the greatest impact. The Yuan era reformulated the nature of strategic concerns along the 
northern frontier, shaping it into a transition zone much in the same way the Liao and Jin shaped 
the northeastern frontier. While interactions, tensions, and accommodations between sedentary 
                                                 
22 MSL, Taizong, juan 219, p. 2171. I explore this phrase further in Chapter 2, under the section titled, “The Politics 
of Historiographical Incorporation.” 
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societies in China and nomadic-pastoralist societies in the steppe had always been one of the key 
definers of policies and experiences (both of the state and the individual) along the northern 
frontier, the Yuan, at least for a time, eradicated this longstanding divide by creating a single, 
lasting empire across it. Early Ming military and strategic concerns were also mostly concerned 
with recapturing, pacifying, and incorporating this region, and the last major obstacle for the 
Ming to reconstitute the Yuan empire was the conquest of Mongolia, meaning that the northern 
frontier took on additional state-building and legitimating dimensions in the early Ming as it 
never had in the Han or Song. 
This dissertation does not discuss the northeastern or northwestern frontiers, beyond their 
role in early Ming attempts to rebuild Yuan lines of diplomatic communications with other 
states. I also do not discuss the coastal frontier in east China, Ming relations with Korea, or the 
southern and western frontiers, all of which presented their own unique challenges and created 
uniquely vexing problems for the Ming state, as well as complicating the lives of the people 
living there. Certainly, the Yuan empire changed how later states might approach, manage, and 
control these regions, but the preponderance of evidence I muster on Ming attitudes towards the 
Yuan past and Ming interpretations of Yuan state-building deals with the northern frontier. 
Material does exist on the same matter for other frontiers, but in the interests of maintaining 
some level of focus among the many avenues of inquiry this dissertation considers, I will remain 
concerned primarily with the north. 
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D. TERMINOLOGY AND DEFINITIONS 
 
 
This study focuses on a politically and ethnically fluid region of China, the northern steppe 
frontier. No single feature, geographic or man-made, demarcated a border between the early-
Ming state and the fractured post-Yuan Mongol polities in the steppe region. It was only in the 
late fifteenth and early sixteenth century that the Ming constructed the Great Wall as we know it 
today, and until then, the steppe frontier and northern China were in a constant state of flux. 
Therefore, scholars must be careful to define what we mean when we use terms like “China” and 
“empire,” as well as descriptors of populations like “Chinese,” “Mongol,” and even “ethnicity” 
in the pre-modern context. 
First, how should historians describe the Ming polity? Was Ming China an empire? The 
question of whether or not the Ming dynasty can be called an empire remains unanswered. Ming 
scholars (and scholars of China in general) refer to “empires” almost haphazardly, assuming that 
the large territorial expanse of most dynasties alone means that those dynasties were also 
empires.23 What is the relationship between Chinese dynasties and empires? Does “dynasty” 
imply empire? Does the fact that “empire” comes from a Western European historical and 
scholastic context mean the term is inapplicable to the Chinese historical experience? If the 
Mongol empire was an empire (and it was, or else the term itself becomes meaningless), but the 
Ming dynasty was not, does that change how historians should interpret the Yuan-Ming 
transition? In light of this, the question of what “empire” meant in China should come under 
examination, especially considering 1) the baggage attached to Latin roots of the term “empire” 
itself, and 2) the influence of nomadic steppe-based political forces upon China. The term has 
                                                 
23 See, for example: abstracts from Scaling the Ming: International Conference, held at the University of British 
Columbia, May 18-19, 2018. https://mingstudies.sites.olt.ubc.ca/files/2018/04/Scaling-the-Ming-2018-Abstracts.pdf  
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described polities across a great span of human history, from the Akkadian Empire of the late 
third millennium BCE to the interventionist activities of the United States in the post-Soviet 
unipolar world.24 It encompasses territorially large and contiguous states like the Mongol and 
Russian empires, maritime units like the Spanish and British Empires of early-modern Europe, 
multilingual and multicultural collections such as the united Habsburg domains under Charles V, 
and the cyclical resurgence of semi- or fully bureaucratized regimes in China. 
In the Chinese written language, “empire” (diguo 帝國) is a modern term originating in 
the nineteenth century, and to my knowledge, until very recently no scholars have seriously 
asked if any pre-modern East Asian political terms are equivalent to empire, or are appropriate 
for use exclusively in East Asian history. Timothy Brook initiated a re-examination of this issue 
in 2016, proposing that scholars should reintroduce “great state” (daguo 大國) in modern 
academic discussions of China’s imperial past and history of state formation.25 The states of 
Song, Yuan, and Ming all used the term “great state” in the form of da as a descriptor (e.g. Da 
Song 大宋, Da Yuan, 大元, Da Ming 大明). Earlier dynasties did so as well, but not to the same 
extent or with the same frequency. The latest work to examine the nature of large states in East 
Asia, and the relationships between East Asian states, is Sacred Mandates, which seeks to 
understand how political traditions in China and East Asia differed from those in the modernist 
European-based paradigm of international relations, and how political traditions among East 
Asian states differed from each other. Notably for the interests of this study, the departure point 
of Sacred Mandates is the Mongol empire and the thirteenth century, a polity that fundamentally 
changed ideas about state-building and rulership across Eurasia: “No successor state escaped the 
                                                 
24 See: Eric Robinson, “American Empire? Ancient Reflections on Modern American Power,” in Classical World 
99.1 (2005): p. 35-50. 
25 Timothy Brook, “Great States,” in The Journal of Asian Studies 75.4 (2016): pp. 957-972. 
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powerful shadow of these innovations.”26 This included China, and therefore it included the 
immediate successor of the Mongol Yuan dynasty in China, the Ming. 
Getting back to the applicability of “empire,” while questioning the haphazard 
application of “empire” to the Ming polity is an appropriate endeavor, I also ask the opposite 
question: why is it problematic to call the largest, most populous, and richest political entity in 
the fifteenth-century world an empire? If the answer is because the Ming dynasty was more 
culturally, ethnically, or politically homogenous than the empires of, say, the Ottomans or Spain, 
then that places the 80 million subjects and 2.5 million square miles of the fifteenth-century 
Ming in the same category as the 2 million subjects and 50,000 square miles of fifteenth-century 
England. As I suggest in Chapter 2 of this dissertation, large areas of China were likely 
ethnically and culturally diverse, particularly the northern frontier region (thanks to Mongol 
influences) and especially the southwest in what is today Yunnan and Sichuan (not covered in 
this dissertation), which were only sparsely settled and governed by the metropolitan core 
regions of the Ming. Thus, it seems appropriate that whatever definition of “empire” a given 
historian might choose, the Ming dynasty ought to be referred to as an “empire” thanks to its 
territorial size, population, diversity, multitude of governing methods in remote regions, and the 
effect of the Mongol legacy on Ming-era inter-state relations. 
The term “China” also requires definition. I use “China” to mean a geographical region 
roughly corresponding to what has also been called “inner China” or “China proper:”27 that is, 
the provinces of the modern People’s Republic except Tibet, Xinjiang, Qinghai, Inner Mongolia, 
                                                 
26 Brook et al., Sacred Mandates: Asian International Relations Since Chinggis Khan (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2018), p. 25-6. 
27 Surveys and textbooks continue the use of terms like “China proper.” See, for example: Patricia Ebrey and Anne 
Walthall, Pre-Modern East Asia to 1800: A Cultural , Social, and Political History, Third Edition (Boston: 
Wadsworth, 2014), p. 9. 
20 
 
Heilongjiang, Jilin, and to varying extents Liaoning. When I refer to China in the premodern 
period, I do not refer to a political entity, but this region whose major historical events have 
centered on the North China Plain, and which has been largely populated by sedentary 
agriculturalists. Ethnic/cultural labels like “Chinese” and “Mongol” are more difficult to pin 
down, and untangling ethnicity in pre-modern China is a challenging task. China’s long history 
and appearance of three millennia of unbroken continuity masks latent national primordialism in 
approaches to Chinese history. Most scholars today openly use the terms “China” and “Chinese” 
to describe all imperial dynastic states and their inhabitants, a simplification that most of those 
same historians readily acknowledge is problematic. Because modern China can lay claim to the 
vast majority of this history without having to dispel competitive arguments from other nation-
states, there exists no universal, alternative terminology or intellectual framework to analyze 
ethnicity in pre-modern China. Modern treatments of China’s past overtly or inadvertently 
presuppose development toward the Chinese nation-state.28 
 In this light, I have chosen to use Naomi Standen’s Unbounded Loyalty, a book on tenth- 
and eleventh-century Song-Liao relations, as the bedrock for my multi-century interpretation of 
cultural-ethnic identity transformations in China. Standen rightly describes the “concept of 
ethnicity” as “the greatest obstacle” in understanding tenth-century frontier studies. The political 
subjects of her study in Unbounded Loyalty – the Liao Dynasty and the Song Dynasty – have 
“routinely been described as Kitan and Chinese, labels that imply – however unintentionally – 
the existence of ethnic groups in the distant past that can accordingly serve as the roots of 
                                                 
28 See: Prasenjit Duara, Rescuing History from the Nation: Questioning Narratives of Modern China (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1995); and Morris Rossabi, “Chinese Myths About the National Minorities: the Case of 
Qubilai,” Central and Inner Asian Studies 1  (1987): pp. 47-81. 
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modern nations.”29 Standen carefully considers ethnic and cultural categories in her work. 
Without repeating all of her nuanced unpacking of the longstanding problems of ethnicity in the 
historian’s field, I shall instead offer her thoughts: 
Cultural identity may be felt or ascribed, by individuals or by groups, but it does not 
become ethnic identity until political meaning is ascribed to cultural differences in the 
context of a struggle for control at the level of the state… It is only when cultural identity 
becomes the basis for asserting or claiming advantage (social, economic, but above all 
political) that it becomes ethnicity. … In other words, ethnicity cannot exist in and of 
itself, but only comes into being when there are advantageous contrasts to be made.30 
 
Standen further warns that the historiography surrounding the “conquest dynasties” of the Liao, 
Jin, and Qing have framed the relationships between these states and “Chinese” states to their 
south along ethnic lines, particularly as han-hu 漢胡 relations (“Han Chinese” and “northern 
barbarians”). I agree with Standen’s assertion that “If one assumes that ethnic thinking was 
fundamental to these interactions, it is no surprise if you find it going on…” and I further think 
that, if such a problem is inherent in the study of “non-Chinese” states existing alongside 
“Chinese” ones, then the reverse is true as well.31 Studying the early Ming, which existed 
alongside the autonymic Northern Yuan (and its various successor groups) suffers from the same 
problem. Standen questions how applicable an ethnic framework of this manner is to Liao-Song 
relations, and for the same reasons, I also question its applicability to relations between the early 
Ming state and the fractured Mongol polities, as well as the early Ming relationship to its 
immediate Mongol past. In essence, I take Standen’s thoughts on cultural-ethnic identity in East 
Asia outside of the study of state-to-state relations and apply them to the study of a state’s and 
rulers’ own self-perceived history. 
                                                 
29 Naomi Standen, Unbounded Loyalty: Frontier Crossing in Liao China (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 
2006), p. 26. 
30 Ibid, p. 28-9. 
31 Ibid. 
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On the matter of proper terminology, I will take Prasenjit Duara’s warning and attempt to 
avoid using terms and narratives that imply the eventual formation of the modern Chinese 
nation-state. Just as Standen has done, I will attempt to maintain specific uses of terms like 
“Chinese,” “Khitan,” “Jurchen,” or “Mongol,” endeavoring to use them to describe cultural 
groups within the states of the Song, Liao, Jin and Yuan, and not the states themselves. This is an 
important measure because northern China was still home to many Mongols after the collapse of 
the Yuan dynasty, and Mongols served as military soldiers under the Yongle emperor, whose is 
the subject of a significant part of this dissertation. 
 
 
 
E. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
 
 
Chapter 1 goes back to the question of “empire.” It discusses how we can apply the term 
“empire” to early Ming China, and investigates the historical background of empire in East Asia. 
This is a particularly difficult question to ask because the word “empire” and the ideas associated 
with it necessarily come from Western contexts, experiences, and languages. Therefore, Chapter 
1 asks what “empire” meant for state-builders in China’s history. What did it mean for China’s 
pre-Yuan history? Post-Yuan? How did the Mongols change mental and physical constructions 
of empire in East Asia, and how did this change state-building practices in China? From here, the 
chapters examines post-Mongol imperial structures in a broader Eurasian scope in order to 
reconsider the centrality of the two notable phenomena examined in this dissertation: the 
construction of the Great Wall and the Tumu Crisis. Here, the chapter identifies two 
historiographical problems. First: the monolithic nature of the Great Wall in mythos, modern 
perceptions, and physical reality have overshadowed its more mundane and practical purposes. 
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Second: the modern Sinologist’s focus on the heavy Confucian, anti-barbarian rhetoric in Ming 
records of the Tumu Crisis inhibit our ability to think outside a strictly Sinological Chinese-
barbarian dichotomy. The solution is to look at the historiographies of other Eurasian empires 
that interacted politically and militarily with nomadic groups after the age of the Mongol empire. 
In the first case, I study the historiography behind strategic wall-building along steppe frontiers 
in early-modern Muscovite Russia. In the second case, I study the historiography behind the 
Ottoman-Timurid conflicts and Tamerlane’s victory over (and capture of) the Ottoman sultan 
Bayezid I (r. 1389-1403). 
Overemphasis on rhetoric suggests the Chinese historical experience with steppe nomads 
was unique, when it was not. By rejecting the Great Wall as a unique Chinese construction and 
symbol, we can consider the fortification-based steppe strategies undertaken by both the Ming 
and Muscovite states as fundamentally comparable, thus opening new possibilities of study for 
post-Mongol, early-modern Eurasian empires. We can take a similar steppe when comparing the 
Oirat victory and capture of the Zhengtong emperor in 1449 and the Timurid victory and capture 
of Bayezid I: by examining the differences in the political circumstances of China and Anatolia, 
and the different reactions to these crises made by the successors of Bayezid and the Zhengtong 
emperor, we can re-frame China’s relationship with the steppe not as one of fundamental 
incompatability and antagonism, but as one of rational choice among the options available to an 
established, wealthy, bureaucratic empire. This serves to create a framework for the remainder of 
the dissertation, one that avoids narrow Sinocentric approaches by 1) asking how the Mongol 
Yuan changed state-building in China, and 2) asking how scholars examining early Ming state-
building can use other historiographies and lenses to dislodge some of the most common 
Sinocentric biases. 
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 Chapter 2 delves into the visions of empire promulgated by Ming rulers and court 
officials in the early years of the Ming dynasty. The three best sources for this inquiry are legal 
codes, spatial representations (i.e. maps), and the formally organized court records of the Ming 
Shilu. An investigation of the legal codes of the Yuan and Ming, as well as the “non-Han” states 
of the Khitan Liao dynasty (907-1125) and the Jurchen Jin dynasty (1125-1234) suggests that, 
between the tenth and fourteenth centuries, empires in continental East Asia became ever more 
concerned with grouping their subjects based on cultural-political classifications. Ironically, 
while early Ming rulers promulgated codes designed to bury Mongol customs and reintroduce 
“Chinese” customs, the very legal framework behind cultural-political classifications derived 
from the administrative practices of previous “non-Chinese” empires, including the Mongol 
Yuan, the Jurchen Jin (1125-1234) and the Khitan Liao (907-1125). No such formalized codes 
existed in the Song dynasty. At the same time, an investigation of the earliest Ming map, the Da 
Ming Hunyi Tu 大明混一圖 (Amalgamated Map of the Great Ming) suggests that it represents a 
far more geographically open and expansive vision of empire more closely in line with the 
imperial depictions of Yuan maps than those of Song or later Ming maps. In conjunction with an 
analysis of imperial rhetoric in Ming analysis of China’s history, we can view how Ming rulers 
interpreted their relationship with the Yuan and Song, and the older dynasties of the Tang and 
Han.  
 Chapter 3 examines the Yuan origins of early Ming military systems and bureaucratic 
operations. Here I argue that Ming strategic concerns largely mirrored those of the Yuan, and the 
Ming made similar strategic decisions to solve similar problems. As established above, historians 
have long observed how the early Ming administration used Yuan military organization systems 
as models for their own, at times copying Mongol precedents wholesale. This chapter begins 
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with an overview of these systems, and returns to the connections between Yuan and Ming 
models, including military paths to high officialdom and the strategic imperatives behind the 
steppe campaigns of the Ming Hongwu and Yongle emperors. Chapter 3 also examines Yuan 
appanages and the early Ming princedoms, and argues that these two systems derived from 
similar strategic considerations with regards to how each maintained territorial security, stability, 
and the loyalty and efficacy of the dynasty’s military apparatus. Mongol Yuan appanages and 
early Ming frontier princedoms served similar roles in securing the military integrity of the 
empire, and represent an evolution in the imperial center’s thought on how to maintain strong 
regional militaries while avoiding the centrifugal diffusion of power away from the capital. In 
both cases, the establishment of the capital on the steppe frontier in northern China – modern 
Beijing – represented a geographical compromise between the need to govern the agriculturally 
and commercially productive central empire and the need to maintain steppe security. 
 Chapter 4 broadly looks at the era after the death of the Yongle emperor (r. 1402-1424), 
the last Ming ruler to lead or launch successful expeditions into Mongolia. Specifically, this 
chapter examines when and why Ming imaginations of empire became smaller and more 
territorially reserved than the expansive imperial vision held by the Ming founders. The Tumu 
Crisis of 1449, in which the Zhengtong emperor led an army afield and was defeated and 
captured by the Oirat Mongol warlord Esen, serves as a distinct marker of the low point of Ming 
imperial ability. After the Crisis, the Ming government commenced the centralized construction 
of what we know today as the Great Wall. Chapter 4 analyzes the Ming records surrounding the 
Tumu Crisis to determine if the rhetoric surrounding Ming imperial ambitions changed owing to 
military defeat, political emergency, and the dramatic changeover of leadership following the 
Zhengtong emperor’s capture. This event, then, marks the end of a broadly “post-Yuan” era of 
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the Ming empire, in which the Ming state bent both Mongol imperial ideals and structures 
towards recapturing the territorial prestige of the Yuan dynasty. 
 Chapter 5 aims to synthesize the work of the previous four chapters. Here, I construct 
new chronologies and frameworks for Ming history, and the place of the Ming dynasty in 
Eurasia and world history. The first chronology is a new narrative of the early Ming dynasty, 
emphasizing its relationship with the Yuan. The second is a discussion of how historians can 
approach state-building in post-Mongol Eurasia. The third is a discussion of the the place of the 
late Ming and Qing within two frameworks: late imperial China, and world history. These 
chronologies rewrite the history of empires and state-building in China, carefully considers the 
role of nomadic steppe polities as part of an integrative history of continental East Asia, and 
thoroughly integrates China into a larger world of post-Mongol polities following the collapse of 
the Mongol empire and the decline of its Mongol successor states. Instead of connecting Ming 
China to the world exclusively through the maritime silver trade, I build additional bridges 
overland and consider the Ming dynasty as part of a global phenomenon of post-Mongol empires 
and beyond. In analyzing the Mongol legacy in China, rather than skipping over the Ming to rush 
to the Qing, I continue this legacy through the early Ming years and regard the period between 
1500 and 1644 as the “outlier” period, rather than ignoring the Ming entirely as an inheritor of 
the post-Mongol Eurasian heritage. 
 In the end, this dissertation aims to reformulate the Ming dynasty’s place in the post-
Mongol world, re-center the Yuan as a transformative force in Chinese history, and connect the 
Ming dynasty to a larger early-modern Eurasian arena. The Manchu-founded Qing often appears 
in historiography as China’s Mongol successor state. The Ming occupied nearly three hundred 
years between the fall of the Mongol Yuan and the Manchu conquest of China. Surely the 
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Mongol legacy did not wait for a semi-nomadic people to reemerge in China when the time was 
right. If we are to properly consider the Mongol legacy in China, we must look for new ways to 
connect successive periods of history. 
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II. CHAPTER 1: IDEAS OF EMPIRE IN CHINA, MONGOL EURASIA, AND 
THE POST-MONGOL WORLD 
 
 
 
 
The complicated political history of China prior to the establishment of the Ming dynasty (1368-
1644) and the Mongol Yuan’s tenure of rule over China would suggest that the Ming must have 
inherited some portion of the imperial legacy of the Mongols. For much of the twentieth century, 
historians have assumed that the Ming was, on some level, isolationist and that the Ming court 
was xenophobic to the point of open hostility to the Mongol past.32 Historians recently have 
produced a significant body of scholarship in the last decade that complicates this 
interpretation.33 Concurrently, the production of world historical approaches to Chinese history 
has challenged older scholastic methods that take continental East Asia as a relatively insular 
unit, instead drawing fascinating and complicated connections between China and the rest of 
Eurasia.34 It is increasingly apparent that China’s numerous states did not develop – and could 
not have developed – for two millennia in isolation from Eurasian influences. It is also evident 
that, as was the case in some eras, lack of direct or indirect contact across Eurasia’s extremes 
does not preclude investigation of the similarities in imperial creations between China and 
                                                 
32 Sugiyama Masaaki, Mongoru teikoku no kōbō: Gunji kakudai no jidai (Tokyo: Kondansha, 1996), pp. 231-35; 
Sugiyama, Dai Mongoru no jidai (Tokyo: Chuo Koron Shinsha, 2008), pp. 248-51; Rossabi, “The Ming and Inner 
Asia,” pp. 246-58; and Miya Noriko, Mongoru jidai no shuppan bunka (Nagoya: Nagoya Daigaku Shuppankai, 
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elsewhere in Eurasia, or between the Ming and the Yuan. In light of this, the question of what 
“empire” meant in China should be reinterpreted, especially considering the baggage attached to 
Latin roots of the term “empire” itself, and the influence of nomadic steppe-based political forces 
upon China. 
This chapter asks two questions: 1) how did non-Chinese states and empires change 
forms and perceptions of empire in China, and 2) how can we look at the historiographies of 
other post-Mongol Eurasian empires to reinterpret Ming relations with steppe nomads and 
Eurasia at large? I will begin by retelling, as succinctly as possible, the long narrative of China’s 
imperial history. The difference in this narrative, however, is I will make significant room for 
steppe states, both those founded by nomadic groups as well as Chinese dynasties that ruled parts 
of the steppe. The first part of the narrative begins by looking at the pre-Yuan dynastic history of 
China, seeking the patterns and justifications of state-building that China’s rulers used prior to 
the Mongol conquest. I will discuss how the new ideas of empire in the Qin dynasty (221 BCE – 
206 BCE) solidified during the Han dynasty (206 BCE – 220 CE). Those ideas of empire then 
underwent radical, long-term transformations when nomadic political forces in northern China 
established empires that encompassed significant populations of both Eurasian steppe nomads 
and Chinese sedentary agriculturalists. These transformations continued during the Tang dynasty 
(618-907), whose rulers and statesmen built an empire based on unprecedented levels of nomadic 
incorporation, accommodative political strategies, and the combination of Eurasian steppe and 
Chinese models of sovereignty. After the fall of the Tang, Song-era ideas of empire became 
territorially smaller and culturally more exclusive, but the Song state was only one among 
several. Other contemporary empires, particularly the semi-nomadic Khitan Liao and Jurchen 
Jin, continued the previous millennium’s traditions of fused politics. Finally, the narrative 
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discusses the Mongol empire itself, and asks what empire meant for the Mongols and how their 
innovations influenced and altered previous patterns of empire-building in China. The Mongols 
created an unprecedented empire, the largest continuous land polity in human history. They also 
conquered the core agricultural territories of China and deployed a huge array of steppe political 
practices as a means of administering a vast, populous, and largely agricultural region with 
different cultural origins. Ideas of empire once more underwent change in twelfth and thirteenth-
century China, this time under the rule of the Mongol Yuan Dynasty. 
The second part of this chapter rewrites the narrative of Chinese history immediately 
following the collapse of the Yuan (i.e. the early Ming) by taking a Eurasian-wide lens, 
unseating embedded notions of Chinese-barbarian dichotomies, and situating the Ming imperial 
experience within a broader Eurasian context. Namely, I will look at a cataclysmic military 
conflict with steppe nomads: the Tumu Crisis of 1449 during which a Ming emperor was 
defeated and captured by a Mongol general, and the subsequent construction of the Great Wall. 
The fortifications you and I can visit outside of Beijing were built in the late fifteenth and early 
sixteenth century as part of a grand strategic project to provide an additional layer of defense 
against nomadic incursion. Sometime in the last five centuries, popular perception associated the 
Great Wall with an eternal boundary between the steppe and agricultural worlds, but recent 
scholars, particularly Arthur Waldron, have demonstrated that the physical object and the idea of 
“the” Great Wall did not exist until the late fifteenth century.35 While past Chinese empires did 
construct lengthy fortifications on the steppe frontier, they were not part of a grand strategy as 
they were in the Ming. Nonetheless, the Tumu Crisis and the Great Wall loom as enormous 
physical and mental phenomena in the history of Chinese steppe-sedentary relations. I wish to 
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take a new approach to understanding these phenomena. My approach is to look to the 
historiographies of two Eurasian land empires contemporary to the Ming: Muscovite Russia and 
the early Ottoman polity. By looking to other historiographies, I hope to unseat some of the still-
latent assumptions that Ming historians often hold when approaching relations between the 
sedentary agricultural and nomadic steppe worlds. My goal is to examine how historians of these 
regions have approached phenomena similar to those so ubiquitous in Chinese history: wall-
building as a defensive strategy against nomadic incursion, and the historiographical handling of 
military defeat at the hands of steppe nomads. The Muscovite state constructed long 
fortifications intended to protect the core of the polity (Moscow) against incursion from the 
Crimean steppe. The early Ottoman ruler Bayezid I (r. 1389-1402) fought against the powerful 
Turco-Mongol ruler Tamerlane, and was defeated and captured, leaving his realm in a state of 
crisis, similar to the state of the Ming after the Zhengtong emperor’s defeat and capture. 
 
 
 
A. EMPIRE IN PRE-MING CHINA 
 
 
1. WHAT IS EMPIRE? THE MODERN ACADEMIC DEBATE AND THE CASE OF 
CHINA 
 
 
In Chinese historiography it is easy to talk about the Han empire, the Tang empire, and the Song 
empire, – or even the “Chinese empire” – despite the fact that, as we will see below, these states 
functioned in dramatically different ways and whose rulers and inhabitants had different self-
concepts of what their political units meant. There is also the problem of the term “empire,” 
which is embedded in the European context and derives from the Latin imperium. The question 
of what we, living in the twenty-first century, should consider a historical or modern empire has 
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been addressed many times before. Michael Doyle described empires as “relationships of 
political control imposed by some political societies over the effective sovereignty of other 
political societies.”36 This bare-bones description, critiqued and expanded since then, permeates 
an aura of truth in a simplistic sense. It suggests, as Doyle describes in his work, the imposition 
of hegemony by one group over others, often with the retention of preexisting political structures 
in the subordinate group, resulting in the creation of a large and far-flung unity of disparate 
organizations all answering to a single source of power that maintains its position through 
military, political, and/or economic coercion. Some historical empires fall neatly into this 
description, like the Ottoman Empire, which was arranged in an ad hoc patchwork of provinces 
whose function, geography and administration changed depending on the strategic needs of the 
empire as a whole.37 Others, like the highly bureaucratized Song dynasty of China, appear to be 
constructions of more-or-less willing participants in the endeavor of empire, all of whom, 
according to dominant historiography, shared a Confucian cultural foundation that diminished 
the need to coercively include them into the state.38 
In recent years scholars have returned to empire. Charles Maier deconstructs and expands 
the classic definition of empire as “control by conquest or coercion” and “control [of] the 
political loyalty of the territories it subjugates.”39 In this classical sense, “an empire is 
characterized by size, by ethnic hierarchization, and by a regime that centralizes power but 
enlists diverse social and/or ethnic elites in its management.”40 For Maier, empires have three 
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major components: voluntary or semi-voluntary cooperation from transnational elites, military 
force, and ultimate collapse.41 In contrast, states that did not necessarily require the coercive 
incorporation of non-inclusive identities were perhaps not empires. According to Maier, this 
means that Japan, whose inhabitants “recognized themselves as a single people,” was not 
imperial until Japanese annexation of Hokkaido, Taiwan and Korea, despite the traditional 
translation of tennō and kōtei as “emperor.”42 The disjuncture between titles and political 
formations repeats itself in Europe, as Christian popes claimed the Augustian title Pontifex 
Maximus and all its imperial connotations after the collapse of the Roman Empire.43 Emperors 
do not make empire, and empires do not need emperors. 
 Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper further advanced the thesis of difference, describing 
empires as territorially expansive and expansionist polities that “maintain distinction and 
hierarchy as they incorporate new people.”44 Empires have historically been diverse but do not 
altruistically embrace diversity. They learned to “manage their unlike populations” as a means of 
finding ways to “both exploit and rule.”45 This thesis differentiates empires from nation-states in 
the intellectual – but not necessarily actual – sense, in that nation-states imagine their citizens as 
a culturally, linguistically, and/or politically homogenized body.46 Burbank and Cooper offer an 
explanation for why what we call empires have emerged and re-emerged over the past several 
thousand years, and why they seem to inevitably create hierarchies of difference: ambitious 
societies or leaders can only expand their own power (or the power of those they purport to 
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represent) at the expense of others, but not always in a process that completely disenfranchised 
those others.47 Empires inevitably incorporate unlike groups into their structures, and those 
empires whose systems fell apart did so because they failed to accommodate those groups (or 
their elites). Such failures tended to engender resistance to imperial structures. 
Turning to China, how applicable and relevant is the current academic debate over 
empire to the premodern dynastic polities? In these descriptions, the theme of domination by one 
group over others repeats itself, often with implicit or explicit structures of cultural hierarchy, 
and with the coercion or cooperation of elites. Empires also tend to experience entropy and 
collapse, especially if they do not negotiate with powerful constituents. Two long-held 
conclusions about China have vexed scholarly attempts to account for China’s imperial history in 
the global history of empires. First, as we will see below, in both Europe and China the 
foundational empires of those regions provided durable intellectual models for the ambitions of 
subsequent empires. However, in Europe the claimants to Rome’s legacy never again re-
established the vast territorial unit of the Roman Empire.48 In China, the heirs of Qin were 
successful in re-establishing more-or-less territorially similar polities over and over again, 
especially after the late sixth century, and permanently after the thirteenth. Second, the 
historiography of China suggests that China’s empires defy the diversity component of imperial 
theory. China, it appears, has always been Chinese (or even Han), and its inhabitants have since 
the Qin and Han Dynasties shared a common cultural tradition centered primarily on 
Confucianism, with elements of Buddhism and Daoism.49 
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Isolating the first millennium of China’s imperial history challenges the first conclusion. 
Between the founding of the Qin Dynasty in 221 BCE and the founding of the Song Dynasty in 
960 CE, 370 of those 1180 years (or about one-third) were eras of disunity. This calculation also 
generously grants the first part of the short-lived Chin dynasty50 (265 CE – 420) and the heavily 
decentralized Tang dynasty (618 CE – 907) after the An Lushan Rebellion in 755 to the 
“unified” category. The next three hundred years, from about 960 to 1279, hardly constitute one 
of “unity,” because the Song Dynasty existed alongside a variety of polities in what has been 
called continental East Asia’s first multistate system;51 and from 1127 the entirety of China north 
of the Huai River was governed by the Jurchen-founded Jin Dynasty. It was only after the 
unification-by-conquest of continental East Asia under the Mongols that what we call China was, 
for the most part, permanently unified in a single polity until the early twentieth century, and it 
was not until the Qing conquest of Tibet and the Zunghar Mongols in the eighteenth century that 
the borders of the modern People’s Republic more or less became what they are today. 
 The second conclusion is harder to challenge, because many scholarly works still 
describe a single “Han” people that made up most of the inhabitants of China’s successive 
empires in opposition to barbarian “hu.”52 Often scholars acknowledge that the term “Han” used 
ethnically is problematic, and even if it was employed in contemporary pre-modern records, it 
usually had a connotation of “civilization” as opposed to “barbarism,” but these scholars tend to 
fall back on the use of “Han” or “Chinese” as monolithic, with caveats admitting the 
                                                 
Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1995). 
50 Here I use the alternate Wade-Giles Romanization for “Jin,” to avoid confusion with the Jurchen-founded Jin 
Dynasty (1125-1234). 
51 See: Morris Rossabi, ed. China Among Equals: the Middle Kingdom and Its Neighbors, 10th-14th Centuries 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983). 
52 Liu Pujiang, “Shuo ‘hanren’: Liao Jin shidai minzi ronghe de yige cemian,” in Minzu yanjiu (1998:6), pp. 57-65; 
or Farmer, Zhu Yuanzhang and Early Ming Legislation, p. 4. 
36 
 
oversimplification.53 This has less to do with their own oversight and more to do with the fact 
that relatively few works attempting to break down and understand Han self-identity in pre-Qing 
periods have been produced. Nonetheless, it is evident that at least in the borderlands of China’s 
empires, imperial subjects were ethnically diverse, identity was fluid, and the metropole’s 
intellectual categorization of various “non-Han” groups broke down as oversimplifications 
themselves.54 China has not always been Chinese in all places. 
 I do not purport to offer an explanation for why empires have continually reformed in the 
geographic area we call China, nor why this phenomenon is virtually nonexistent anywhere else 
in the world.55 More informed scholars than I have offered various answers. Burbank and Cooper 
suggest that the ability of the state in China to tie elite fortunes directly to its own treasury and 
the capital, its ability to radiate centralized bureaucratic authority to the countryside, and its 
capacity to ensure elite resources did not derive from privately held estates, all encouraged a 
tradition of service to a unified realm rather than local interests outside the state’s purview.56 
Rosenthal and Wong argue that unique historical contingencies, including the frequency and 
nature of interstate war, account for the discrepancy between European fragmentation and 
Chinese unification.57 I also do not aim to break down the specifics of ethnic identity in any era 
of China’s history. Instead, as Chapter 2 will discuss, the Ming Dynasty was the intellectual 
inheritor of a long tradition of political history, Confucian tradition, and a recent tumultuous 
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history of Mongol rule. The cumulative textual experience that early Ming rulers and statesmen 
drew upon to fashion their empire had changed over time. The writers and thinkers of prior 
empires had filtered history through a narrow sieve of textual tradition. However, the chaotic 
nature of the Yuan-Ming transition and the lived experiences of the Ming founder and his 
successors were often so great as to overflow this sieve, even as Confucian literati strove to 
reconstruct an idealized model of civil governance in the fashion of antiquity. Empire meant 
something very different to its early Ming constructors than it had for their sources of inspiration, 
the ancient kings of the Xia, Shang and Zhou, and the Han dynasty. 
 
2. WARRING STATES AND QIN-HAN CHINA 
 
 
As mentioned in the introduction, the Mandarin term for empire, diguo, is a modern word. No 
single precise term or word exists in Classical Chinese that describes the consciously organized 
territorial polities of great size that continually reformed in Inner China.58 How did China’s 
empire-builders imagine empire? Something unique happened with the Qin, whose founding 
emperor knew he was building something new, and did not claim to be a successor of the Zhou 
beyond observing that he had surpassed its weak, decentralized model.59 But simply returning to 
the Warring States Period (5th cen. – 221 BCE) and the Qin-Han dynasties and examining 
records does not reveal further obvious answers. Michael Nylan has observed that, perhaps in 
response to the lack of clear terminology for “empire” in the official documents of the time, 
“modern histories routinely translate as ‘empire’ two terms – tianxia (‘All-under-Heaven’) and 
junxian (‘commandery/county’) – since both imply sovereign rule over extensive territories. 
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Neither term connotes temporary military power (unlike the Latin imperium), and the two 
compounds rarely appear together in the same essay or treatise.”60 We need a more nuanced 
approach. I will discard any attempt to find exact equivalents to the English “empire” (or the 
Latin imperium) before the Mongol empire. Instead, in addition to the terms tianxia (“All under 
Heaven” 天下) and junxian (“commandery and county” 郡縣), this chapter will also briefly 
consider hainei (“within the seas” 海內), its expanded version sihai zhi nei (“[the realm] within 
the four seas” 四海之內), and yitong (“to unify” or “unified” 一統). 
The political order of the Warring States and Qin-Han eras was part of a greater 
organized moral cosmos defined by tianxia, or All-under-Heaven.”61 Tianxia, in turn, referred to 
the “lands and activities under the beneficent supervision of the ancestors of the ruling house. … 
Thus, employment of the term tianxia always signals the author’s concern with the moral 
dimension of the authority [of the ruling house].”62 This concept, in the history that all educated 
officials and scholars understood in the Warring States era, recalled the moral ecumene of the 
Zhou Dynasty (11th cen. – 771 BCE),63 which had originally dispatched relatives of the noble 
house to settle and govern an expanded region beyond the “royal” territories of the Zhou 
dynastic state and its predecessors.64 The Warring States period earned its name from the 
subsequent generational weakening of ties between the Zhou and its cadet branches, and the 
Zhou’s gradual loss of power to its regional subordinates. By the 5th century BCE, open conflict 
among the various states signaled the final termination of actual Zhou authority, but not the 
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termination of its moral ecumene, tianxia, which continued to appear in records of the time, 
referring to the civilized world. 
The subsequent intensification of warfare spurred rapid centralization of power in many 
of the Warring States, sparking an arms race of bureaucratic reform. In this arms race, kings and 
states who failed to remove intermediary dukes and landlords in order to deepen state access to 
resources (particularly manpower to swell armies and grain to feed them) ultimately found 
themselves unable to compete, and ultimately subjected to conquest and annexation by more 
powerful states.65 Unlike tianxia, the second term listed above, junxian, describes these 
centralization efforts, and is therefore reflective of the nuts-and-bolts bureaucracy necessary to 
run a large, complex state. The term literally translates as “commandery-county” and explicitly 
refers to the territorial divisions within a given state created as a means of maximizing 
administrative efficiency. By the end of the Warring States era (3rd cen. BCE), the eventually 
victorious state of Qin had organized its territory into larger jun subdivided into smaller xian. 
The centralized power of the more militarily formidable states permitted them to circumvent or 
eliminate aristocrats and appoint bureaucratically selected officials to jun and xian. The final, 
rigorous implementation of this two-tiered system in the unified Qin realm created an empire 
organized not along ethnic or ad hoc lines, but along lines designed to facilitate administration 
and break up preexisting loyalties.66 
What serves as the ideal empire in ancient China? In China there existed a historical 
memory of several kingdoms that had once governed tianxia, but are not traditionally considered 
empires: the mythical Xia (21st cen. BCE – 16th cen. BCE), the Shang (16th cen. BCE – 11th cen. 
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BCE) and the Zhou. Yuri Pines argues that while the Zhou would later become a historical 
repository of ideal governance and good policy for later imperial states, in the early Zhou era 
there existed no idea of the “empire” that the Qin eventually created: 
[D]uring the Western Zhou period we may discern foundations of the later ideas of unity, 
such as the notion of universal ritual supremacy of the Zhou kings, their supposedly 
limitless authority within their domain, if not within the entire realm, laudation of 
territorial expansion and possible emergence of a view of the eternally present single 
locus of worldly authority. Nonetheless, all these do not suffice to conclude that a kind of 
‘quasi-imperial’ outlook emerged already during the early Zhou period. By the end of the 
Western Zhou period, as the dynastic rule disintegrated, we may discern voices of 
nostalgia for the past glory, but not proposals of the renewed unification of the present. 
 
The ideal of unification only emerged in the later Warring States era, a goal that many states 
entertained and that Qin completed. The philosopher Mozi (ca. 470 – 391 BCE) was the first 
political thinker to articulate this ideal in a historical sense, creating a narrative of past 
unification stretching from the Xia through the Shang and Zhou, a unity that, according to him, 
was lost among the “overlords” of the Warring States era.67 The continuation of this ideal of 
unity under sagely states and rulers became a strong current of later Confucian thought, 
embraced as a pillar of the state’s moral legitimacy in the Han dynasty.  
 
3. EMPIRE FROM HAN TO SONG, SEDENTARY AND NOMADIC 
 
If one were to generalize a narrative of ideas of empire after the first unification under Qin, it 
would change over time in tandem with the influence of Inner Asia on the China-Inner Asian 
frontier. That narrative begins with the solidification of sedentary agricultural empire under the 
Han dynasty, transforms with exposure to Inner Asian political practices and new forms of 
legitimacy during the following era of disunion, expands and transforms even more under Tang 
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dynasty cosmopolitanism and steppe-sedentary fusion, and then enters a period of crisis and self-
reflection during the territorially smaller and militarily challenged Song Dynasty. The following 
is an attempt to succinctly characterize the underlying transformations of empire between the fall 
of the Qin in 206 BCE and the end of the Song in 1279 CE. 
After brief unification under Qin, the self-proclaimed state of Han managed (with brief 
interruption) to rapidly reunify the territorial expanse of the Qin empire under a new 
government. The Han dynasty (206 BCE – 220 CE) lasted for over four hundred years, marking 
it as the longest-lived dynasty (according to the zhengshi) in China’s history. If ideas of empire 
were being expressed for the first time as “unity” just prior to and during the Qin dynasty, then 
empire-as-unity matured and solidified under the Han. According to Michael Loewe, “Early in 
Han, the idea of empire was still experimental; by 220, it was seen as the norm.”68 This 
experimental status is confirmed by the decentralized nature of the early Han state, which 
following the formal establishment of the Han dynasty ceded power to regional warlords and 
kings, particularly those in the eastern regions of the empire. Over the next century the Han court 
managed to mitigate the autonomy of its eastern governors by coopting them with material and 
titular gifts, replacing them with members of the royal lineage, or exerting central authority via 
military mobilization against the Xiongnu nomads of the north.69 Han state-building entered a 
new phase of “empire-making” that the Qin never had a chance to undertake: the unity of not 
merely territory, but of ideology and political authority. By the time Sima Qian wrote the Shiji 
(ca. 94 BCE), the use of tianxia, hainei and junxian had become unified in an imperial and 
conceptual sense: 
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秦王初并天下...今陛下興義兵，誅殘賊，平定天下，海內為郡縣...自上古以來未
 嘗有 
 
“The Kings of Qin first brought together All under Heaven… Now Your Majesty 
[Emperor Wu of Han] has arisen with the righteous army, punished the cruel and the 
deceitful, pacified All-under-Heaven [tianxia], and organized the world within the seas 
[hainei] into commanderies and counties [junxian]… From antiquity it has never been 
so.”70 
 
Unity, or yitong, had become the defining characteristic of empire in the Han era, combined with 
new forms of underpinning political ideology. Legalist71 philosophy had lost strength as a 
legitimating base of China’s first large-scale polity, but its main tenets remained, fused with a 
new Confucian foundation.72 The same basic functions of coercion, punishment, and reward 
perfected by the Qin remained in the Han era, tempered by Confucian moral underpinnings that 
provided a “façade of legitimacy.”73 A memory of pre-Qin warfare and bloodshed contributed to 
an intellectual environment that discouraged fragmentation, supported unification, and 
transformed the image of the ideal ruler from that of a tremendous conqueror to that of a 
peaceful benefactor.74 
 The tumultuous era after the fall of the Han created new repositories from which would-
be empire-builders drew both political structure and legitimacy. These new repositories were 
primarily generated by nomadic rule in the northern half of the former Han empire. After the 
Chin Dynasty (265 CE – 420) briefly ended the post-Han division of the Three Kingdoms era, 
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the Chin suffered a devastating civil war that loosened its control of the North China Plain and 
Gansu corridor region. Powerful nomadic groups – who lived in these regions, and did not 
“invade” in the classical sense – subsequently established their own kingdoms in the north, and 
many proclaimed imperial dynasties in the Qin/Han fashion.75 During this era, known as the 
Northern and Southern Dynasties, the Turkic Tabgach (Tuoba) state of Northern Wei (386-534) 
formed and expanded an empire that interwove Confucian-Legalist administrative bureaucracy 
with cosmopolitanism, military pragmatism and foreign inclusion encouraged by the plural 
nature of its social makeup.76 The Northern Wei was more than an empire that simply ruled over 
both Turkic nomadic groups and agriculturally-inclined Chinese; its rulers crafted what Chin-Yin 
Tseng and Jessica Rawson call a “dual presence” that mixed “the traditions and practices of the 
Chinese sphere and those of the Eurasian steppe.”77 The Northern Wei promulgated Chinese-
style laws, offered sacrifices at state-sponsored Confucian temples, adopted Chinese names, and 
mandated the use of the Chinese language at court. At provincial levels, the state mandated all 
medium-level offices hold three inspectors, one of whom had to be of Turkic descent.78 The 
emperors of the Northern Wei portrayed themselves in a tripartite form: as a Han dynasty-style 
benefactor and protector; as martial conquerors who engaged in peacetime activities like hunting 
and archery; and as the disseminator of Buddhist mercy. The latter two were new forms of 
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legitimation that bolstered rule by a new cultural group over a largely sedentary agricultural 
society.79 
 The Northern Wei was not the first state founded by nomads that attempted to bring 
together Chinese and Eurasian steppe models of rulership. Others, notably the Särbi (Xianbei) 
state of Yan80 based around modern Beijing (which was one of the many kingdoms that had 
arisen after the Chin civil war) employed such policies. But none prior to the Northern Wei had 
managed such a vast empire, or instituted active pursuit of “dual presence.” Modern 
scholarship’s understanding of the relationship between the Qin Dynasty and its nomadic 
northern counterpart, the so-called Xiongnu Confederation, remains murky, but neither Qin 
emperors nor Xiongnu chiefs appeared to adopt the political practices of the other in overt 
attempts to accommodate frontier populations. The same is true of the Han Dynasty and its own 
nomadic “counterpart,” the Särbi/Xianbei Confederation, who engaged in mutual military 
struggle numerous times, and of whom the latter demanded and received diplomatic superiority 
over the former in official correspondence in the early years of the Han.81 
 In contrast to Qin-Han relations with Eurasian steppe nomads, the tenure of Northern Wei 
nomadic rule over northern China had significant political consequences for interpretations of 
empire. Cultural plurality, an expanded political lexicon, and new strategies of diplomacy and 
warfare – all generated by nomadic rule in China – described the late-sixth-century reunification 
under first Sui (581 CE – 618) and then Tang rule. The royal house of the Tang dynasty (618-
907), the Li lineage, was of mixed Chinese-Särbi descent, a fact often overlooked but pertinent 
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for its explanatory power in Tang political history.82 The Tang empire expanded far beyond the 
borders of the Qin and Han, incorporating frontier nomads as Tang subjects. The Tang state 
arranged subject frontier nomads (and other “barbarians”) in special jimi (羈糜) prefectures. As 
Jonathan Skaff explains, the term jimi held particular connotations: 
The Chinese compound jimi literally means “horse bridle” and “ox halter.” The term 
suggests Tang administrative attitudes toward “barbarians,” in which Han are equated 
with “humans” who use bridles and halters to control ethnic groups who are analogous to 
beasts of burden. In addition, the differentiation of headgear of horses and oxen suggests 
the varied peoples that the Tang aspired to rule.83 
 
The Han Dynasty had engaged in similar practices on the northern frontier after Han Wudi’s 
victory over the Särbi, but Han-era jimi were generally left to their own devices, ruled by their 
own chiefs, and were subject to their own laws. Tang jimi were often (but not always or 
uniformly) taxed and administered more closely in line with “regular” Tang provinces, indicating 
a closer political relationship between the periphery and the center.84 
Militarily, Tang rulers and generals coopted Eurasian steppe practices with a willingness 
unseen in past empires in China. Tang armies deployed new military tactics and strategies as a 
means of effectively subjugating and coercing steppe nomads: they trained their own light 
cavalry and employed friendly nomadic auxiliaries, rather than attempting to supply and 
maneuver the ponderous infantry and heavy cavalry armies of the Qin and Han in steppe 
regions.85 The Tang court and its emperors highly valued military leaders and strategists who 
understood nomadic political and military practices, and who could apply that knowledge in 
pursuit of a greater Tang empire.86 Tang emperors also prepared displays of power designed to 
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speak to the Tang emperor’s place as both the huangdi of China and the heavenly qaghan of the 
steppe. After the armies of Tang Taizong (r. 626-649), the second Tang emperor, defeated and 
conquered the Later Türk Empire, Taizong gathered the chiefs of his enemies and brought them 
to the capital, who formally requested that Taizong take the steppe title of Heavenly Qaghan in a 
highly ritualized ceremony. Taizong replied that he would take the title alongside that of 
huangdi:  
四夷君長詣闕請上為天可汗，上曰：「 我為大唐天子，又下行可汗事乎」羣臣及
四夷皆稱萬歲。是後以璽書賜西北君長，皆稱天可汗 
 
The chiefs of the siyi [four barbarians] requested that the emperor take the title of 
Heavenly Qaghan. The emperor [Tang Taizong] said: “I am the Son of Heaven of the 
Great Tang, and also shall manage the affairs of the Qaghan.” The officials and chiefs 
together all called for [the emperor’s] long life. Thereafter [the emperor] with his royal 
seal bequeathed titles upon the northwestern chiefs, and they all hailed him as Heavenly 
Qaghan.87 
 
This carefully crafted observance performed in the manner of a steppe-style quiriltai, or meeting 
of chiefs to proclaim a ruler, speaks to Tang emperors’ identification of their empire as 
encompassing both the sedentary agricultural regions ruled by their predecessors and the steppe 
regions of the nomadic Türks, Tabgach, and Särbi.88 
 The Tang empire ceased overland expansion and abandoned inclusive imperial views 
after the An Lushan Rebellion of 755. An Lushan himself was of Sogdian descent, and his 
rebellion included the nomadic portions of the multicultural Tang armies. The memory of that 
civil war weighted heavily on the minds of empire-builders in the tenth century, especially that 
of the founder of the Song Dynasty (960-1279), Song Taizu (d. 976), who curtailed the 
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autonomous power of his military generals. His successors never deployed irregular nomadic 
auxiliaries as elements of the Song army, and maintained huge, expensive armies near the 
capital, fearful of potential rebellion in distant provinces. Song diplomatic historiography follows 
two major trends: 1) examination of the “international” multi-state system of the post-Tang 
world, in which the Song empire was merely one of several actors; and 2) analysis of the relative 
weakness of the Song military vis-à-vis its neighbors.89 Song maps, as we will see in the next 
chapter, depict a geographically bounded state surrounded by various barbarian groups, none of 
whom reside within the empire or were governed by the Song emperor. But the Tang legacy of a 
cosmopolitan, expansive empire remained, if we look to the states with which the Song shared 
continental East Asia. These are the Khitan-founded Liao dynasty (907-1125), the Jurchen-
founded Jin dynasty (1125-1234), and to a lesser extent, the Tangut-founded Xi Xia. 
I will make a quick aside before moving on with this historical narrative. It is difficult to 
pry the history of China between the tenth and thirteenth centuries from the grips of Chinese 
nationalist historiography. This is partly due to the nature of the production of history texts by 
successive imperial regimes. For much of Chinese history, stable and semi-stable regimes that 
claimed the Mandate of Heaven to rule China marked their claim as legitimate by producing a 
written history of immediately preceding empires, organized during the Qing as the zhengshi 
“orthodox histories;” as we will see in the next section, this was not always a straightforward 
process, for there could be multiple predecessors for whom a given imperial claimant might 
produce a written history. Modern interpretations of this narrative tend to omit the histories of 
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the Liao and Jin dynasties, instead privileging the Song Dynasty as the historical continuator of 
Chinese civilization.90 
By reinserting the Liao, Jin, and Xi Xia states into the history of mid-millennial China, 
the history of ideas of empire suddenly becomes much more nuanced, in the sense that nomadic 
influences never disappeared; and also much smoother, in the sense that earlier cosmopolitanism 
continued through the early second millennium. Liao was formally established in 907 by a 
Khitan chieftain named in contemporary records as Abaoji (阿保機) or Liao Taizu (遼太祖, d. 
926). Already this challenges traditional narratives that emphasize continuity through the Song, 
as the Tang collapsed in the same year as the Liao’s founding, while the Song was established 
only in 960. “Khitan” (Chinese: Qidan 契丹) is the term used to describe a nomadic people that 
lived in Northeast Asia, in the region between the modern borders of Mongolia and the northern 
regions of the Chinese province of Inner Mongolia. The early origins and political structures of 
the Khitans are obscure and not attested to in any extant records, but we do know that Abaoji 
managed to claim leadership of the Khitan tribes thanks to a combination of political savvy and 
military prowess (not unlike many Chinese dynastic founders). The Liao is of particular interest 
because, capitalizing on the contentious era following Tang collapse, its rulers extended Khitan 
control over a parcel of territory around modern-day Beijing, known in modern historiography as 
the Sixteen Prefectures. 
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By including the Liao in this narrative, the narrow vision of “China” implied by focusing 
only on the Song demonstrates weakness. The permeability of frontiers and political inclusivity 
marked early Liao-Song relations. Naomi Standen has researched in detail the frequent border-
crossings that educated elites and military leaders undertook to move from Song to Liao 
territory, and vice versa. It appears that among the border-crossers themselves, and the rulers 
who accepted them, no cultural stigma tainted what  itswould be considered under modern 
nation-state law to be treason. Political expediency motivated a ruler’s employment of skilled 
literati and military leaders, while the opportunity of service under competent rulers motivated 
the border-crossers’ willingness to change allegiance.91 These inclusive attitudes broke down as 
the Song state emerged as the dominant power near the end of the so-called Five Dynasties and 
Ten Kingdoms period (907-960), and claimed the Mandate of Heaven. Subsequently, warfare 
often punctuated Song relations with the Liao, but the Song state never expanded its borders to 
the extent of the Tang, despite numerous attempts to retake the Sixteen Prefectures territory 
around Beijing. Northern China, long a frontier region populated by diverse cultural groups, 
remained diverse and was now under the control of a decidedly non-traditional regime in the 
Chinese sense. 
In the early twelfth century, unrest in the eastern reaches of the Liao empire resulted in 
the collapse of the Liao and its replacement by a new empire, the Jurchen-founded Jin Dynasty. 
The Jurchens (Chinese: Nüzhen 女真) were a semi-nomadic forest-dwelling people who lived in 
modern Northeast Asia, and the ancestors of the Manchu. Initially subordinate to the Liao state, 
the Jurchens managed to leverage the unexpected success of their rebellion against the Liao to 
create an alternative well of political power around which other disaffected tribes gravitated. The 
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Jurchens’ rapid military victories against their former Liao masters catapulted them into a 
position of imperial lordship over the former Liao territories and the creation of their new Jin 
Dynasty. Despite an initial Song-Jin alliance designed to destroy their mutual enemy, Jurchen 
armies soon turned southwards and conquered much of northern China, pressing far beyond the 
former Liao frontier and seizing the whole of the region north of the Huai River by 1142. 
Already the differences between the Liao and Jin states are stark, in that the latter controlled 
much larger stretches of territory that relied on sedentary agriculture, and much greater 
populations of Chinese farmers and literati. Yet despite the rapid conquest of the north, there 
were still instances of former Song literati, officials and generals refusing Southern Song calls to 
migrate south of the Huai River – they were quite happy to remain in Jin territory, serve their 
new Jin masters, guard Jin garrisons, and administer the agricultural regions of the Jin empire.92 
The Jurchens, unlike the Khitans and Mongols, had practiced marginal agriculture and fishing in 
Northeast Asia, and so perhaps were more willing to adopt Chinese administrative practices, just 
as their new subjects were more willing to accept Jin rule.93 
Among the Song, Liao, and Jin, the Tangut state of Xi Xia (or Western Xia) managed to 
maintain its independence for nearly two centuries between its founding in 1038 and its 
assimilation by the Mongols in 1227. Occasionally labeled an empire, Xi Xia’s center of power 
resided in the Ordos region and the Gansu corridor.94 Certainly, like the other polities that 
existed in multistate eleventh-century East Asia, the Tangut rulers governed ethnically and 
culturally diverse subjects (as empires often do), but the Xi Xia itself survived largely as a vassal 
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of first the Liao, then the Jin, and then the Mongols – but never the Song. The Xi Xia fought to 
secure its survival, first by waging war against the Song to maintain its independence, then 
offering tribute, royal marriages, and vassalage to the Liao, Jin, and Song, and finally by seeking 
alliance (not vassalage) with the Song against the Mongols. The fact that the Xi Xia was never a 
Song subject cements the idea that, if we are to look for empires in China between the tenth and 
thirteenth centuries, we should look at the Khitans and Jurchens first. 
What is the takeaway of this vast and rapid telling of China’s geopolitical history? It 
suggests that if we re-insert nomadic and semi-nomadic states into the narrative of post-Qin 
China, we see a political trend in which the ideas and state-building practices of empire 
encompassed frontier peoples, and political expediency was valued over cultural purity. 
Confucian moralists who emphasized the rigidity of borders and the incompatibility of civilized 
and barbaric customs may have improved their influence at court after the Tang-era An Lushan 
Rebellion, and dominated political discourse in the Song bureaucracy, but this interpretation 
privileges views that fail to look beyond reified state borders.95 Although continental East Asia 
in the post-Tang era had become politically sundered, and the ideal of unity found less concrete 
foundations than it had in the past, inclusive imperial visions remained a reality. This was not the 
end of actual political unity, however. In the mid-thirteenth century, the Mongols swept out of 
Inner Asia, forever changing the political and intellectual landscapes of empire in China, and 
generating entirely new ideas of empire that outmatched all prior ideas in their intellectual and 
geographic scope. 
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4. MONGOL IDEAS OF EMPIRE 
 
 
The unprecedented accomplishments of the Mongols transformed China and the world. The 
Mongols themselves introduced a new scope of empire to China, and directly connected distant 
regions of Eurasia for the first time. Mongol political organization itself, too, was altered by 
exposure to Chinese methods and ideas of administration and empire. Three important changes 
to ideas of empire occurred in East Asia: 1) the creation of universal empire in military terms, 2) 
growing overlap between military and civil administration, and 3) the fundamental and 
ultimately long-lasting fusion of steppe-style administration with the political considerations and 
imperatives of sedentary agricultural empires.96 
 
a. MONGOL UNIVERSAL EMPIRE AND MILITARY POWER In Eastern Eurasia the 
Mongols extended their reach over the entire subcontinent, conquering and incorporating a large 
number of culturally and politically diverse regimes that had existed in a multi-state system since 
the late tenth century. These included Song, Liao, Jin, and Xi Xia, as well as the Dali Kingdom 
in modern Yunnan Province, disparate kingdoms in Tibet, and the Koryŏ Dynasty on the Korean 
peninsula. The early history of the Mongols does not bear repeating here. By the early thirteenth 
century, Chinggis Khan had become the sole ruler of the Mongols and launched several 
campaigns against the Jurchen Jin dynasty. In 1234 the Jin fell to the Mongols, who 
simultaneously expanded west into Central Asia. Successive rulers of the Mongol empire 
launched numerous campaigns against the truncated Song state south of the Yangzi River 
between the 1230s and 1270s. The fifth Mongol khan, Khubilai, took ideological and military 
steps to expand his empire. In 1271 he proclaimed the founding of a Chinese-style dynasty, the 
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Yuan, and in 1273 his armies seized the strategically critical city of Xiangyang. By 1279 the last 
Song holdouts surrendered or succumbed, and the Mongols secured their rule over continental 
East Asia. 
The rapid pace of Mongol conquest was facilitated by the great advantage that steppe 
cavalry archers enjoyed over heavy cavalry and infantry on open battlefields, the Mongols’ 
innovative military structures, the successful capture and redeployment of defeated soldiers, the 
reputation that preceded them, and the incorporation of new forms of military tactics and strategy 
when they proved useful in achieving Mongol goals. In particular, as Chinggis Khan was 
consolidating his rule over the Mongol tribes, he organized his soldiers along decimal lines, 
rather than according to kinship ties, as a means of breaking old political allegiances and 
replacing them with loyalty only to Chinggis himself. Perhaps the most oft-cited example of 
incorporation of successful tactics into the Mongol military encyclopedia is the movement of 
Arab siege engineers from western Eurasia to China, where they constructed trebuchets to assist 
Khubilai Khan’s campaigns against the Southern Song.97 
The continuous success of the Mongol conquests, both in China and Inner Asia, 
expanded and changed ideas of empire. The Mongol realm came to be defined as consisting of 1) 
states that had submitted and/or been defeated, and 2) states that had yet to submit or were 
rebellious. Once the united Mongol ulus, or state, had come into being under Chinggis Khan, no 
other ulus legally existed; China’s past uluses (dynasties), as well as the uluses of other parts of 
Eurasia, became communities, or irgens, and were subjects of Mongol empire regardless of their 
actual status.98 Early Mongol rhetoric did not make room for foreign lands outside Mongol 
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control, except in the sense that they were illegally rebelling from Mongol overlordship.99 In her 
investigation of Mongol historiography and the History of the Yuan (Yuanshi, ca. 1370s), 
Francesca Fiaschetti links the Classical Chinese term waiyi (“foreign”) to the Mongol term bulga 
irgen (“rebellious people”), suggesting that extant Chinese concepts of All-Under-Heaven, which 
under previous dynasties had ideological components that were not reflected in expansionist 
pursuits, became transformed into a real pursuit of universal empire that left no room for 
elements politically outside the Mongol domain.100 Subjugation, maintenance of stability, and 
quashing rebellion were in turn carried out by the application of military power. “Foreign” 
regions of the Mongol empire were classified in military terms: either by their strategic necessity 
in carrying out ongoing or future campaigns (such as the use of Korea as a staging ground for the 
invasion of Japan), or according to whether or not a given region’s rulers had voluntarily 
submitted to the Mongols. Rebellion placed one unlawfully (and only temporarily) outside the 
qaghan’s power. The Secret History of the Mongols speaks to this worldview: 
By the strength of eternal Heaven and the good fortune of my uncle the Qa’an [Qaghan] I 
have destroyed the city of Meget, I have ravaged the Orosut people and brought eleven 
countries and peoples duly under submission. […] So, just as the time when, having been 
sent to ride against a rebellious people of a different race, we were asking ourselves 
whether we had been successful. Büri and Güyük spoke to us in this way and we parted 
in disaccord.101 
 
Thus Mongolian world order became “strongly influenced by criteria of usefulness and loyalty to 
Mongolian rule.”102 
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That loyalty, still in a military sense, served as an organization of hierarchy in the 
Mongol Empire. Socially and politically, peoples and polities that submitted first to the Mongols 
were treated more favorably. This was later reflected in the legislative structures of the Yuan 
Dynasty, wherein Inner Asians were given privileges over Chinese, even in the Yuan Dynasty’s 
hybrid Mongol-Chinese administration (a phenomenon that will be explored in the next chapter). 
The first non-Mongols to submit to Chinggis Khan were the Uighurs, who not only enjoyed the 
privileges of having submitted voluntarily, but whose ruler at the time, Barchukh Art Tegin (r. 
1208 – 1235), was the only non-Mongol to be granted honorary status as Chinggis Khan’s son.103 
In contrast, Khubilai Khan (r. 1260-1294) berated King Wonjong of the Korean Koryŏ Dynasty 
for his recalcitrance: 
汝內附在後，故班諸王下。我太祖時亦都護先附，即令齒諸王上，阿思蘭後附，故
 班其下，卿宜知之. 
 
You [Wonjong] submitted later, therefore you are ranked low among the kings. During 
the reign of our Taizu [Chinggis Khan], the Iduq qut [Uighurs] were the first to submit; 
therefore it was ordered that [their king] be ranked first among the kings. Arslan [king of 
the Karluks] next submitted; therefore [he] was ranked below [the Uighurs]. You ought to 
know this.104 
 
The Uighurs, Karluks, and other Turkic tribes enjoyed great status and high position throughout 
the Mongol Empire, but particularly in Yuan China. They served as advisors to Chinggis Khan’s 
successors – Khubilai especially – and received the majority of the Chinese jinshi examination 
degrees awarded to Inner Asians.105 
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 The name(s) of the Mongol empire and its branch in China characterize these measures. 
The Mongol state itself took on a new name: the yeke Mongol ulus, or “Mongol Great State,” a 
title whose use suggested that the Mongols themselves understood the unprecedented 
accomplishments of Chinggis Khan and his descendants. The earliest appearance of the term is 
from 1240, prior to which the Secret History of the Mongols tells us that the Mongol polity was 
simply called the Mongol ulus, or the “Mongol state.”106 This transformation from a unified 
polity of loosely affiliated Mongol tribes to a force that conquered and bound together a variety 
of different subjects from multiple ethnic and political traditions tells us that the Mongols 
understood the vast nature of empire they had created. This legacy remained potent for several 
centuries afterwards. A 1346 stone inscription, written in both Chinese and Mongolian, praised 
the world-empire that the Mongols had built: 
“After the world and [its] people had been in chaos from time without beginning to the 
present, [Chinggis] Qans was born and vanquished the idle sovereigns of foreign realms. 
[Having founded] the Mongol Great State, he picked up [the myriad countries] as if they 
were fallen leaves.”107 
 
In China, Khubilai viewed his Yuan dynasty, or Da Yuan, “as a Chinese way of expressing yeke 
Mongol ulus, that is, the entire Mongol empire embracing the Eurasian continent.”108 The full 
Mongolian name for the Yuan empire in China was the Dai Ön kemekü Yeke Monqol ulus, or the 
“Great Yuan Mongol Great State, a form that fused the Chinese da, or “great,” modifier with the 
Mongol yeke modifier.109 The justification that the Mongols had conquered and united all under 
Heaven was fused with the precepts innovated by the Qin dynasty, of having brought together 
All-under-Heaven, which was no longer just China, but the known world. Khubilai 
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simultaneously presented the Mongol Yuan as a Chinese-style dynasty (for the benefit of the 
Yuan’s Chinese subjects), and, in his imperial worldview, incorporated China into the larger 
Mongol empire. 
 
b. OVERLAPPING CIVIL AND MILITARY ADMINISTRATION The overtly 
militaristic nature of early Mongol empire-building reflected itself in Mongol administrative 
practices. The synonymous nature of civil and military functions was not itself a new Mongol 
style of government, but one adapted from Northern Wei, Liao and Jin practices, and expanded 
to great effect under the Yuan Dynasty.110 Pre-Yuan dynasties in China did have military officers 
serving in civil positions, and civil officials before and after the Mongol conquest often served as 
military commanders, but the Mongol synonymity between the two was nearly absolute. The 
consolidation of Inner China under Khubilai Khan’s Yuan Dynasty extended this overlap beyond 
the Yangzi River into southern China for the first time. The “militarization” of civil offices had 
occurred to some extent after the An Lushan Rebellion in the Tang Dynasty, but that was more a 
function of the degradation of centralized power and the inability of the Tang court to prohibit 
regional military governors – to whom the court had ceded significant autonomy in exchange for 
support against An Lushan – from exercising their own power in civil spheres and authorizing 
their subordinates to do the same.111 Thus the primary difference between Tang administration 
on one hand and Northern Wei, Liao, Jin and Yuan on the other lies in the regionalization of 
power. Tang militarization occurred regionally outside the auspices of court control.112 For the 
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Wei, Liao, Jin, and especially the Yuan, the militarization of government was a conscious policy 
decision that served particular purposes. 
These policies are most evident in the Yuan, whose rulers and statesmen faced the 
challenge of ruling a massive sedentary agricultural population with a relatively tiny “elite” of 
Mongols. Accurate figures are difficult to calculate, but estimates based on a 1290s census 
suggest the Mongol population of China was around 1 million, while the Chinese population 
stood around 70 million.113 In order to fill its offices, the Yuan state forwent the Song dynasty 
examination system, which favored Chinese elites educated in the Confucian classics and literary 
skills. Instead, the Yuan promoted clerical and military routes to high office. This policy had two 
purposes: 1) it rewarded those with practical military and administrative skills that the Yuan state 
deemed important for dynastic maintenance, and 2) it ensured that Chinese would not dominate 
government offices and potentially erode the social and political position of Mongols in the Yuan 
empire.114 The holders of higher regional offices, particularly the branch secretariats (xing 
zhongshusheng 行中書省) who governed several provinces, managed both civil and military 
affairs, and were in turn managed according to the importance of military actions occurring in 
those provinces.115 Even as some measure of “Confucanization” took hold in late Yuan policy-
making and empire management, the civil and military spheres remained overlapping, as did the 
cultural makeup of their office-holders. Court factions did not appear to favor militaristic or civil 
approaches, or their formal separation, but were made up of both generals and scholars, who 
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were not only Chinese but also Turkic, Mongol, and representatives of many Inner Asian 
peoples.116 None of these formal administrative functions covers the princely appanages of royal 
Yuan family members, which the khan granted to relatives. The relationship between 
appointed/recommended officials and the princely appanages remains unclear, but it is at least 
evident that Yuan officials within them managed affairs at the discretion of either the Yuan 
khan/emperor or their immediate prince, and not the affairs of civil or military matters alone.117 
Mixed civil-administrative government extended to diplomatic affairs. As discussed 
above, the Mongol Empire and its Yuan successor viewed the world as made up of submitted 
states and states that had not yet submitted or were rebellious. It should therefore be no surprise 
that military forms of administration managed approaches to foreign regions and kingdoms. 
Fiaschetti has identified the frequent and repeated use of terms like “attack,” (gong 攻) “pacify,” 
(fu 撫) and “conquer,” (zheng 征) in relation to regions outside the empire, regardless of whether 
or not they were antagonist states.118 As an example, the administrative unit that governed Korea 
was a branch secretariat titled, “The Provincial Office for Attacking the East and Other Places” 
(zhengdong dengchu xing zhongshusheng 征東等處行中書省).119 In the context of the attempted 
Yuan invasions of Japan, this form of governance makes sense: Korea was to serve as a staging 
point for the preparation and launching of the naval armada, particularly the island of Jeju, where 
the semi-autonomous kingdom of Tamna served as a critical maritime base for the projected 
campaign.120 
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c. THE FUSION OF STEPPE AND SEDENTARY IMPERIAL WORLDVIEWS In 
addition to the militarization of government in China described above, Chinese political 
traditions and geopolitical worldviews altered Yuan imaginations and approaches to empire. 
Perhaps the most important for the modern historian’s consideration of the Yuan Dynasty is the 
Yuan adaptation of state-sponsored historical writing. China’s long and plethoric history of the 
production of state-crafted history texts is simultaneously a blessing and obstacle for twenty-first 
century researchers. It offers a huge amount of relatively easily accessible source material, but 
those materials have been filtered through two millennia of alterations and censorship performed 
for the legitimizing purposes of particular states. 
When the Mongols, having overwhelmed the Jin, finished their conquest of the Southern 
Song, their rulers wished to insert themselves into the historical continuity of China as a means 
of legitimately establishing the Yuan along an imagined continuity. This continuity radiated from 
the first unifications of the Qin and was passed along, in the minds of Mongol rulers and 
statesmen, by its own predecessors. But it faced a problem in that its statespeople and thinkers 
were unsure which state – among the Song, Liao, and Jin – it should posthumously consider the 
true bearer of legitimate succession and unified continuity, and thus for whom it should write an 
“official history” (zhengshi 正史) to mark that legitimacy. An answer was proposed in the 1340s 
by a scholar of Turkic descent, Tuo-tuo, who suggested writing histories for all three: 
這三國為聖朝所取制度、典章、治亂、興亡之由，恐因歲久散失，合遴選文臣，分
史置局，纂修成書，以見祖宗盛德得天下遼、金、宋三國之由，垂鑑後世，做一代
盛典. 
 
These three kingdoms had been taken over by our holy regime. Their statutes and 
institutions, [circumstances of] governance and disorder, and the causes of their rise and 
fall may vanish as time goes by. Together, [our] selection of officials, division of the 
annals, establishment of offices, and the chronicling of their histories will reveal the glory 
and virtue of our ancestors and the reasons for our succeeding to the Liao, Jin and Song 
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as inheritors of All under Heaven. These will serve as a mirror for later generations, and 
will be the great work of our dynasty.121 
 
This practice of adopting local modes of government and legitimization was not unique to the 
Chinese component of the Mongol empire, as Mongol rulers and statesmen undertook similar 
projects in Persia and the Islamic world, where there also existed established historiographical 
traditions.122 The monumental task of writing the histories of the Song, Liao and Jin – which 
took a mere three years – served to “accommodate the Mongol conquerors within the Chinese 
dynastic order,” and explain how the Mongols were able to use military power to unify China.123 
Yuan incorporation of Chinese political traditions extended to the policy of managing 
regions outside the Yuan empire itself where, like in Han and Tang jimi prefectures, the Mongols 
desired to use local elites as a means of avoiding complications. 
雲南土官病故，子姪兄弟襲之，無則妻承失職。遠方蠻夷，頑獷難制，必任土人，
可以集事。 
 
When an aboriginal official in Yunnan sickens and dies, his son, nephew or brother 
inherits his position; if such does not exist, the wife takes the husband’s official post. 
These distant barbarians are wayward, uncivilized and difficult to govern, so we must 
employ local persons if we are to accomplish anything.124 
 
Mongol efforts to legitimize Yuan rule with Chinese political traditions continued and intensified 
over the course of the Yuan, especially as social unrest and infrastructural failures plagued the 
empire in its later years. By stressing the Yuan empire’s ability to unify All under Heaven, they 
coopted Chinese elites and literati, who often found reason for Mongol legitimacy in Mongol 
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application of military power for the purposes of unification.125 In the 1330s onward, shakeups in 
capital-level government offices were increasingly described in Confucian terms – genghua (更
化) or “transformation” in a Confucian sense – even when those shakeups were carried out in 
tanistric fashion, settled with armed clashes in the palace or even outright warfare between 
contenders for the Yuan throne and their supporters.126 
 The fusion of Mongol and Chinese political practices found its ultimate expression in the 
Yuan shift away from a steppe-centered model of rule to one centered in the agricultural regions 
of China. Khubilai Khan’s movement of the capital from Karakorum in Mongolia to Dadu (now 
modern-day Beijing) was in keeping with this shift, and was the result of a careful calculation of 
political and military resources. John Dardess explained the dilemma facing early Yuan rulers: 
“Was it more advantageous to control the agrarian realms from a power center in the steppes, or 
to control the steppes from a power center in the agrarian realms?” Khubilai’s decision for the 
latter opened up the resources he needed to crush steppe-based pretenders to the Yuan throne (a 
chronic problem facing all Mongol rulers), but it also described the incorporation of Chinese 
traditions into Mongol imperial administration.127 Eventually Mongolia itself, the homeland of 
the empire that the Mongols had constructed, was reduced to a Chinese-style province, sparsely 
administered yet rigidly overseen in order to ensure the security of the China-based Yuan 
Dynasty.128 This political move, as we will see in Chapter 3, mirrors quite closely the strategic 
policy of the Ming Dynasty. 
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B. RETHINKING THE EARLY MING NARRATIVE IN A EURASIAN 
FRAMEWORK 
 
The classic story of the early Ming dynasty reads as follows. The Yuan dynasty collapsed in the 
mid-fourteenth century due to three major factors: 1) the decline of Yuan military power, thanks 
to decades of mismanagement and graft; 2) infighting within the highest echelons of the Yuan 
government, exacerbated by repeated succession crises which often resulted in tanistric conflict; 
and 3) the politically-motivated dismissal of the most capable members of the Yuan 
administration and military, who may have otherwise been able to put down Chinese peasant 
rebellions.129 In the resulting vacuum of power, regional Chinese and Mongol strongmen 
established their own powerbases, governments, and armies. They challenged Yuan sovereignty 
and, in many cases, declared their own dynasties.130 One such movement was a Buddhist-
inspired group of rebels known as the Red Turbans, and within their ranks rose a charismatic 
orphan named Zhu Yuanzhang, who served as a military commander, scored numerous victories 
against Yuan forces and other regional warlords, and eventually seized control of the Red 
Turbans.131 Zhu soon conquered his rival warlords, defeated the Mongol Yuan forces sent 
against him, and established the Ming dynasty with its capital in Yingtian (modern Nanjing). He 
took the reign title Hongwu 洪武, or “vastly martial,” a name intended to demonstrate the 
military strength of his new state. The Hongwu emperor attempted to attack the remnants of the 
Yuan court, who had fled into Mongolia, but the Mongols managed to defeat the armies he sent 
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northward. Following several similar defeats, the emperor gave up on his ambitions to conquer 
the Mongolian steppe and over the thirty years of his reign settled into a defensive policy, 
enfeoffing his sons at strategic points across Ming territory, but specially placing his oldest and 
most well-trained sons in fiefs along the northern steppe frontier, each commanding several 
thousand garrison soldiers to defend against Mongol incursion.132 According to the classic 
narrative, these were the beginnings of the Great Wall. 133 In domestic affairs, the early Ming 
state under Hongwu passed laws discriminating against Mongol customs and styles of dress, and 
the emperor blamed Mongol corruption for the collapse of the Yuan dynasty.134 
 After the Hongwu emperor’s death in 1398, his young and inexperienced grandson 
ascended to the throne as the Jianwen emperor, but Jianwen’s reign was short-lived. The 
Hongwu emperor’s fourth son, Zhu Di, served as a powerful enfeoffed prince in modern Beijing. 
With a great number of soldiers under his command (including Mongol cavalry), he launched a 
civil war to take the throne by force, and in 1402 captured Nanjing (his nephew likely dying in 
the process) and took the reign title Yongle 永樂, or “perpetual happiness.” The Yongle emperor 
adopted a more direct and aggressive policy on the frontier, launching five massive, expensive 
military campaigns into the steppe with the goal of ending the remaining Yuan pretenders and 
conquering Mongolia. He also meddled in inter-tribal Mongol relations in order to keep the 
Mongols divided and improve the safety of the frontier. When the Yongle emperor died in 1424, 
however, Mongolia remained firmly outside Ming control.135 
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 Ming interest in the steppe declined after the Yongle reign. The Ming stopped interfering 
in Mongol internal relations, and as a result, by the 1440s a Mongol general named Esen 
managed to unite the fractured Mongol groups, brought the Hami kingdoms (northwest of the 
Ming) under his sovereignty with the threat of force, and extended his military influence east 
nearly to Joseon Korea. The prospect of a reunited Mongol power on the Ming border frightened 
Ming emperors and statesmen. The sixth Ming ruler, the young and inexperienced Zhengtong 
emperor 正統, decided to personally lead a campaign into the steppe to defeat Esen and break up 
Mongol power. Esen, however, soundly defeated and destroyed the Ming army and captured the 
Zhengtong emperor near a fortress called Tumu. The ensuing political emergency in the Ming 
was thereafter known as the Tumu Crisis. This disaster cemented the already existing Ming 
isolationist attitude, and in the classic narrative, reflects traditional Chinese relationships with 
nomadic steppe groups: one in which China was always on the defensive in the face of nomadic 
aggression, and which regarded offensive campaigns as a foolhardy waste of materials, 
manpower, and money. 
 This is a common narrative, both in twentieth-century scholarship and popular retellings 
of Ming history, and recent scholarship on the Yuan-Ming transition has not yet constructed a 
coherent alternative version more valuable to the modern scholar.136 However, by taking a 
Eurasian wide-lens and observing how other post-Mongol polities across the continent managed 
and interacted with steppe nomads, a new picture emerges. Ming approaches and attitudes 
towards the Mongols and steppe nomads were not unique to the Chinese historical experience, or 
a result of Chinese “strategic culture.”137 Instead, Ming strategies in dealing with the Mongols – 
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namely, building long strategic fortifications like the Great Wall, or maintaining a purely 
defensive posture after the Tumu Crisis – were quite rational and understandable moves for the 
Ming state to make, given its position and available resources. We will briefly look at two 
Eurasian phenomena in order to re-situate China’s historical experience with the Mongols: 
Muscovy Russia’s practice of building strategic walls and fortifications to defend against 
Mongol incursion, and Ottoman reactions to military defeat at the hands of Tamerlane. 
 
1. MUSCOVY, STEPPE RELATIONS, AND STRATEGIC WALL-BUILDING IN 
RUSSIA, 1450-1650 
 
 
Following the Mongol conquest of Russia in the mid-thirteenth century, the Mongols rendered 
the Grand Duchy of Moscow, as well as its sister Rus duchies and principalities, into tributary 
states under the Mongol empire. The Rus experience under Mongol rule reflects the most 
common, if generalized, stereotypes of Mongol occupation practices: the Mongols did not settle 
Russia or attempt to radically change Russian religious, political, or social practices, instead 
extracting resources by conscripting manpower through tributary demands. This permitted 
Moscow and other Rus polities to avoid the ideological problems caused by their defeat at the 
hands of the Mongols, because the conquest remained largely invisible.138 It is not necessary to 
delve into the details of Mongol rule over Russia, which continued, at least nominally, for the 
next two centuries. After the Mongol empire fractured into four autonomous khanates in the late 
thirteenth century, the Kipchak Khanate (also known as the Great Horde or Golden Horde) 
continued to exercise power over Russia, until internal Kipchak unrest in the late fourteenth and 
early fifteenth centuries reduced its ability to demand tribute from its subject states. During the 
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reign of Vasilii II (r. 1425-62) of Moscow, Kipchak regional power continued to decline, and by 
the reign of Ivan III (r. 1462-1505) Moscow no longer recognized Kipchak suzerainty. Muscovy 
instead became, in many ways, a Kipchak successor state, alongside the Crimean and Kazan 
khanates.139 
During the last years of Kipchak power, particularly in the late fifteenth century, the 
Crimean Khanate and Muscovy formed an alliance. Both powers had an interest in reducing the 
authority of their common overlord. After the Kipchak decline, the Moscow-Crimean alliance 
continued on the basis of a mutual desire to keep the steppe region between them stable, and the 
existence of a common foe in Lithuania, but after the reign of Ivan III the alliance broke down. 
The ultimate collapse of the Kipchaks, overlapping Muscovite and Crimean interests in the 
eastern Kazan front, and Muscovite encroachment southwards into Crimea exacerbated mutual 
tensions.140 Crimean raids north across the Oka River became more common, and Muscovite 
settlement south increased in volume. From this point, Crimea sought to check the growing 
power of Moscow by seeking alliances with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the 
Ottoman Empire. 
Muscovy’s history of strategic wall-building for defense against nomadic incursion began 
in earnest in the late fifteenth century. Initial constructions were of a small scale, designed to 
protect settlers from light raids rather than large-scale invasions. South of Moscow along a 250 
kilometer stretch of the Oka River, a tributary of the Volga, the Muscovite state funded the 
construction and manning of rammed-earth walls, forts, traps, and ditches. These fortifications 
protected the regions north of the Oka that did not enjoy natural coverage from forest, 
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marshland, and impassible sections of the river bank. After relations between Moscow and 
Crimea soured in the early sixteenth century, Moscow extended the construction of fortifications 
to the south and southeast, linking existing lines of defense with the town of Alatyr on the Volga. 
By the end of the century these fortifications were integrated in a much larger, longer, and more 
robust network of defense, the Abatis Line, which protected about 1000 kilometers of otherwise 
open territory between Moscow and the steppe grasslands. The methodical extension of these 
defensive lines was part of a larger strategic program designed to gradually extend Muscovy’s 
ability to operate administratively and militarily in the south vis-à-vis the Crimean Khanate, and 
it required a simultaneous effort to colonize these areas in order to maintain populations from 
which the state could draw labor and soldiers for the fortifications.141 
 In the 1580s and 90s, the Abatis Line was largely completed. Muscovy then shifted 
military forces further south in conjunction with the establishment of new towns and settlements, 
pushing into territory of the Crimean Khanate. In the early seventeenth century, intense Crimean 
raids prompted the construction of more lines of fortifications, intended to cut off the main north-
south avenues of steppe incursion, again linking frontier military settlements with earthen walls 
and forts, and now more commonly defended with effective cannon. A brief diplomatic 
confrontation with the Ottoman Empire and Crimean Khanate prompted Muscovy to temporarily 
suspend its southern encroachment and fall back on the Abatis Line, but construction resumed 
after the resolution of the Azov Crisis of 1637-42 and culminated in what is now called the 
Belgorod Line.142 In the following decades, further conflict and disputes with the Ottomans and 
the Crimean Khanate spurred Moscow to extend defensive lines to the southwest, constructing 
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additional fortifications in Ukraine to counter strategic threats to areas under Moscow’s 
suzerainty. Again, Muscovy moved soldiers forward from previous lines and settled refugees 
from regional conflicts along the Voronezh and Oskol rivers. This latest series of defenses, the 
Iziuma Line, ran for over 500 kilometers, pushed the frontier over 100 kilometers outward, and 
linked twenty fortified towns and settlements, providing a continuous line of defense in Ukraine. 
The strategic construction of defensive fortification lines ran parallel to the development, 
experimentation, and deployment of newer and more effective weapons and troop organization. 
Early sixteenth century Muscovite efforts to build a permanent, mobile force of frontier soldiers 
met fiscal and technological challenges. Early cannon were too heavy and cumbersome to be of 
much use against mobile Crimean horsemen, and it was not until the 1620s that Muscovy 
obtained the expertise and technology to produce and deploy lighter, transportable cannon ideal 
for anti-cavalry frontier defense. Early muskets and rifles were too inaccurate and slow-firing to 
be of much use in offensive campaigns for similar reasons.143 Fortifications like those Moscow 
constructed on the nomadic frontier improved the ability of western-style firearms to repel 
nomadic forces, but offensive campaigns remained difficult to conduct.144 The seasonal 
mustering and disbanding of Moscow’s fifteenth- and sixteenth-century southern frontier armies, 
and the prohibitive cost of maintaining a permanent force, meant Moscow forewent a constant 
policy of offense. Thus, the Muscovite court initially relied on smaller groups of soldiers who 
could move from one location along a defensive line to another, aided by a network of signaling 
towers. The Abatis Line, as Moscow’s first large-scale fortification line, was intended to provide 
warning of Crimean raids, slow down Crimean movements, hold supplies for mobile Muscovite 
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forces, and buy time to prepare Moscow for possible siege, but the Line could not withstand a 
large attack.145 
 These military efforts required the settlement of regions along the defensive lines, in 
order to provide the manpower to build, garrison, and repair fortifications. The state offered 
bounties to entice people to settle the frontier, and carefully managed the practices necessary to 
keep frontier settlements safe. Local governors forbade settlers from logging in certain stretches 
of frontier forest in order to maintain natural barriers. Soldiers set controlled fires to burn steppe 
grasses, both to deprive nomadic horsemen of fodder and prevent wildfires from destroying 
fortifications. Regional promulgations required frontier towns to maintain and deploy scouting 
parties.146 Later demographic phenomena, such as deteriorating economic conditions in northern 
Muscovy, brought more settlers south even without state encouragement, thus permitting the 
movement of the frontier ever farther south.147 Kollmann offers a succinct view of the measures 
necessary to maintain the frontier: 
These new settlements were supported by grain shipments from the center until settlers 
produced sufficient resources, which took decades. Fortresses were staffed by … anyone 
else available, including runaway serfs, which set up a constant tension as enserfment in 
Russia was solidified in the seventeenth century. Frontier governors welcomed any 
available labor, ignoring government directives to send runaways back to their owners. 
Behind the line, peasants migrated in, runaways settled, landlords moved serfs and the 
state forcibly moved gentry and state peasants, turning some of the latter into border 
guards. Military units farmed their fields communally … All this presaged social 
mobility; in the 1640s the “new model army” was organized by recruiting local peasants 
to become dragoons, cavalry, and infantry and by 1658 a Belgorod regiment had formed 
on this borderland.148 
 
One of the many groups on the frontier, the Cossacks, played a unique role at the edges of 
Muscovite territory, functioning as a mobile and transitory population both within and beyond 
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the defensive lines. The role of Cossacks in Moscow-Crimean relations, from a Sinological point 
of view, parallels the role of Mongol units serving in the early Ming military, and in Ming efforts 
to play nomadic groups against one another. Moscow often subsidized – or rescinded subsidies 
to – Cossack groups, usually with one or two goals in mind: 1) to bring the Cossacks into 
Muscovy’s conflicts with steppe nomads, or 2) to encourage Cossacks to cease launching raids 
against parties with whom Moscow had concluded peace treaties.149 The Don Cossacks, living 
on lower stretches of the eponymous river, functioned as Moscow’s most frequent partners in 
wars against Crimea. In addition to serving as contemporary polities, Cossacks living in 
Muscovite territory often garrisoned fortifications along defensive lines, served in formal 
Muscovite armies, and settled as farmers in strategically important regions along the Crimean 
frontier.150 
 
2. ANALYSIS OF MUSCOVITE FRONTIER HISTORIOGRAPHY 
 
These programs of fortification construction and army organization were not, of course, 
conducted in a political vacuum, and historians have carefully outlined developments within and 
without Muscovy that played a role in the construction and extension of steppe frontier defenses. 
Internal politics in Moscow and the complicated web of relations among Muscovy, Crimea, 
Kazan, Poland-Lithuania, the Ottoman Empire, and various Cossack hosts inevitably created a 
mutable frontier. With the advice of Dr. Michael Khodarkovsky, whose expertise is in Russian 
frontier expansion and imperialism, I have selected a handful of books that cover in a broad 
sense the era of Muscovite relations with steppe nomads after the disintegration of the Kipchak 
Khanate/Golden Horde: Kollmann (2012), Davies (2007), Ostrowski (1998), Khodarkovsky 
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(2004 & 1992), Crummey (1987), Fennell (1983), and the essays in an edited volume by Bater 
and French (1983). First, I will discuss how historians have interpreted Moscow’s attitudes 
towards steppe nomads, and in particular the Crimean Khanate. 
 It appears to me, as a Sinologist, that Russian history’s reassessment of the “Tatar Yoke” 
as a crippling force on early Russian society and state parallels Chinese history’s reassessment of 
the Mongol Yuan Dynasty as a disruptive force that crushed the economic and cultural vibrancy 
of the Song Dynasty.151 Fennell concluded that the “backwardness” and “impoverishment” of 
late medieval Muscovy was caused “not so much by any external factor or by the so-called 
‘yoke’ imposed by the Tatars, as by the innate and devastating conservatism of the ruling class, 
by their unwillingness and inability to change an outmoded and creaking system and by the sheer 
impotence of most of the rulers.”152 Fennell also points to inconsistent succession practices, 
particularly lateral succession from brother to brother, as a source of instability both before and 
after the Mongol invasion.153 In this analysis, resistance to the Mongols during and after the 
conquest had been an impossible goal to organize; the question of whether or not to resist was 
not one that Rus rulers could or would articulate into a coherent policy. It was only after two 
centuries of Mongol rule that the gradual centralization of power in Moscow, particularly by Rus 
monarchs ingratiating themselves with their Mongol overlords and thereby strengthening their 
own position against potential rivals, brought stability to Muscovy.154  
In Crummey’s view, the emergence of Moscow’s centralized monarchy brought two 
developments that would shape Muscovy’s place in Russia in the early-modern era: the state’s 
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consolidation of command over military forces; and the ability for Moscow, as a Kipchak 
subject, to effectively coordinate with other Kipchak subjects on a diplomatic level.155 The 
incapacity of the Kipchak Khanate to impose its political will upon Moscow is demonstrated in a 
failed Kipchak invasion of Muscovy in 1480: the Kipchak khan Ahmed wished to unify his 
broken realm and punish Muscovy as a recalcitrant subject, but his poorly assembled army could 
not ford the Oka river defended by Muscovite forces. With no other means of attacking Moscow, 
the Kipchak army retreated with the onset of winter. Crummey notes that this “stand off” itself 
did not singlehandedly mark the end of the period of Kipchak dominance, because that era had 
already slowly withered away over the course of the century.156 Thereafter, under the long reigns 
of Ivan III (r. 1462-1505) and Vasilii III (r. 1505-33), relations between Muscovy and its sister 
successor state the Crimean Khanate are characterized as largely peaceful and governed by 
“practical” considerations: steppe stability and mutual defense against Lithuania.157 Peace ended 
when the Crimean Khanate extended diplomatic overtures to Lithuania, which disrupted the 
Crimean-Muscovite arrangement and encouraged both parties to intervene in the affairs of Kazan 
and turn it against the other.158 According to Crummey, the Crimean Khanate felt threatened by 
the slow encroachment on lands further south by Muscovite settlers,159 while Ostrowski points to 
Kazan’s alliance with Crimean as the reason for Muscovy’s “logical” conquest of the Kazan 
steppe, in order to forestall the emergence of two hostile, steppe frontiers.160 Paired with the 
improving efficacy of the Muscovite army under Ivan IV (r. 1547-84), or Ivan the Terrible, 
Moscow’s ability to act boldly against steppe polities appears a logical, almost sensible course of 
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action.161 This style of self-defense formed a “pattern” of Muscovy’s (and latter Russia’s) 
relations with the steppe world. 
 In this view, the extension of defensive lines first south, then southeast and finally 
southwest was part of a larger, long-term, strategic inevitability of conflict between Muscovy 
and steppe polities. Khodarkovsky (1992) and Davies, however, examine these relations with 
finer tools, suggesting that local considerations on smaller timescales created the most pressing 
incentives to construct large-scale fortifications. In his analysis of Russian-Kalmyk relations, 
Khodarkovsky (1992) shows how granular politics – including among other things the use of 
particular titles in diplomatic exchanges, the level of centralization among steppe nomadic 
polities, the conduct of embassies, and willful misrepresentation of the other’s intention – all 
contributed to a fluid steppe frontier arrangement.162 These shifting elements of diplomacy 
largely revolved around the major goals of either side. The Muscovite state desired a stable and 
nonthreatening steppe frontier, and wished to impress its political superiority over groups it 
perceived as subordinate. The Kalmyks wished to benefit economically from their relationship 
with Moscow by selling and trading horses for goods, weapons, and other items that would 
enrich Kalmyk groups and provide material wealth that could enhance the position of Kalmyk 
tayishis.163 
 The Kalmyks, who arrived in Russia in the early seventeenth century, are not the primary 
focus of this chapter, but the Moscow-Kalmyk relationship underscores similarities in how 
historians have approached Muscovite relations with steppe nomads. When possible, 
Khodarkovsky offers the point of view of the Kalmyks, while acknowledging that the 
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historiographic tradition of Muscovite-steppe relations is limited thanks to the lopsided nature of 
the sources that favor Muscovy, and often when discussing Kalmyk perspectives he writes in 
acknowledged generalities, due to the limited nature of sources.164 Davies, in contrast, delves 
deeply into the tensions not only between Moscow and the Crimean Khanate, but also Moscow 
and Muscovite settlers, and Moscow and local governors, Muscovites and Crimeans, and 
Cossack hosts and all above mentioned parties. However, deep discussion of granular attitudes 
on the part of the Crimean Khanate is still necessarily limited because of the small sourcebase. 
Historical studies of the Crimean Khanate do enjoy Ottoman sources as a second pool from 
which historians can do comparative or analytical studies, but the Ottoman Empire, like 
Muscovy and Russia, was an imperial state with regards to the nomadic khanates living near the 
Black Sea Steppe, and its sources are similarly biased. 
 In his 2004 book on Russian colonialism, however, Khodarkovsky flips his perspective to 
that of Moscow, and asks two major questions: 1) why did conflict predominate between 
Moscow and nomadic groups on the steppe, and 2) how did Russia extend its political 
dominance over huge swathes of the Eurasian steppe belt? Here he chooses to focus on the later 
stages of Moscow’s early-modern imperialism, in the process glossing over the early history of 
Muscovite-Crimean relations. In doing so he once again acquiesces to the view that warfare 
between Moscow and nomadic groups was inevitable thanks to “irreconcilable” interests.165 He 
also points more specifically to the advancement of gunpowder weaponry as one of the chief 
reasons for the long-term failure of steppe nomads to resist Russian encroachment – a 
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phenomenon mirrored on the other end of Eurasia with the Qing conquest of the Zunghars.166 
While this approach is correct in a sense, it largely repeats the methodologies and conclusions of 
Fennel, Crummey and Ostrowski: conflict was historically inevitable; nomadic raiding continued 
because its “economics” made stopping it difficult; nomads could not effectively fight back 
because of a lack of cannon; and settlers served as an extension of the state’s frontier 
considerations rather than actors with agency.167 This is not to say Khodarkovsky’s 2004 book is 
without merit, for it does couch the longue durée of Russian expansion in somewhat nuanced 
terms, namely the observation that until the eighteenth century Russian imperialism had no 
overarching strategic vision, that Moscow was primarily concerned with controlling the means 
and methods of diplomacy, and that wall-building served both for defense and the control of 
population movements.168 
 Davies does take the time to ask how other polities in Eastern Europe and the Black Sea 
steppe region approached frontier defense, an methodology too infrequently seen in Chinese 
historiography. He points out that when Ukrainian historian and political figure Mykhailo 
Hrushevsky (d. 1934) juxtaposed Muscovy’s approaches to those of Polish-Lithuania, 
Hrushevsky unfairly concluded that Muscovy’s defense strategy was far more effective than it 
was in reality.169 Rather, Davies states, Muscovy’s construction of a network of frontier defenses 
was a “long and expensive” project that moved along in fits and starts, with limited initial 
effectiveness and tension between the state and settlers; and it suffered from setbacks when the 
political landscape of the Black Sea region changed.170 However, Davies suggests that 
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Hrushevsky was correct to look at Poland-Lithuania as a comparative unit as the limited power 
of its ruler in the face of the Sejm, a body of nobles with considerable power to restrict the 
monarchy, curtailed Poland-Lithuania’s ability to react to steppe incursions with the same level 
of decisiveness and efficacy.171 
 The volume on Russian historical geography that Bater and French edited contains a pair 
of essays pertinent to this historiographical discussion. Shaw combines a discussion of the 
motivations of Muscovite settlers with the construction of defensive lines, and also considers 
steppe politics. Lending credence to the view that settlers often operated independent of – or 
regardless of – Moscow’s considerations, Shaw notes that Crimean land, to put it simply, was 
valuable and fertile, ideal for a wide means of livelihood from agriculture to hunting, fishing, 
fowling, and beekeeping.172 The slow rate of settlement and shifting geopolitical situations, 
however, placed an effective limit on the rate at which Muscovy could expand southwards.173 
With enough manpower and supplies, frontier settlers under state direction could erect 
fortifications at a dizzying speed: in one instance on the steppe between the Voronezh and 
Chelnovia rivers, nearly a thousand laborers constructed 25 kilometers of earthen wall in five 
months.174 These instances are few and far between, however, without considerable state 
investment. Stebelsky takes this topic of discussion east and discusses the expansion and 
colonization of the steppe in incremental terms, noting how environmental considerations 
informed settlement patterns on north-to-south and east-to-west axes.175 He also details how 
colonization provided benefits for the government in Moscow, beyond simply being part of a 
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program that removed political rivals: the settlement of Central Asia and the Urals brought new 
sources of iron, copper, and the expertise necessary to turn them into material that became useful 
in the Swedish wars.176 Moscow’s eastward push witnessed many of the same strategic practices 
as the southern advance: the construction of defensive lines that slowly encroached upon 
nomadic territory. However, Muscovy’s position in Central Asia was not imperiled by the direct 
exposure of Moscow to raids, indicating that the eastern strategy was guided more by a semi-
coherent policy than survival.177 Stebelsky uses the language of strategic inevitability in his 
analysis of the eastern frontier, much like his contemporaries. 
 In this brief overview of Muscovite wall-building projects and the array of political 
considerations, intentions, and contextualities that surrounded them, we might conclude that the 
historiography of wall-building suggests it was simultaneously a reactive and long-term strategic 
program of defense. This is partly because of the nature of the sourcebase and partly because of 
the dominance of state-centric narratives. Wall-building becomes a “fail or succeed” project, in 
which historians can point to specific examples of when it works and when it doesn’t, and when 
it does work, how farsighted state planning allowed it to work. The granular analysis of affected 
societies, both sedentary and nomadic, rarely comes into play, except in the case of Davies, who 
mostly examines the relationship between the Muscovite state and its settlers. One section in 
Khodarkovsky’s study does merit attention, in which he warns historians against equating 
Kalmyk social units with states, and with the liberal use of terms like “khanate,” which imply 
statehood.178 The political structure of nomadic “khanates” rested on the prestige of the khan, 
whose allies could very easily withdraw their support and depart, a salient point that Chinese 
                                                 
176 Ibid, p. 151. 
177 Ibid, p. 149. 
178 Khodarkovsky, Where Two Worlds Met, pp. 14-5. 
79 
 
historians have also acknowledged.179 Yet when the narrative becomes one of the state, perhaps 
because the object of the narrative (defensive fortifications) was created by the state, the 
assumption is that the opposite side – nomadic peoples – also form a “state” with a “strategy” 
directly opposed that of the wall-builders. In building walls, the Muscovite state created a 
contrasting narrative that had not existed previously. 
 
3. THE OTTOMAN-TIMURID CRISIS OF 1402 
 
The confrontation between the Ottoman ruler Bayezid I and the post-Mongol steppe ruler 
Tamerlane occupies a much smaller timeframe than the long, drawn out period of confrontation 
and negotiation between Muscovy and Crimea. This is not to say that relations between the 
Ottoman Empire and nomadic steppe peoples were limited to the early fifteenth century, but for 
comparative purposes with Ming history the capture of Bayezid appears particularly relevant. 
Bayezid came to power amid political tensions in late-fourteenth-century Anatolia, succeeding 
his father Murad I. Bayezid’s rule met challenge, and he faced considerable recalcitrance from 
his own vassals – Muslim and Christian – as well as rival emirates in Anatolia, who often joined 
together in opposition to Bayezid. In a series of swift campaigns that earned him the moniker 
“Thunderbolt,” Bayezid conquered western Anatolia, defeated a coalition of European forces, 
and moved against Constantinople, laying siege to the city between 1394 and 1402. At the same 
time he faced pressures from eastern Anatolia and Central Asia, where the Ilkhanid successor 
states and, in short time, the Turco-Mongol ruler Tamerlane moved against Ottoman territory. 
 The conflict between Bayezid and Tamerlane sprouted from overlapping claims to a 
diverse region of patchy sovereignty in the former eastern Anatolian domains of the Ilkhanids, a 
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Mongol successor state. The Ottoman conquest of the eastern Anatolian city of Sivas brought the 
two fledgling empires in conflict, and disputes over titles and the language and politics of 
superior-inferior relations exacerbated this friction. As Timurid pressure on Bayezid’s domains 
increased, Bayezid abandoned his siege of Constantinople and, on the advice of his allies, moved 
against Mamluk strongholds in order to consolidate and expand his power. Tamerlane saw this as 
an affront, perhaps because he sought confirmation from the caliph of Cairo of his superior status 
over Bayezid. Tamerlane invaded, re-conquered Sivas, and met Bayezid’s army near Ankara in 
1402. The battle turned poorly for Bayezid: Tamerlane won and captured Bayezid alive. There 
are several accounts explaining why Bayezid lost. Most distribute the blame in various measures 
to the defection of Bayezid’s soldiers, Tamerlane’s ability to block Ottoman access to water 
supplies, Tamerlane’s use of elephant corps, and the superior numbers and discipline of the 
Timurid army. There are also multiple narratives of Bayezid’s fate after he was captured: that 
Tamerlane dragged him across Central Asia as he continued his campaign to reform a steppe 
empire in the Mongol design; that Bayezid killed himself in captivity; or that he died of natural 
causes in the year following his capture. The long-term consequences of the battle are also 
subject to different narratives, but the most common of the Ottoman narratives place emphasis 
on the subsequent civil war among Bayezid’s successors and the eventual rise of Mehmed I, who 
appears in Ottoman chronicles as wiser, less impetuous, and more militarily savvy than his father 
– in all, a “real” challenge to Timurid power during the reign of Tamerlane’s son, Shah-Rukh. 
 This catastrophe has been interpreted through a variety of academic, sympathetic, and 
popular lenses, some of which are less analytical than others. In his popular book Lords of the 
Horizons, the journalist Jason Goodwin characterized Bayezid as “headstrong and arrogant” and 
that confrontation between him and Tamerlane was “inevitable” thanks to their exchange of 
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diminutive and vitriolic language, and Goodwin’s account is one that insists Bayezid committed 
suicide in captivity, placing a last grain of agency into the disgraced sultan’s story.180 Similarly, 
Maksudoglu places moral superiority in Bayezid’s quarter, and writes that Bayezid wished for 
peace, but was unable to realize peace because Tamerlane’s treaty conditions were unacceptable. 
Maksudoglu also claimed that when the battle turned against Bayezid, the sultan stayed to fight 
with the “awareness” that defeat was his responsibility, though he had the opportunity to flee if 
he had wished.181 Most academics have taken more care to address the circumstances 
surrounding Bayezid’s defeat and capture. Parry places blame on the lack of integration in 
Bayezid’s army, essentially welded together from the soldiers of numerous rapidly conquered 
territories and gifts of tribute from Balkans vassal-states. While Parry does suggest Bayezid’s 
headstrong personality and style of rule were likely root causes for his alarming, simultaneous 
expansion into Timurid and Mamluk territory, he emphasizes that overextension and poor 
centralization efforts formed the bedrock for the sultan’s defeat.182 Finkel offers perhaps the most 
intuitive interpretation, echoing Parry’s explanation that Bayezid’s army suffered from political 
fragmentation, and also detailing the various ways in which fifteenth-century Ottoman 
chroniclers cast the event: by diverting attention to the subsequent Ottoman civil war, by 
blaming those soldiers who defected to Tamerlane, and by recasting Bayezid as a tragic figure.183 
 Few modern historians of the Ottoman Empire view the battle and its fallout from a 
Timurid point of view. Imber suggests that Tamerlane actively exploited the fragile loyalties of 
Bayezid’s soldiers by having his own commanders, some of whom were the former chiefs of 
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Bayezid’s Turkic regiments, display their banners.184 However, Imber, like other Ottoman 
historians, points to the hidden resiliency of the Ottoman polity as the reason it did not ultimately 
disappear after Bayezid’s defeat, glossing over Tamerlane’s reasons for not capitalizing upon 
it.185 Finkel observes parallels between the accounts of Ottoman and Timurid chroniclers, 
particularly that Tamerlane’s chroniclers depicted their ruler’s failure to pursue Bayezid’s son 
Suleyman after the battle as mercy rather than weakness, and that Suleyman subordinated 
himself to Tamerlane in exchange for political freedoms.186 A few historians attempt to address 
the Bayezid-Tamerlane conflict in terms beyond those of abutting domains, suggesting that the 
Ottoman-Timurid struggle stemmed from conflicting and mutually exclusive sources of political 
legitimacy: the old Chinggisid Mongol lineage versus the new Osman Turkic lineage. In this 
interpretation, Tamerlane saw himself as the inheritor of an altered form of the Chinggisid 
legacy, in which he simultaneously ruled in the name of a Chinggisid puppet and in his own 
right.187 According to Finkel, the fact that Tamerlane’s claims to sovereignty rested on this 
legacy explains Tamerlane’s reaction to Bayezid’s conquest of eastern Anatolia, lands that were 
formerly ruled by the Mongol Ilkhanids.188 Bayezid, in contrast, pressed the relatively young 
claim of the Osman dynasty as the rightful ruler of all Turkic peoples, a legacy inherited and 
altered from the Seljuks of Rum.189 
For a better glimpse at the Timurid view we may look to Timurid historians. While John 
Darwin’s well-known volume After Tamerlane only briefly mentions the Bayezid-Tamerlane 
conflict, it does go into greater detail about the motivations and goals behind Tamerlane’s 
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conquests. Darwin suggests that Tamerlane did not simply attempt to replay Mongol strategies of 
empire-building, but actively “wrecked” political and economic rivals surrounding his Central 
Asian imperial core.190 He, like the Ottoman rulers that followed Bayezid, balanced loyalties by 
satisfying his steppe subjects with traditional modes of exploitative warfare and satisfying his 
sedentary agricultural subjects by investing plunder into urban centers, particularly 
Samarkand.191 Marozzi, a journalist writing about Tamerlane in the same vein as Jason Goodwin 
(1998), attempts to present multiple accounts of Bayezid’s captivity and trace the origins of each. 
He notes that the version in which Bayezid committed suicide by dashing his head against the 
bars of his cage appears to have originated with a sixteenth-century English playwright, 
Christopher Marlowe (d. 1593).192 In Central Asia, the Persian method of historiography that 
governed the writing of Timurid history also paints Tamerlane in a positive light, insisting that 
Tamerlane treated Bayezid honorably while in captivity, and wept when he heard of Bayezid’s 
death.193 However, like a mirror of some Ottoman historians, Marozzi tends to gloss over the 
mutual vitriol of letters exchanged between Tamerlane and Bayezid, suggesting that Bayezid was 
the instigator of the conflict, and that Tamerlane’s letters were reasonably worded and his 
demands fair.194 Manz has written multiple books on Tamerlane and the Timurids in Iran, and 
suggests a fairly straightforward narrative to the conflict: that 1) Tamerlane’s primary motivation 
was to destroy a potential challenger to his authority, especially after Bayezid refused to 
acknowledge his inferior place, 195 and 2) Bayezid’s captivity was comfortable and he was not 
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mistreated.196 Manz also does not detail how Tamerlane organized with Bayezid’s successors 
and split up the remaining powers of Anatolia, instead writing that he left “without leaving any 
permanent administration in Anatolia.”197 
 In the longue durée view of Ottoman history, Streusand (2011) observes that modern 
historians have tended to describe the history of the empire “as a gradual, linear rise … to an 
imperial apogee in the reign of Qanuni Sulayman … followed by gradual degeneration…”198 
According to the rise-and-decline mode, the rising of the Ottoman polity was interrupted only by 
Bayezid’s defeat, which “deviated” from careful and considered expansion. Streusand says that 
while historians have “chipped away at this model,” it remains in place and is  in need of an 
overhaul, one which is not “steady and linear” and which reflects “political tensions and clashes 
within the empire.”199 Streusand does not do away with periodization, but instead chooses to 
describe several “Ottoman empires,” the first of which culminated in and ended with Bayezid’s 
reign. Bayezid’s strategy of rapid conquest worked, and in many ways made sense, because of 
his success and because he found himself surrounded by hostile enemies on all sides, from 
Constantinople and southeast Europe, to rival Anatolian princes, to the Mamluks, to Tamerlane 
in the east.200 In many ways Bayezid’s rapid military movements and his political strategy of 
leaving local rulers in place was the same as Tamerlane’s, and when viewed through a century-
wide lens, the Ottoman dynasty proved far more resilient and adaptable than the Timurid 
dynasty. The fact that Bayezid’s sons survived, instated as individual rulers under Tamerlane’s 
nominal patronization, suggests that their foundation of political legitimacy remained strong 
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through the early fifteenth century. Princedoms in southeast Europe backed different Ottoman 
sultans, rather than attempting to dispose of them, and by the time Bayezid’s son Mehmed I died, 
his revitalized empire was stable and strong even in the face of Karaman and Byzantine hostility. 
 Writing History at the Ottoman Court, a collection of essays on Ottoman historiography, 
does much to reveal where conflicting accounts of early-fifteenth-century Ottoman history 
originate. Kastritsis notes that modern historians place considerable emphasis on the Bayezid-
Tamerlane battle as a point of rupture for Ottoman chroniclers,201 after which they developed 
“historical consciousness,” but Kastritsis deftly argues that the Ottoman chronicles’ focus on 
Bayezid’s defeat was much more about the civil war among Bayezid’s successors (particularly 
Mehmed I), who needed to legitimize themselves in an era of fractured power. This created a 
space for their chroniclers to distort some accounts and fabricate others, most of which tended to 
deflect the blame for Bayezid’s defeat away from the failure of the Osmanli dynasty and towards 
the aforementioned practical factors.202 The battle did change fifteenth-century Ottoman court 
historiography, as one would naturally expect given the near-destruction of Ottoman power, but 
it did not create that historiography.203 
 
4. LESSONS FOR MING HISTORIOGRAPHY 
 
 
Among these disparate events with a variety of causes and results, where are the lessons for 
Sinologists? What are some lessons that historians of China, and particularly the contemporary 
Ming era, can learn from these historiographies of other Eurasian land empires? The most natural 
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conclusion is that historians of all three regions still have much work to do if we want to consider 
the nomadic point of view. But this is not a new observation. Rather, I identify four spaces in 
which historians of the Ming Dynasty can reexamine embedded practices of steppe frontier 
history: 
1) Reexamine our tendency to lend considerable descriptive authority to court records and the 
heavy Confucian rhetoric therein. Both Confucian officials and modern historians lay out the 
three options that Ming statesmen apparently had when deciding how to deal with Mongol 
power: Offensive warfare, defense fortifications, or diplomacy. But these were not necessarily 
absolute choices. 
2) Engage in more extensive regional, early-modern frontier comparisons, particularly with 
Korea along the Yalu River and Japanese maritime frontiers. This is starting to be addressed in 
the emerging subfield of early-modern Northeast Asian studies, e.g. Rawski (2015) 
3) Reevaluate the narrative power of walls. Walls, as they are physically imposing constructions 
created by the state, themselves create a narrative of opposition and dichotomy. Dichotomous 
steppe-sedentary relations do not need walls to exist, of course, but the monolithic nature of the 
Great Wall, for instance, stands as a huge marker in this regard. 
4) We might, as Finkel observed in the Ottoman case, seek parallels between Ming and Mongol 
chronicles of confrontation on the fifteenth-century frontier. Some historians, notably Hok-lam 
Chan, have done some of this work. Chan detailed a Mongol narrative of how the third Ming 
emperor was actually ethnically Mongol and, in a way, a Mongol ruler in China.204 
In Ming history, the half-century between the Tumu Crisis in 1449 and the formal 
construction of the Great Wall concentrates extreme, calamitous, narrative power in a short 
                                                 
204 Hok-Lam Chan, Legends of the Building of Old Peking (Hong Kong: The Chinese University of Hong Kong, 
2008), chapter 3. 
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period of time: a concentration that lends itself to classic steppe-sedentary dichotomies in 
Chinese historiography. However, despite the static and monumental nature of the Great Wall, 
we do not need to interpret it as a physical marker of a historical break. The Muscovite 
experience tells us that wall-building can coexist with offensive or expansive strategies and 
imperial imaginations. We perhaps only perceive the Great Wall and the Tumu Crisis as the 
breaking point because these phenomena appear, in comparison with the early Ming era from 
1368-1424, as signals that something had gone “wrong”, or that the Ming state’s weakness 
completely precluded expansionist efforts. Ming military power remained potent after 1500, and 
experienced revitalization in the face of Japanese and Manchu expansion.205 The Ming fell 
primarily due to fiscal mismanagement. Davies correctly identified the same issues that Chinese 
historians have observed: defenses are expensive and ineffective without a larger strategy of 
neutralization, while offensive frontier forces are expensive and difficult to maintain in steppe 
terrain. However, Chinese historians may have placed too much emphasis on the strong, 
Confucian rhetoric of court records when they have described the third option – diplomacy – as 
demeaning or politically untenable. It may have been untenable in the face of a united steppe 
polity, as it was in the case of the Oirats under Esen, or in the late Ming after the Manchu 
integration of the Mongols, or after the Muscovite conquest of the Kalmyks and the wars against 
the Ottomans and Crimea, but diplomacy was absolutely a valid approach when the steppe was 
fractured: when the Yongle emperor played various Mongol tribes against one another, when the 
                                                 
205 See: Robinson, Martial Spectacles; Tonio Andrade, The Gunpowder Age: China, Military Innovation, and the 
Rise of the West in World History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016); Kenneth M. Swope, A Dragon’s 
Head and a Serpent’s Tail: Ming China and the First Great East Asian War, 1592-1598 (Norman: University of 
Oklahoma Press, 2009); and Nicola Di Cosmo, “Did Guns Matter? Firearms in the Qing Formation,” in The Qing 
Formation in World Historical Time, ed. Lynn Struve (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004). 
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Jurchen groups of northeast Asia served as Ming tributaries, and throughout the the Muscovite 
experience after the decline of the Kipchaks. 
 Similarly, while the Tumu Crisis can be described as the end of Ming pretensions to an 
empire that included the steppe (as I myself do), it did not necessarily preclude expansionism, as 
the resurgence of the Ottoman dynasty following Bayezid I’s defeat may indicate. The Ming did 
expand to the south, and established more direct control of marginal regions in Yunnan and 
Sichuan. Of course, the defeat and capture of Bayezid I and the Zhengtong Emperor occurred in 
different contexts, particularly with regards to the maturity of the polity: Bayezid relied on his 
personal ability and prestige to rule a poorly integrated, hastily-assembled realm of vassal-states 
and tributaries, while the Zhengtong emperor was a quasi-figurehead ruler atop a vast, mature 
bureaucratic machine that ably survived his unexpected exit. However, this does suggest the 
possibility that the Ming empire after the Tumu Crisis did not work to correct its evident military 
ineptitude precisely because it was able to fall back on a robust administrative structure. The 
fragmented Ottoman polity needed military power to keep itself together after Bayezid’s defeat, 
while the Ming empire could easily absorb the blow of Zhengtong’s defeat and loss, and adapt to 
a new situation on the steppe frontier. It was, quite simply, easier and more sensible for Ming 
state officials to replace the ruler and maintain the status quo than it was to invest the energy, 
money, and manpower needed to revitalize Ming strategies to conquer the steppe. In any case, 
below I shall take a closer look at each of the four lessons I have suggested: 
 
1) Ming historians should reexamine our tendency to rely too heavily on Confucian court 
records that create a narrative of dichotomy. 
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Arthur Waldron identified what he calls the “policy cycle” of Ming officials, which 
describes the rotation of strategies the Ming state deployed to manage relations with the Mongols 
on the northern frontier.206 These strategies were 1) offensive military engagements into the 
steppe, 2) the construction of defensive arrangements, such as fortifications, to warn against, 
slow, and stop Mongol incursions, and 3) engaging Mongol groups diplomatically, usually by 
offering subsidies as incentives to halt raiding or to pit Mongol groups against one another. The 
cyclical strategic model does appear to fit the first hundred years of Ming rule quite well. During 
the Hongwu reign, the Ming military began with an offensive strategy between 1368-70, then 
shifted to a defensive one after the initial steppe campaigns failed, then resumed an offensive 
strategy in the late 1380s and early 1390s. Under the Yongle emperor, the Ming cycled between 
offensive and diplomatic strategies, with the emperor leading steppe campaigns himself, and 
sometimes personally directing the Ming empire’s diplomatic engagement with the fractured 
Mongols in an effort to curb frontier conflict. After the Yongle emperor’s death, the Ming state 
and court waffled among these three strategies to little effect, never again launching successful 
northern campaigns, but also making few efforts to engage with the Mongols diplomatically. 
Instead the Ming court primarily relied on existing defensive arrangements to protect Ming 
territory. This period of detachment permitted the rise of Esen, who, in the absence of Ming 
political interference, united the Mongols. The Tumu Crisis then caused the Ming court to shift 
more or less permanently towards a defensive strategy, embodied by the Great Wall. Ming 
emperors and bureaucrats eschewed offensive campaigns as costly and unlikely to succeed, and 
dismissed diplomatic endeavors as politically demeaning. 
                                                 
206 Waldron, The Great Wall of China, p. 37. 
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However, I believe the cyclical tripartite model fails to provide enough nuance. As I 
mentioned earlier, the Muscovite and Ottoman experiences suggest alternative ways of looking 
at Ming-Mongol relations between 1368 and 1500. Moscow used fortifications in all three 
strategies: offense, defense, and diplomacy. Muscovy’s fortified lines reduced the damage of 
nomadic raids, created a supply zone from which Muscovy could launch offensive campaigns, 
and coerced Crimeans, Kazans, and Kalmyks into acquiescing to Muscovite diplomatic demands. 
In this interpretation, the failure or lack of Ming offensive strategy following the Yongle reign is 
not because of the Great Wall (as though the Wall signaled a turn toward isolationist policy) but 
because of the difficulty and expense involved in operating in the steppe region. Simply put, 
Ming bureaucrats and emperors did not see a reason to launch offensive campaigns any longer.  
We can also look at the differences in the geopolitical arrangements of the Ming and 
Muscovite frontiers. In the Ming case, the geopolitics of the steppe seems to have been as heavy 
a dictator of Ming strategy as the rhetorical considerations of the Ming court. A united Mongolia 
under Esen provided only one avenue of diplomatic dialogue, a dialogue that was underscored by 
superior-inferior relations, much like that of Muscovy and the Kipchak Khanate. With the Ming 
court entirely unwilling to accept anything but Esen’s inferior status, and with Esen in possession 
of a much more powerful military, meaningful diplomacy could not occur. Unfortunately for the 
Ming state, the emperor decided to flex his absolute authority and lead an offensive campaign 
that he was ill-equipped to command, confirming what Ming court officials already knew: such a 
campaign would be ineffective at best, and disastrous at worst. The only option left, in the eyes 
of the Ming court, was the extension and enlargement of defensive arrangements. But the 
rhetoric of “untenable diplomacy” was more a result of geopolitical realities than a moral 
unwillingness to treat with “barbarians.” In Moscow’s case, the collapse of Kipchak power 
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ushered in a new era of multilateral relations among Muscovy, Crimea, Kazan, Poland-Lithuania, 
and the Ottoman Empire, providing avenues to enact more fluid, opportunistic diplomacy, and 
encouraged Moscow to shuffle among various military strategies as the shifting diplomatic scene 
demanded. 
 
2) Engage in more extensive regional, early-modern frontier comparisons, particularly with 
Korea and Japan. 
 
The study of Northeast Asian frontiers has emerged as a new field of regional East Asian 
studies.207 Rawski describes the transformation of Northeast Asia – roughly modern Liaoning, 
Jilin, and Heilongjiang – from an unpopulated periphery into a frontier between competing 
imperial powers. Rawski places the change in the tenth century with the rise of the Khitan-
founded Liao state.208 This transformation in turn pushed Korea to engage more extensively in 
interstate geopolitics, as its position left it “vulnerable to military pressures from Manchurian 
regimes.”209 Japan’s relations with Northeast Asian powers likewise grew in tandem with the 
expansion of maritime economic activity and, eventually, clashing frontiers. The first real 
Northeast Asian conflicts involving Japan were the Mongols’ attempts at invasion in the 
thirteenth century, followed a few hundred years later by the Japanese invasions of Korea in the 
late sixteenth century. In between, burgeoning trade relations with Ming China and the growth of 
the global silver network linked Northeast Asia and Japan further. 
                                                 
207 See: Evelyn Rawski, Early Modern China and Northeast Asia: Cross-Border Perspectives (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2015); Standen, Unbounded Loyalty; and Sakura Christmas, “The Cartographic 
Steppe: Imperial Japan on China’s Edge,” Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University (2016). 
208 Rawski, Early Modern China and Northeast Asia, p. 34. 
209 Ibid, p. 35. 
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The Great Wall, in many ways, distracts from a broader analysis of other early-modern 
frontiers in Northeast Asia. Sinologists might look at Muscovy’s fortified frontiers with not only 
the Crimean Khanate, but also the Kalmyks, the Kazan, and various Central Asian khanates. We 
can also look at how other states, like Poland-Lithuania, interacted with steppe polities (Crimea) 
and how nomadic groups in the middle (Cossacks) served as go-betweens, as mercenaries, or 
operated as independent agents seeking concessions from multiple powers in turn. Rather than 
painting an image of steppe powers on one side of the frontier and sedentary powers on another, 
we might investigate relations among China, Korea, Japan, Khitans, Jurchens, Mongols and 
Manchus in multilateral terms. 
 
3) Reevaluate the narrative power of walls. Walls, as they are physically imposing 
constructions created by the state, themselves create a narrative of opposition and 
dichotomy. 
 
As discussed already, the existence of fortified lines on the Muscovite-Crimean frontier 
creates a narrative of state-versus-state conflict, in which the fortified lines are proof of a larger 
strategy on Muscovy’s part, or indicative of the inevitability of conflict between sedentary and 
nomadic polities. Historians of Muscovy have described the Muscovite lines as part of a larger 
strategy, and the methods of manning and maintaining the lines as the purview of the state. 
However, we know that the Muscovite settlers who moved to the Crimean frontier had a variety 
of reasons for doing so: they were not only encouraged by the Muscovite state, but economic 
decline in northern and western Muscovy during its wars against Poland-Lithuania prompted 
many more to move south. Settlers proved, in many ways, intractable, and the repeated 
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proscriptions against logging indicate that it was a common problem. This chapter’s analysis has 
taken states as actors, but we must not forget that subsistence farmers were actors as well. 
The monolithic stature of the Great Wall, physically and metaphorically, suggests its 
historic power. But we must remember that the Wall, like any other fortification line, was not 
impermeable, and that it was part of a larger idea of empire among Ming emperors and 
bureaucrats, an idea that changed over the first century of Ming rule. Before the Ming state 
initiated the large-scale construction of what became the Great Wall, sections of fortified lines 
were constructed by local governors as solutions to local problems, as we have seen in Chapter 
4; and states in China have constructed fortified lines on the steppe frontier at various times for 
various purposes, from defense to population control to use them as bases for offensive 
campaigns. Straddling both sides of these fortified lines were nomadic populations, who 
subordinated themselves to different polities, sedentary and nomadic, for their own purposes. 
After the fall of the Yuan, northern China was still host to significant Mongol populations and 
Ming armies contained Mongol units. The Yongle emperor valued his Mongol cavalry regiments 
as experienced and effective soldiers. 
 
4) We might, as Finkel observed in the Ottoman case, seek parallels between Ming and 
Mongol chronicles of confrontation on the fifteenth-century frontier. 
 
This goes beyond the observation that historians need to take the perspective of nomadic 
peoples. Rather, historians should seek to compare the narratives advanced by nomadic polities 
to those of sedentary states. Historians of China – notably Hok-lam Chan – have already done 
this to some extent. However, there are other major historical periods that deserve the same 
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treatment: the Yuan-Ming transition, the Ming-Qing transition, the Tumu Crisis, and, to some 
extent, Liao-Song and Jin-Song confrontations. Often Sinologists implicitly or explicitly view 
these transitions through the classic lens of the dynastic cycle. Ascribing the fall of the Ming to 
fiscal problems explains the Ming state’s inability to suppress domestic revolt and repel nomadic 
enemies, but it does not afford a clear picture of how imperial visions changed in these times of 
crises. Neither does it describe how those visions broke down, or were co-opted and transformed, 
except to assume that the successor inherited their predecessor’s visions wholesale. As this 
dissertation demonstrates in the Yuan-Ming case, the Ming state did inherit a version of the Yuan 
imperial vision, but the Ming state had to alter that vision in order to to wrap around a more 
ethnically bound and, eventually, territorial limited discourse. 
This can also extend to modern historiography – comparing how today’s historians of 
nomadic polities and historians of sedentary polities view the same (or similar) events. In the 
case of the Ottoman-Timurid conflict, we can see that Ottoman historians focus on the variety of 
narratives regarding the reason for Bayezid’s defeat and his ultimate fate, and the long-term 
resiliency of the Ottoman polity. The version that Timurid historians forward focuses less on 
why Tamerlane emerged victorious, and instead describes the challenges posed by Tamerlane’s 
reliance on his personal charisma and the hybrid steppe-urban nature of his empire. Timurid 
historians gloss over the aftermath in Anatolia of Tamerlane’s battle with Bayezid, describing 
Tamerlane’s decentralized method of carving up territory as par for the Timurid course. If we 
look at both narratives of the same event, we can see that the resiliency of the Ottoman state 
might be less the result of the prowess of Bayezid’s son Mehmed I, and more a result of the 
Timurid pattern of establishing subject lords in conquered territory. 
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C. CONCLUSION 
 
 
Selective interpretation of what constitutes a Chinese dynasty lends itself to a misunderstanding 
of China’s long history of ideas of empire. One can argue that China’s empires were never fully 
Chinese after the collapse of the Han dynasty – and such an argument would imply equivalence 
between modern ethnic categories and cultural self-identification at between the first millennia 
BCE and CE. Regardless, it is clear that Eurasian steppe-style political traditions influenced the 
creation and imagination of empire in China, particularly after the late fourth century CE. 
Modern world-historical and Eurasian interpretations of the Tang empire bypass the linguistic 
rigidity of Tang textual records and reveal its cosmopolitan and politically multifaceted nature. 
Consideration of the Song Dynasty’s contemporary rivals, the Liao and Jin, further questions 
precisely what a “dynasty” or “empire” meant in the tenth through thirteenth centuries. In China, 
unity was a powerful tool, deployed to justify empire. The Mongols expressed this in the most 
straightforward fashion, conquering most of continental East Asia and legitimizing their rule as a 
Chinese-style dynasty that had unified All-under-Heaven. 
Continuing this narrative into the early Ming, new world-historical tools help reveal 
fascinating parallels between early Ming history and the experiences of other post-Mongol 
polities. The fact that both the Ming dynasty and Muscovite Russia relied on enormous strategic 
wall-building projects to defend against nomadic raids demonstrates that the construction of the 
Great Wall was not signaling uniquely Chinese or Ming xenophobia and isolationism, but rather 
than these policies made rational sense and do not preclude connections between the Ming and 
its nomadic, Mongol Yuan past. Similarly, scholarship on Chinese and Ming history does not 
need to treat Ming military defeat at the hands of nomads as, again, a uniquely Chinese 
predicament and one that revealed inexcusable military weakness. The militarily powerful and 
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charismatic Ottoman ruler Bayezid also faced defeat at the hands of a Mongol-style ruler, 
Tamerlane, but this did not preclude Ottoman military strength. Ming scholars should draw 
further parallels between the resurgence of Ottoman military power and the great military 
endeavors that the Ming undertook to protect Korea from Japanese invasion, or defend the coast 
from piracy. While the scale between Ottoman conquests at that empire’s height, and Ming 
military accomplishments in the sixteenth century are quite mismatched territorially, historians 
should not forget that within a decade of its founding the Ming began, in rather spectacular 
fashion, as one of the largest states on earth, and certainly the richest. 
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III. CHAPTER 2: THE INTELLECTUAL AND SPATIAL LEGACY OF THE 
MONGOLS IN IMPERIAL CHINA 
 
 
 
 
In this chapter we will see how, through examining legal codes, northern China must have been 
more ethnically diverse than historians have previously supposed, and how the exchange and 
inheritance of Yuan imperial ideas informed early Ming ideas and imagination of empire. The 
imperial experience of the Yuan Dynasty and the greater Eurasian geographic arena it created 
inspired early Ming visions of empire. Examination of state archives, documents, maps, and law 
codes from the Yuan-Ming transition era reveals the fact that the Yuan imperial experience had 
two major impressions upon imperial constructions in China: 1) it suggests that imperial thought 
and practice in the early Ming were not isolated from the “barbarian” influences of the Mongol 
Yuan; and 2) it places the intellectual and practical empire-building techniques of the early Ming 
state far closer to the “cosmopolitan statecraft” of the Northern Wei, Tang, and Liao-Jin empires 
than a “native” focused approach would suppose. This chapter will examine three facets of the 
political history of northern China and the Yuan-Ming transition era to uncover early Ming 
thoughts on empire and imperial construction. 
First: ethnic law. The “ethnic” and “cultural” makeup of northern China at the beginning 
of the Ming Dynasty remains unclear to modern historians. There are nearly no surviving 
indications – in written form or otherwise – of northern China’s ethnic landscape in the late 
fourteenth century. The sources that survive are state documents, in which the obfuscating 
effects of early Ming rhetoric on “Han” versus “Mongol” identity (or “barbarian” hu 胡) muddy 
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our ability to understand how people living in northern China identified themselves. How closely 
did these populations identify with what we call “Han”? How “Mongol” or “barbarian” were 
they? This section relies on state-fashioned law, originally designed to categorize different 
“ethnic” groups, as a means of locating how the early Ming state and its subjects managed and 
understood cultural and ethnic identity in the late fourteenth century. This sections begins with a 
cursory overview of Tang, Liao and Jin law, and then examines the highly structured Yuan 
formulations of ethnic law in order to interpret the language of early Ming ethnic law. I propose 
that northern China in the late fourteenth century must have been more ethnically diverse than 
we have previously realized. 
Second: comparing spatial representations. Northern Song Dynasty-era maps universally 
demarcate a clear border between the Song and Liao empires. What is interesting about these 
maps is that they often include Khitan Liao-governed regions within Song territory, despite the 
Song’s chronic inability to recover those regions from the Liao. In contrast, the sole surviving 
Yuan Dynasty map of the Mongol empire and the earliest Ming map together represent the 
extension of the cartographic knowledge of Chinese statesmen to most of Eurasia. This section 
will compare maps from the Song, Yuan and Ming and argue that the early Ming, Eurasian-
spanning map titled Da Ming hunyi tu (“Amalgamated Map of the Great Ming”) represents a 
vastly expanded imperial vision fashioned from Mongol Yuan cartographic knowledge and 
imperial representations. Such a vision was far more in line with Yuan imaginations of empire 
than those of the Song. The subsequent disappearance of Eurasian maps in Ming cartography 
speaks to the particular impact of the Yuan on early Ming imperial ideas, and how those ideas 
changed in the mid-fifteenth century, following the decline of Ming military power and the Ming 
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court’s increasing inability to influence states beyond its frontiers (this phenomenon of decline is 
further explored in Chapter 4). 
Third: analysis of the rhetoric in Ming criticisms of the past, and the rhetoric of 
Yuan/Ming diplomatic correspondence. The sections in the Ming shilu (“Veritable Records of 
the Ming”) from the reigns of the first (Hongwu) and third (Yongle) Ming emperors are full of 
references to past Chinese states. Of particular importance were the three ancient dynasties of the 
Xia, Shang and Zhou.210 Ming records also show that early Ming emperors constantly measured 
past states against one another, and against the Ming. Modern historiography has established that 
the founding emperor Hongwu (r. 1368-98) and his statesmen visited records of those ancient 
Three Dynasties as they sought models of proper government. Early Ming emperors also cast 
doubt upon the moral authority of the unifying states that came after the Zhou, particularly the 
Han (206 BCE – 220 CE), Tang (618 CE – 907), Song (960 – 1279) and Yuan (1279 – 1368). 
Curiously, Ming rulers and statesmen did not necessarily give special attention to the Yuan 
Dynasty’s Mongol origins as the reason for its fall, but go to great lengths to place it within 
existing historical chronicles alongside its predecessors. In this section I propose that Ming rulers 
did not found their criticisms of the Yuan Dynasty on its barbarian origins, but rather on its 
moral and infrastructural failings. Those failings either 1) echoed the failings of earlier empires, 
or 2) were imperfections of comparable degree to those of the Han, Tang and Song. Ming rulers, 
particularly the founder Hongwu, then referenced China’s past in diplomatic correspondence 
with other states. They invoked the ancient Three Dynasties as they made the case for the Ming 
Dynasty’s claim to the Mandate of Heaven. These diplomatic letters were similar to those that 
                                                 
210 Hereafter referred to as the Three Dynasties. Xia Dynasty (mythical) 21st cen. – 1600 BCE. Shang: 1600 – 1046 
BCE. Zhou: 1046 – 771/256 BCE. 
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early Yuan rulers dispatched to foreign states, particularly in their willingness to invoke military 
power as both a foundation of legitimacy and coercion to accomplish political goals. 
The purpose of this chapter, then, is to draw these three strands of research into an 
overarching structure that seeks to re-describe the early Ming state as one construed of culturally 
and politically multifaceted imperial ideas. Literal interpretation of Ming records and their 
Confucian rhetoric has obscured the Yuan influences on Ming ideas of empire. Instead, political 
agendas and strategies that can be described as decidedly “non-Confucian” in a classical sense 
(i.e. favoring aggressive wars, deciding not to employ acculturalization as a foreign policy 
technique, etc.) were tools of the early Ming state and its vision of empire.211 
 
 
 
A. LAW AND EMPIRE IN NORTH CHINA 
 
 
Early Ming law is a well-documented subfield. Jiang Yonglin’s study of the Ming Dynasty’s 
standardized legal codex, the “Great Ming Code” (Da Ming lü 大明律), offers a deep analysis of 
the laws that the first Ming emperor and his court fashioned. Jiang endeavors quite successfully 
to interpret the imperial intentions and purpose of the early Ming state following the collapse of 
the Yuan Dynasty. In his work, Jiang has taken a deliberately narrow focus, choosing to look at 
the decades surrounding the Code’s creation. The Code includes sections on what we, living in 
the twenty-first century, might call “ethnic law.” Specifically, regarding Mongols who remained 
in Ming China after the Yuan collapse, the Code attempted to legislate distinctions between 
Mongols and Chinese, and to prohibit the practice of Mongol customs in the Ming empire.212 As 
                                                 
211 For a comprehensive discussion of the role of Confucianism in Chinese strategic policy, see: Wang, Harmony 
and War, particularly Chapter 1, “Confucian Strategic Culture and the Puzzle.” 
212 Jiang, The Mandate of Heaven, pp. 132-139. 
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Jiang points out, these laws were designed to return the Central Kingdoms213 to the models and 
practices of antiquity, and to ensure the century of Mongol rule would not infiltrate China 
culturally as well as militarily.214 
 However, when one takes early Ming law in a multi-centurial perspective, grand themes 
emerge that suggest entirely new ways of viewing the era between the tenth and fourteenth 
centuries. The ethnically-based law laid out in the Ming Code appears to be a relatively new 
phenomenon, unknown in the long, pre-Mongol history upon which the Hongwu emperor and 
his successors drew for moral guidance. No such ethnic distinctions appear in Song or Tang 
Dynasty law, for instance. The first laws in China’s history that appear to follow similarly ethnic 
lines are developed in their most basic form under the Khitan-founded Liao Dynasty (907-1125), 
further developed by the Jurchen-founded Jin Dynasty (1125-1234), and then elaborated, 
standardized and used to great (and intrusive) effect by the Mongol Yuan. Under the Khitan 
regime, these laws took form as bi-ethnic frameworks, creating roles and distinctions for the 
ruling conquerors and their Chinese subjects. By the time of the multi-ethnic Mongol Empire, the 
laws took on new layers of administrative purpose and cultural meaning, distinguishing among 
four different ethnic groups, creating privileges and prohibitions for each. When scholars look at 
early Ming records, they find virtually no discussion of the ethnic makeup of northern China, 
save a handful of proscriptions against the practice of Mongol customs and the wearing of 
Mongol clothes. Given the significant historical baggage behind the establishment of the Ming 
empire, it seems unlikely that northern China was as ethnically homogenous as historical 
treatments have assumed. 
 
                                                 
213 In my translations of Ming sources, I endeavor to translate the modern Chinese term for China, “Zhongguo”, as 
“Central Kingdoms.” My aim is to recover the original geographic meaning of Zhongguo from nationalist narratives. 
214 Jiang, The Mandate of Heaven, pp. 48-9, 125-6. 
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1. CULTURAL AND “ETHNIC” LAW IN THE LIAO AND JIN 
 
 
The origins of the Mongol multi-ethnic classification system are located in the Liao state of the 
tenth century. Considering the Liao as an empire of China as much as the Song (as Chapter 1 has 
argued) muddles the classic historical chronology of China (which takes Song as the Tang 
successor) because the Song did not arise until some six decades after the Liao founding. 
Regardless of these historiographical issues, the geopolitical vacuum left by the Tang collapse 
permitted Khitan ascendancy and the creation of what has been called continental East Asia’s 
first multistate system.215 
 Chinese history texts sometimes treat the Liao as a “conquest dynasty,” because it was 
not part of “Han” civilization, and it controlled the region around modern Beijing, a parcel of 
territory that pre-modern and modern scholars alike have considered part of China.216 However, 
as Naomi Standen has pointed out, the Liao state was hardly one based on conquest and 
militarism. It warred frequently with the Song but was not necessarily more aggressive than its 
counterpart to the south; its ruling cadre was based on two particular royal clans, not the elite 
status of soldiers; and its large empire was built upon complicated political arrangements, and 
relied on conquest no more than most China-based regimes.217 In this context, the term “conquest 
dynasty” hardly describes a state that did not engage in significant conquest of China. 
Nonetheless, the Liao governed regions that held significant Chinese populations. How did it 
administer these places, and did it legally recognize cultural differences that could be considered 
proto-ethnic? 
                                                 
215 Morris Rossabi, “Introduction,” in China Among Equals, p. 9-11. 
216 On the Liao as a conquest dynasty: Mote, Imperial China, pp. 29-30. 
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 To answer this question, we must begin with the classic Chinese cultural dichotomy 
between the “cultured” and the “barbaric,” or huayi 華夷. In this dichotomy, hua represents 
Confucian-centric society, almost always tied to a polity or polities located on the North China 
Plain and surrounding macro-regions. This brand of society is usually associated with sedentary 
agriculturalist life and a political system based on extraction of in-kind taxes from farmers. In 
contrast, the yi are the “barbarian” groups living “beyond the pale,” outside the auspices of 
benevolent Confucian government, without adherence to classically acceptable rites and rituals, 
and (in the mind of sedentary states in China) building political systems based on military might. 
In this socio-politico-cosmological formulation, there are several kinds of yi, organized 
according to the four cardinal directions (rather than specific cultural or “ethnic” practices) under 
the term siyi 四夷. The most militarily potent of these yi were, naturally, the horse-riding 
nomadic pastoralists who operated in the steppe-desert-forest regions to the north and northeast 
of China. The huayi formulation reached its intellectual apogee under the Tang empire, which 
enjoyed military supremacy in continental East Asia and vast tracts of the steppe until the An 
Lushan Rebellion in 755.218 
The cultural efflorescence of Tang society and political power of the Tang state arguably 
gave rise to the first period in which ideas and philosophies that originated in China dramatically 
influenced societies and polities in East Asia, particularly when Korea and Japan imported the 
Chinese language, Chinese scholarship, and Chinese philosophy as major components of their 
elite social strata; and in which significant populations of nomadic-pastoralists acknowledged the 
Tang emperor as their kaghan, or “heavenly ruler.”219 This dichotomy extended to law, as Tang 
                                                 
218 Wang Gungwu, “The Rhetoric of a Lesser Empire: Early Sung Relations with its Neighbors,” in China Among 
Equals, p. 47-65. 
219 Skaff, Sui-Tang China, p. 120. 
104 
 
law did not distinguish among specific cultural groups with regards to offenses and appropriate 
punishments. Foreigners who were “unassimilated” or “uncivilized” (huawairen 化外人) were 
subject to the law of their home, regardless of where that was. Tang law did apply to 
“assimilated” foreigners (huaneiren 化內人). In instances where “foreigners” and “natives” were 
involved in the same case, the Tang state applied Tang law.220 
A Khitan chieftain named in contemporary records as Abaoji formally established the 
Liao state in 907. “Khitan” is the term used to describe a nomadic people that lived in Northeast 
Asia, in the region between the modern borders of Mongolia and the northern regions of the 
Chinese province of Inner Mongolia. The early origins and political structures of the Khitans are 
obscure and scarce in extant records, but we do know that Abaoji managed to claim leadership of 
the Khitan tribes thanks to a combination of political savvy and military prowess (not unlike 
many Chinese dynastic founders).221 Following the establishment of the Liao state, social 
stratification was essentially the inverse of the classical Chinese cultured-barbarian dichotomy, 
but represented with more flattering terminology and bureaucratized in a far more tangible 
fashion than it ever had been in Tang intellectual thought. In the Liao, conscious social and 
cultural distinctions separated Khitan rulers and their Chinese subjects, at least in the southern 
regions of the Liao empire that encompassed modern Beijing. Liao law still represented those 
distinctions as a binary, and Liao sub-capital administrative structures duplicated those 
distinctions. Under the Liao, a “northern administration” (beimian) managed populations of 
nomadic groups, while a distinct “southern administration” (nanmian) managed Chinese 
populations living in the Beijing frontier area.222 Both administrations answered to the Liao ruler 
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and his official retinue, but operated without significant mutual interaction or coordination. This 
dual form of government borrowed heavily from both nomadic tribal models and Tang-style 
bureaucratic systems. In particular, the creation and organization of the southern administration 
was largely in the hands of “Chinese” literati and statesmen who frequently changed their 
political allegiance among the many states that existed during the tenth century. It further 
appears that among Chinese there was no great stigma attached to serving “barbarian” Liao 
rulers, at least before the establishment of the Song state and the beginning of sharp Song-Liao 
conflicts in the late tenth century.223 
It seems unlikely that Liao government systems remained static and unchanging for the 
duration of the state’s existence, but a lack of scholarship on the subject limits our understanding 
of those changes. We can, however, examine the new forms of government that the Jurchens 
created and adapted to serve their new Jin state in the mid-twelfth century. The Jurchens were a 
nomadic forest-dwelling people who lived in modern Northeast Asia, and the territorial/cultural 
predecessors of the Manchus. Initially subordinate to the Liao state, in the early twelfth century 
the Jurchens managed to leverage the unexpected success of a rebellion against the Liao to create 
an alternative well of political power around which other disaffected tribes gravitated. The 
Jurchens’ rapid military victories against their former Liao masters catapulted them into a 
position of imperial lordship over the former Liao territories and the creation of their new Jin 
Dynasty. Despite an initial Song-Jin alliance designed to destroy their mutual enemy, Jurchen 
armies soon turned southwards and conquered much of northern China, pressing far beyond the 
former Liao frontier and seizing the whole of the region north of the Huai River by 1142. 
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The differences between the Liao and Jin states are important, in that the latter controlled 
much larger stretches of territory that relied on sedentary agriculture, and governed much larger 
populations of Chinese farmers and literati. Yet despite the rapid conquest of the north, there 
were still instances of former Song literati, officials and generals refusing Southern Song calls to 
migrate south of the Huai River – they were quite happy to remain in Jin territory, serve their 
new Jin masters, guard Jin garrisons, and administer the agricultural regions of the Jin empire.224 
The Jurchens, unlike the Khitans and Mongols, had practiced marginal agriculture and fishing in 
Northeast Asia, and so perhaps were more willing to adopt Chinese administrative practices, just 
as their new subjects were more willing to accept Jin rule.225 
In the early years of the Jin, its rulers adopted Liao-style dual government, managing the 
steppe-forest belt with a “northern administration” and sedentary agricultural regions in China 
with a “southern administration.” In the decades following the founding of the empire, the Jin 
state moved closer to a style of administration more closely resembling those that had arisen in 
China, and it was also more administratively “poly-cultural” than its predecessor in both internal 
and external relations. It monitored the Mongols with Chinese practices, leaving them to govern 
themselves and declining to directly interfere in Mongol tribal politics (a factor that would 
ultimately permit Mongol ascendancy); it folded the Koryŏ state of the Korean peninsula more 
completely into the new Jin world order; and it incorporated the Tangut Xi Xia state as a closely 
integrated vassal, rather than a coerced ally as it had been for the Liao.226 
The great impetus of innovation in Jin legal institutions seems to be the poly-cultural 
nature of its empire that was, in terms of numbers, predominantly Chinese. It also, like the Liao, 
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borrowed heavily from Tang precedents for punitive and legal matters. However, the Tang code 
had no framework for legally distinguishing among cultural groups and creating for each certain 
privileges and prohibitions. The Jin empire, in addition to incorporating Jurchens, Chinese and 
Khitans, also closely included Koreans, Balhae, Mohe, Tanguts, and Turks. Thus it is in the Jin 
that we see the first legal frameworks in Chinese history designed to promote certain cultural 
groups, and the creation of separate legal frameworks designed to regulate different cultural 
groups. In the earliest iterations of Jin statecraft, Chinese law governed Chinese subjects, Khitan 
law governed Khitan subjects, and Jurchen law governed Jurchen subjects. Law forbade certain 
Jurchen practices, such as levirate (the marriage of a son to his deceased father’s widow or 
concubine) to Chinese and Koreans.227 On the other hand, Jin law maintained the traditional 
Chinese prohibition against preemptively dividing the father’s property while the father was still 
alive.228 Civil examinations and the time-tested yin privilege229 system endeavored to place 
Jurchens from all strata of society in official positions, and to maintain the use of the Jurchen 
language in state matters.230 These snippets of Jin law suggest that the Jin state deployed 
culturally-specific legal frameworks to govern an expanded empire with more complex tools 
than those used by the Liao. 
 
2. ETHNIC LAW IN THE MONGOL EMPIRE AND THE YUAN DYNASTY 
 
 
Culturally and ethnically distinguishing laws took on new roles under the Mongol-founded Yuan 
Dynasty, shaped to improve state control and reduce the possibility of dissent rather than merely 
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manage multiple populations. The most recent scholarship on the origins of the Mongol empire’s 
administrative institutions suggests that they heavily derived from Khitan precedents.231 The 
Mongols brought about three great geopolitical changes to East Asia. First, they annihilated the 
multistate system that had characterized continental relations for over three centuries, from 907 
to 1234, by conquering the Jin, Tangut Xi Xia, and Southern Song. Second, they connected 
China more directly to a larger world for the first time; no longer were the western regions of 
Asia only understood through merchandise and merchants, for now the Mongols brought Central 
Asians (semuren 色目人) and Muslims (huihui 回回) into China to create new, innovative 
administrative systems with specific roles for those groups. Third, they built upon the Jin cultural 
administrative system and created the first “proto-ethnic” laws; i.e. laws that fashioned distinct 
social and political purposes for different cultural groups based on geographic origin, language, 
religion, pre-conquest political alignments, and cultural “closeness” to the Mongols. 
The core of these laws was the “four-class” system first described in a modern academic 
context by Meng Siming.232 The use of “class” in this terminology is inexact, as the system was 
not created for economic functions, but for entirely political purposes.233 In sum, the system 
organized the Yuan empire’s populace among four tiers, from highest to lowest: 1) Mongols, 2) 
Central Asians (semuren), 3) North Chinese (hanren 漢人), and 4) Southern Chinese (nanren 南
人). Of these four categories, “Mongols” and “South Chinese” were the most fixed, and 
described particular people who originated from particular places and had particular allegiances 
prior to the Mongol conquest of China (to the Chinggisid lineage and the Southern Song state, 
respectively). The categories of “North Chinese” and “Central Asians” were more flexible, as the 
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former included Khitans, Jurchens, and Koreans; and the latter often included Muslims of all 
origins. The categories were both cultural and political. For the Mongols, North Chinese were 
more trustworthy than South Chinese because Turkic, Khitan and Jurchen states had ruled the 
north for centuries. South Chinese chafed under Mongol rule – the Yuan state rarely permitted 
southern scholars any but the lowliest of posts, and the Yuan state heavily favored Central 
Asians and Mongols in most administrative circumstances.234 
The specific laws that branched from this “four-class” system had significant social 
resonance. Perhaps the most often cited example of Yuan discriminatory law is the decree that 
prevented Chinese magistrates and commoners from carrying weapons. In the arena of the state, 
however, we see even more evident examples of law that reflected the growth of “proto-
ethnicity,” drawn from Jurchen and Khitan precedents but also innovated for Yuan purposes. 
Mongols were exempt from yin nomination requirements, usually apprenticeship, a tactic 
borrowed from the Jurchens to insert more Mongols into the Yuan administration.235 Different 
yin ordinances governed North and South Chinese, as a means of reinforcing discrimination 
against the latter.236 The Yuan state tightly controlled other avenues to office, and restricted 
hereditary positions in the bureaucracy in order to prevent established Chinese lineages from 
monopolizing offices and to further facilitate the inclusion of Mongols and Central Asians in 
state functions.237 Beyond the central state and into local levels, gazetteers often listed officials 
according to the “four-class” system as a means of monitoring who was serving where, and 
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keeping track of the origins of even the lowliest appointed officials.238 In general, Yuan law was 
designed to manage its diverse population, maintain stability, and keep Mongols at the top.239 
The Yuan came to an end in the mid-fourteenth century amid rebellion, famine, disease, 
and internecine warfare. Various explanations have been offered to explain the Yuan Dynasty’s 
fall, but the significant death and destruction surrounding the collapse of the Yuan regime is 
firmly embedded in representations of the Yuan-Ming transition. Ming Dynasty scholars and 
literati who later wrote about the time recall its chaotic nature, and the natural response of many 
educated men was to wait out the storm and, for those ambitious enough, seek out political and 
military leaders to whom they could offer counsel and advice. Following the formal 
establishment of the Ming Dynasty in 1368, the early Ming state initiated a program of social 
and legal reform that reflected the great intellectual changes of the past three centuries. 
Proto-ethnic law in the early years of the Ming Dynasty served administratively different 
functions than it had during the Yuan, but the very pointed and specific purpose of Ming law 
demonstrates that thinking about different populations along proto-ethnic lines had become a 
reality in China. Several mental shifts about the spatial extent of the world, civilization, and the 
meaning of ethnicity must have changed during the Yuan era. The Hongwu emperor 
promulgated codes designed to sharply distinguish among Chinese, Mongols, and Central 
Asians, and reduce the cultural impact of the Mongols in China. Furthermore, the Great Ming 
Code expanded Chinese law to cover foreigners, rather than applying their own local customs as 
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had been practiced under the Tang Code. In one such promulgation, Mongols and Central Asians 
in China were encouraged to marry Chinese: 
凡蒙古色目人聽與中國人為婚姻不許本類自相嫁娶違者杖八十男女入官為奴其
中國人不願與回回欽察為婚姻者聽從本類自相嫁娶不在禁限 
 
Mongols and semu people shall marry Chinese persons… They shall not marry within 
their own people. Any violation shall be punished by eighty strokes of beating with the 
heavy stick, and both men and women shall be enslaved by the government. If Chinese 
persons do not wish to marry Qincha Hui Muslims, the latter may marry among their 
own; the above prohibition shall not be applied.240 
 
Other laws were designed to stifle the “polluting” (wuran 汙染) influence of Mongol customs in 
China. In his earliest promulgations, the Hongwu emperor made classical references to the 
“mutton-stink” of the barbarians and the “sweeping away” of their practices. Once enthroned as 
emperor, he took measures to ensure such practices would not become re-entrenched, including 
laws designed to fix surnames to ethnicity: 
禁蒙古色目人更易姓氏詔曰天生斯民族屬姓氏各有本源古之聖王尤重之所以
別婚姻重本始以厚民俗也朕起布衣定群雄為天下主已嘗詔告天下蒙古諸色人
等皆吾赤子果有材能一體擢用比聞入仕之後或多更姓名朕慮歲久其子孫相傳
昧其本源誠非先王致謹氏族之道中書省其告諭之如已更易者聽其改正 
 
Prohibition against Mongols and Central Asians changing their names: 
 
Regarding the inherited names of the various minorities, there is an origin for each name. 
The sage kings of ancient times considered this especially important, and thus disallowed 
intermarriage. This was an important fundamental from the very beginning in order to be 
generous to folk customs. 
 
I, the Sovereign, awoke and made known my intentions, pacified the multitudes and the 
mighty, and became master of All Under Heaven. Thereafter I instructed the Mongols 
and Central Asians under Heaven to act as my loyal sons. As expected there were those 
with talent, and I promoted them to a man. 
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I heard that after they had entered office, some changed their names. I have been 
concerned about this for many years. Those officials’ descendants inherited their names 
and titles and hide their true origins. Indeed, it is not the case that the former kings 
conveyed conscientiousness [regarding] the ways of the clans. I have instructed the 
Grand Secretariat [on this matter]. If there are those who have already changed [their 
names], then hear this correction.241 
 
Similar laws sought to enforce clothing regulations, though the fact that the Ming court 
frequently re-issued such regulations implies that such laws were ineffective, and also suggests 
that customs, practices, and clothing in northern China had for a long while overlapped with 
those of steppe nomads. The words of the Hongwu emperor, born a peasant, attest to the cultural 
reality of the average Ming subject in the fourteenth century: 
詔復衣冠如唐制初元世祖起自朔漠以有天下悉以胡俗變易中國之制士庶咸辮
髮椎…胡俗衣服則為袴褶窄袖及辮線腰褶婦女衣窄袖短衣下服裙裳無復中國
衣冠之舊甚者易其姓氏為胡名習胡語俗化既久恬不知怪上久厭之至是悉命𣸪
衣冠如唐制士民皆束髮于頂官則烏紗帽圓領袍束帶黑靴… 
 
An imperial order to return to clothing according to Tang regulations: 
 
Since Khubilai Khan arose from the desert and came to possess All under Heaven, he 
used Hu [barbarian] customs to transform the systems of the Central Kingdoms 
[zhongguo 中國]. Scholars and commoners all wore their hair braided down the backs … 
Hu customs and clothes then became pleated trousers, narrow sleeves and hair braided to 
the waist. Women’s clothing consisted of pleated trousers and short jackets, and 
underneath a skirt. 
 
We have not returned to the old clothing styles of the Central Kingdoms. This is 
extremely serious. [People] have changed their family names to Hu names, and study Hu 
languages. Customs have already been changed for a long while, and no one thinks it 
strange. Know that I command clothing and attire to be according to Tang regulations. 
Scholars and commoners all shall bind their hair at the top of the head, and officials shall 
wear black caps, with clothes [pulled] over the head. Gowns should be worn with belts, 
and black boots. …242 
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This passage on clothing customs does not, on its own, represent a revelation in Ming studies. 
However, few historians seem to have paid attention to the fact that the first Ming emperor 
thought steppe customs and clothes so common that it required legislation to reverse.  For the 
Hongwu emperor and his court, law controlled and categorized Ming subjects in ways that the 
Tang and Song states had not envisioned. 
Curiously, as Jiang Yonglin points out, the Great Ming Code does not describe laws 
governing marriage and family names among any populations besides Mongols and Central 
Asians.243 Nor does it acknowledge that many of its marriage laws were derived from Yuan 
precedents, so that “the ‘barbarian’ Mongol legal legacy… became an essential component of the 
‘Chinese’ anti-‘barbarian’ discourse in the Ming.”244 How do we unpack this paradox? By 
placing these observations in a longue durée context, thus revealing the enormous cultural and 
ethnic political impacts of the Mongols and the Yuan state. The reality of northern China in the 
late fourteenth century was undoubtedly that its population was ethnically and culturally mixed, 
that its people observed a variety of customs, and its practices did not conform to the social 
vision of the Hongwu emperor and his scholar-statesmen. The inability of the Ming state to 
enforce its ethnic vision suggests that either the Ming state did not wish to supply the men and 
material necessary to acculturate northern China’s populations, or it could not possibly do so, 
given the fact that northern China had been culturally diverse for four centuries. This could not 
be undone in a mere twenty years. 
 
 
 
                                                 
243 Ibid, p. 131. 
244 Ibid, p. 139. 
114 
 
B. SPATIAL REPRESENTATIONS OF THE EMPIRE AND THE STEPPE 
FRONTIER IN THE SONG, YUAN, AND MING 
 
 
It is not a new scholarly notion that early Ming rulers never intended the border to remain fixed 
on the steppe frontier as an artificial barrier between the “barbaric” and the “cultured.” Twenty-
five years ago, Arthur Waldron argued that the Great Wall we know of today did not exist as a 
physical construct nor an idea before the Ming dynasty, and did not become those things until the 
sixteenth century, well into the dynasty’s existence. The revelation that there was no singular 
Wall has intellectual significance: 
In the Ming . . . the question facing the first rulers after the Mongol Yuan had been 
overthrown was not, as is sometimes thought, how once again to hold the Great Wall, 
because there was no Great Wall then. Rather, the problem was where the Ming 
dynasty’s own territory should end. Should it stretch north, and try to encompass at least 
some of the territory that its predecessor, the Mongol Yuan, had held? Or should it adopt 
a line closer to the ecological boundary of Chinese-style agriculture? Debate over this 
issue simmered for most of the dynasty’s nearly three hundred years. . . .245 
 
The term associated with the Great Wall (changcheng 長城) appears only four times in the 
records of the Ming Shilu from the thirty-year reign of the founder, the Hongwu emperor: twice 
in the opening years, and twice in the middle. It appears only three times in the Yongle records, 
four times in the Xuande records, and four times in the Zhengtong/Tianshun records. By 
contrast, it appears eight times in the Hongzhi reign, nine times in the Wanli reign, and ten times 
in the Tianqi reign.246 Just as no perpetual manmade construct separated the sedentary 
agricultural and nomadic steppe worlds, neither did geographic features universally provide such 
barriers.247 The difference between the cultured and the barbaric, as Waldron puts it, was moral, 
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not geographic.248 The Ming state, with a long history from which it could draw, understood that 
the difference could be militaristic as well. 
The single, continuous Great Wall that we see today may not have existed prior to the 
Ming, but fortifications intended to provide defense against nomadic incursion have existed in 
various forms since the Warring States Era. These fortifications were not passed on or inherited 
between dynasties. Different states, including those that originated outside of China, constructed 
them for different purposes in different places, often left different stretches of defensive walls 
unconnected, and sometimes did not find need to construct them at all (such as the Tang).249 In 
the early 20th century Owen Lattimore suggested that Qin- and Han-era fortifications in the north 
were built for the dual purpose of defense and population control; i.e. keeping frontier settlers in 
the empire and preventing them from joining nomadic populations.250 Across the long span of 
Chinese history, steppe-region walls have served numerous strategic and political purposes. 
Song dynasty-era depictions of fortifications offer significant information on the perceptions and 
realities of strategic concerns and policies in middle-period Chinese history. The Song, far more 
than the Ming, appears in scholarship as a territorially truncated empire, the smallest of China’s 
unifying states by the reckoning of the Qing-era zhengshi 正史. Historians familiar with the 
Song dynasty’s perpetual armed struggle with first the Khitan Liao dynasty (907–1125) and later 
the Jurchen Jin dynasty (1115–1234) will understand that the strategic core of these conflicts lay 
in the Sixteen Prefectures region, a large parcel of territory around modern-day Beijing.251 The 
Sixteen Prefectures were particularly important because they opened the way to the North China 
                                                 
248 Waldron, The Great Wall of China, p. 42–3. 
249 Ibid., 47–48. 
250 Owen Lattimore, “Origins of the Great Wall of China: A Frontier Concept in Theory and Practice,” in 
Geographical Review 27.4 (1937): pp. 98, 112. 
251 Standen, Unbounded Loyalty, pp. 76–99. 
116 
 
Plain, and therefore control of the region was strategically imperative for any state centred in 
those flatlands.252 The Song never controlled the Prefectures: They remained administered and 
fortified by the Khitan Liao (907–1125) and Jurchen Jin (1115–1234) states, a source of constant 
anxiety for Song rulers and statesmen. 
Yet the Prefectures appear on Song maps as part of the Song empire. This is easily 
explained: Song cartographers imagined them as properly “cultured,” and to cede them to the 
barbarians on paper would be to acknowledge a strategically, politically and culturally 
unfavourable status quo. In the mind of Song statesmen, this perpetuity of control over the 
Prefectures extended into the distant past. A Song-era compilation of forty-four maps titled the 
Lidai dili zhizhang tu 歷代地理指掌圖 depicts the region as part of all past empires and eras, 
from mythical antiquity through the Song. But the most curious element of these maps is that 
each and every one depicts a northern border marked by fortifications, always on the steppe 
frontier, and always encompassing the Prefectures and other regions along the same latitude. 
This includes the then most-current map, titled “The prefectures and commanderies of cultured 
and foreign places during our Great dynasty.” (Ben chao hua wai zhou jun tu 本朝化外州郡
圖).253 
The depiction of these walls is particularly important because during long periods of 
China’s history, there were often no such continuous (or even discontinuous, or any) 
fortifications along that frontier. In addition, the depictions did not represent contemporary 
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political realities. Shui Anli 稅安禮 (fl. 11th–12th cen.), the Song author of the Lidai dili 
zhizhang tu, imagined a fortified border as the proper separation between China and the 
“barbarians,” a border that enveloped regions the Song state did not govern. The atlas was 
designed to serve as a pedagogical tool for literati studying for the examinations, and was 
intended as a reference for answering questions related to statecraft, government and territorial 
administration.254 It went through several editions in the Song, demonstrating its popularity and 
perceived usefulness in matters practical and ideological. In effect, whether or not Song-era 
bureaucrats, literati, and elites knew it did not depict a territorially accurate rendering of China’s 
imperial past and present, they imagined that it should. This imagining became even more 
stretched in later Song maps—the 1180s Duoli tu 墮理圖 similarly depicts the empire and a 
steppe-frontier fortification, even though the entire northern half of this depicted empire had long 
been lost to the Jurchen Jin dynasty. 
Only one map of the entire Mongol Empire from the Yuan era has survived to the present 
day, in the Yuan jingshi dadian 元經世大典 (1329), a compilation of statecraft texts, and it 
depicts Eurasia on a grid.255 The distinctive grid is usually what first grabs a viewer’s attention, 
but more importantly for our discussion, it represents the first true map of Eurasia in Chinese 
geographic knowledge. China’s cartographic tradition of mapping regions outside China prior to 
the Yuan era tended to rely on literary sources rather than the geographic knowledge of 
merchants or wayfarers, and preferred to depict places and people according to their relative 
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position and proximity to China rather than according to geographic accuracy.256 The sheer 
extent of the Mongol conquests and the establishment of the Yuan dynasty ushered in a new era 
of imperial vision and cartographic depiction. As Hyunhee Park has discussed, the Muslim 
scholar Jamal al-Din submitted a memorial to Khubilai Khan that reflected these innovations: 
在先漢兒田地些小有來，那地里的文字冊子四五十冊有來，如今日頭出來
處、日頭沒處都是咱每的，有的圖子有也者，那遠的他每怎生般理會的？回
回圖子我根底有，都總做一箇圖子呵，怎生？ 
 
The entire land of China was very small in the past. The geographic books of the Khitai 
[Chinese] had only forty to fifty types. Now all of the land from the place of sunrise to 
the sunset has become our territory. And, therefore, do we not need a more detailed map? 
How can we understand distant places? The Islamic maps are in our hands. And therefore 
we could combine them [with the Chinese maps] to draw a [world] map.257 
 
The earliest map we have from the Ming era, the fifteen-foot wide silk scroll Da Ming Hunyi Tu 
(大明混一圖, the Amalgamated Map of the Great Ming), originated in the late fourteenth 
century. It is strikingly different from its Song predecessors, and more closely resembles the 
Yuan grid map in its extent and format.258 It depicts not only what has traditionally been called 
“Inner China,” but the entirety of Eurasia, as well as Japan and some Southeast Asian islands, in 
a distorted yet recognizable form. Of the features depicted on the map, two are particularly 
relevant for our discussion. First, the map places greater territorial emphasis on regions once 
governed by the Mongols; and second, it depicts no walls or fortifications in northern China. 
These points have significant consequences for how empire was imagined in the early Ming 
regime.  
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Who made the Amalgamated Map, why was it made, and what sources did its creators 
use? A 1994 study concluded, based on the use of specific place names, that it was crafted in the 
early decades of the Ming dynasty, perhaps in 1389.259 This would date the map to two decades 
after the formal end of the Yuan dynasty. More recently, Lin Meicun has argued that the artists 
who created it were probably court painters, given that the early Ming state did not have a 
designated court cartographer.260 He also notes that Xu Da, one of the most successful early 
Ming generals, sealed and protected the Yuan court’s records when he conquered their capital, 
Dadu, thus preserving materials that may have been the sources for the Amalgamated Map.261 
Liu’s speculations dovetail with the conclusions of Wang Qianjin, Hu Qisong and Liu Ruofang, 
who suggested that the Amalgamated Map may have derived its depictions of various regions 
from several sources: Of China from the Yu ditu 與地圖, a nonextant Yuan-era map drawn by 
Zhu Siben 朱思本 (d. ~1335) in the early 14th century; of Africa, Europe, and Southeast Asia 
from a nonextant map drawn by Li Zemin 李澤民 (fl. 14th cen.) called Sheng Jiao Guang Bei Tu 
聲教廣被圖; and of India and other places from the Diqiuyi 地球儀 of Muslim scholar Jamal al-
Din (Zhama Luding 札馬魯丁, fl. 13th cen.).262 Other scholars have similarly concluded that the 
Amalgamated Map, and its Korean counterpart, the Kangnido (Hun yi jiang li lidai guodu zhi tu 
混一疆理历代国都之图), drew their geographic information of particular regions from 
particular sources—Chinese, Mongol and Muslim.263 The cartographic traditions involved in 
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their creation, and the improved accuracy of southern oceanic locations when compared to Song 
maps, further reinforces their Yuan origins.264 
The map’s proposed date of origin in 1389 places it near the end of the reign of the first 
ruler of the Ming dynasty, Zhu Yuanzhang, known as the Hongwu emperor. The Hongwu 
emperor’s thirty-year rule was characterized by the stabilization of the new empire and attention 
towards the remaining military threat posed by the Mongols. The Amalgamated Map was created 
in an era of strategic fluctuation between the young Ming empire and the remnants of the 
Northern Yuan on the steppe. Between 1369 and 1398, Ming military endeavors on the northern 
frontier shifted at various times among direct attempts to invade Mongolia (1370–72), 
suspension of steppe campaigns in favor of internal consolidation and expansion on other 
frontiers, (1372–87), and geostrategic maneuvering to expand into the northwest via Gansu and 
northeast via Liaodong in order to outflank the center of Mongol power (1387 onward).265 After 
the Hongwu emperor’s death in 1398, civil war between the young Jianwen Emperor and his 
uncle Zhu Di (the founder’s fourth son) interrupted Ming strategic efforts in the north, but Zhu 
Di’s victory and ascension to the throne as the Yongle emperor ushered in a new, aggressive 
phase of Ming-Mongol warfare. The Yongle emperor moved his capital to Beijing, and from that 
base led five campaigns into the steppe with various levels of success. He was able to do so 
because of his efforts to create a more robust supply network necessary for operation in the 
steppe environment, and the large-scale acquisition of warhorses from foreign sources, including 
Korea and friendly Mongol tribes.266 Unlike in earlier and later reigns, initial setbacks at the 
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hands of the Mongols galvanized rather than tempered Ming expansionism under the Yongle 
emperor: When his handpicked general Qiu Fu was defeated and killed in modern Heilongjiang, 
the emperor decided to lead the next campaign rather than settle for a robust defense.267 After the 
Yongle reign, Ming military action in the north never again operated with any success in the 
Mongolian region. His death marked what scholars have described as the truncation of Ming 
expansion and the beginning of strategically insular politics in the Ming court: Between the 
Yongle reign and the late 1440s, Ming bureaucrats increasingly decried the fiscal wastefulness 
and futility of the northern campaigns.268 
Thirteen eighty-nine is of particular importance in the context of the Hongwu emperor’s 
strategic attitude towards the Mongols, because that year was in the middle of the resumption of 
large-scale Ming incursions into Mongol territory after the period of consolidation and defense. 
The Ming undertook these incursions in response to the nascent power of the self-declared 
emperor of the Northern Yuan, Toghus Temür, and his most powerful allies and commanders, 
Naghachu and Nayir Bukha. In 1387 Ming armies marched into Liaodong against Naghachu, 
defeating him and forcing his surrender, thereupon prompting Toghus Temür to flee to the old 
Mongol capital of Karakorum where he died in 1388. This was followed by a campaign in 1390 
against Nayir Bukha, which ended after Ming attacks into Mongolia itself forced his defeat and 
surrender. In the context of ongoing Ming military engagements in the north, then, the proposed 
date of 1389 for the creation of the Amalgamated Map was situated in a renewed period of Ming 
aggression towards the Mongols. In this sense, the map’s lack of fortifications on the frontier 
reflects an open vision towards the boundaries—or lack thereof—of the northern frontier, and a 
rhetorical desire for an extension of Ming authority over strategically troublesome area. It is also 
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worth noting that the names of Ming princely estates, created for the purpose of maintaining 
northern military preparations, are one of the identifiers scholars have used to determine the date 
of the map’s creation.269 The conscious efforts of the creator of the Amalgamated Map, given the 
military context of the time, suggests an awareness of the crucial situation along the heavily 
militarized northern frontier and the desire to encompass former Yuan territory for the glory and 
security of the Ming empire.  
As Liu has noted, scholars have repeatedly concluded that the author(s) of the 
Amalgamated Map and the Kangnido likely derived their knowledge from these Yuan maps and 
perhaps other sources of information obtained from Yuan archives.270 The Kangnido probably 
drew its Central Asian place names from Arabic sources transmitted during the era of Mongol 
dominance of Eurasia.271 However, I know of no scholarship that has placed the Amalgamated 
Map in a larger context, particularly one that situates the early Ming as part of a longer transition 
era beginning in the Song. It seems likely that its anonymous creator lived through the last years 
of the Yuan, and, if he was educated, was at least familiar with common perceptions of empire 
under the Yuan regime and the Yuan state’s legitimating principles. Confucian elites who lived 
during the Yuan era often justified Mongol conquest and rule of China with the rationale that 
they had united the whole world, and had thus done something even the Tang dynasty and the 
ancient kings had not accomplished.272 It was Heaven’s will that the Mongols had received the 
Mandate, and thus that they governed all under Heaven. Therefore, in the fourteenth century, 
policy-makers and elites in the early Ming dynasty appear to have imagined the Ming empire as 
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the imperial inheritor of the Yuan empire, and not as a deliberately conservative state in spatial 
terms. This single map, the Da Ming Hunyi Tu, serves as a snapshot of how early Ming literati 
and their emperor envisioned the empire. It is the only map we have from the period, but its 
importance cannot be understated, because it is wholly unique in Chinese cartographic history. 
No maps depicting a similar spatial extent appear in China again until the arrival of Jesuits and 
Western cartographic techniques during the late sixteenth century. 
By the mid-Ming era, however, the familiar construct of the steppe-frontier fortification 
reappeared with vigour, indicating a spatially limited vision of empire. The Guang Yu Tu, an 
atlas compiled by Luo Hongxian (1504–64), very clearly depicts not only a continuous wall 
stretching from the Yellow Sea to Ningxia, but additionally represents the Gobi Desert as a 
single, solid barrier demarcated by a stark black band.273 The Guang Yu Tu 广與图, like the 
Amalgamated Map, was based on Zhu Siben’s nonextant Yuditu, suggesting that it was primarily 
concerned with depicting the regions inside China, but the stark difference between how each 
represents frontier regions suggests a dramatically different way of thinking about the Eurasian 
world at large and the Ming empire’s place within it. The Guang Yu Tu also omits many place 
names for frontier regions in favour of more labels within China, despite the fact that the 
Amalgamated Map indicates Ming court elites had access to geographical information about 
Eurasia.274 The separation between the Ming empire and the steppe and the willingness to omit 
foreign place names, according to Luo Hongxian’s representation, was one willed by Heaven and 
reinforced by man. Such a combination of artificial and geographic barriers was not unknown in 
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the Chinese literary tradition. To take one representative example from the Han dynasty, Cai 
Yong (133–92) wrote: 
天設山河，秦築長城，漢起塞垣，所以別內外，異殊俗也 … 雖或破之，豈可
殄盡，而方本朝為之旰食乎？ 
 
Heaven arranged [she 設] mountains and rivers, the Qin built long walls, and the Han 
constructed strategic fortresses. These [measures] divide the inner and outer, and separate 
the common from the coarse. . . . How could we [live] together with such beasts?275 
 
What caused this change in Ming thought between 1389 and the 1500s? After the Yongle 
emperor’s death, a series of strategic decisions, careful calculations, and military blunders 
changed Ming perceptions of empire into one that ended at the steppe. The Tumu Crisis of 1449, 
during which a large Chinese army was annihilated and the emperor captured, stands out as a 
particularly shocking turn of events that dramatically altered Ming strategic culture in Beijing’s 
court. In state records compiled immediately after the Crisis and the Zhengtong Emperor’s 
capture, we can find a representative reference to the role of walls and geography in separating 
the inner and outer, reflecting Cai Yong’s attitude: 
…遼東宣府大同寧夏甘肅皆有高山大川長城固壘限隔延綏境外亦有黃河千六
百餘里實天造地設之 
 
. . . Liaodong, Xuanfu, Datong, Ningxia, and Gansu all have high mountains, great rivers, 
and long walls. It is assured that their strong fortifications separate [us] and pacify the 
frontiers. Furthermore, the Yellow River extends more than sixteen hundred li. Truly 
Heaven created the earth and arranged [she 設] them.276 
 
The Ming military’s ability to operate in the steppe also deteriorated. The Yongle emperor’s 
onerous campaigns into Mongolia were costly on the depopulated north, and the weisuo 衛所 
and tuntian 屯田 systems that had organized and maintained the two-million-strong Ming army 
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eroded after the 1420s.277 The expensive postal relay system, vital for communications during 
deep steppe campaigns, fell into disrepair, limiting the ability and willingness of the Ming court 
to dispatch expeditionary forces.278 The reduction of Ming operations in the Mongolian steppe 
and interference in Mongol politics allowed the resurgence of Mongol power under new 
warlords, particularly the Oirat general Esen, who was responsible for defeating the Zhengtong 
Emperor’s army in 1449.279 The court’s reaction to the emperor’s decision to lead a campaign 
had been poor, and his capture caused panic over both the Ming empire’s military situation and 
the line of succession.280  
The Tumu Crisis was carved into the memory of Ming bureaucrats, elites and rulers long 
after the incident itself, and became a byword for disaster, misfortune and caution, lamented as 
the “Tumu hardship” (Tumu zhi nan 土木之難), the “Tumu calamity” (Tumu zhi hai 土木之害), 
and the “Tumu defeat” (Tumu zhi bai 土木之敗).281 It fundamentally challenged Ming 
intellectuals’ relationship with Song Confucian precedents, called into question Yongle-era 
standardizations of Neo-Confucian texts and interpretations, and complicated the relationship 
between adherence to orthodox philosophical models and effective government.282 As de Heer 
notes, into the sixteenth century the crisis was cause for political disturbance when the Zhengde 
Emperor (r. 1505–21), known for his impetuous behavior, wished to lead an expedition against 
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the army of Dayan Khan, but met opposition from an official who was willing to disobey his 
emperor and physically block the his passage in order to prevent a repeat of the Tumu Crisis.283  
The Crisis, then, called into question accepted imperial and Confucian norms, destabilizing 
Song-era philosophical precedents while at the same time cementing a theretofore fluid frontier 
along the lines of the existing fortifications and, by the end of the fifteenth century, the Great 
Wall itself.284 We can conclude that the legacy of the Yuan imperium remained strong in the 
early Ming regime, and Ming ambitions to incorporate the former Yuan heartland lingered in the 
dynasty’s founding decades, but after 1449 these ambitions largely dissolved. The absence in the 
Da Ming Hunyi Tu of an otherwise consistently depicted fortified steppe border, and the fact that 
the map more closely resembles its Yuan counterpart rather than those made during the Song, 
and its creation during a period of aggression towards the Mongol steppe speaks to these 
ambitions. 
Visually, the Song and Ming maps differ in content and presentation. The Da Ming Hunyi 
Tu is purely a territorial map, with no accompanying text except for place-name labels. Each 
map of China in the Lidai Dili Zhizhang Tu includes text that explains what the map depicts, and 
the context of each historical era. Even considering only the region of China (which the Da Ming 
Hunyi Tu goes far beyond), the Da Ming includes much more detail, naming some several 
hundred local places and painstakingly depicting dozens of rivers and mountains. The Song maps 
are much more simplistic, and reflect a mapmaking tradition more concerned with 
contextualizing with written records rather than visually depicting a vast empire. The Song maps, 
then, suggest less concern with territorial majesty and more concerned with how places and 
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people within a strictly defined region changed over time. The Da Ming purports to show the 
empire in a single moment – or at least the vision Ming rulers maintained for the new empire – 
encompassing the old Mongol empire and demonstrating the vast reach of the Ming polity. 
 
 
 
C. THE POLITICS OF HISTORIOGRAPHICAL INCORPORATION 
 
 
Early Ming documents reflect, in subtle language, the idea in the early Ming that Mongolia, at 
least, was properly part of the Ming empire. In a diplomatic letter to Japan, the Hongwu emperor 
referenced his military expeditions into Mongolia: 
…北夷遠遁沙漠將及萬里特遣征虜大將軍率馬步八十萬出塞追獲殲厥渠魁大
統已定… 
 
. . . The northern barbarians [i.e. Mongols] distanced themselves and evaded us in the 
desert, travelling as far as ten thousand li. I have dispatched a special expeditionary 
general to lead a cavalry army of 800,000 to march through the passes, and capture and 
destroy the rebels. Unification is certain . . . .285 
 
These discussions extended beyond territorial incorporation into an intellectual inclusion of the 
Mongols into the Ming state’s reckoning of the imperial past. The use of the term “unification” 
(datong 大統) implies the northern steppe as part of the Ming empire. 
Ming emperors, furthermore, did not consider the Mongols themselves and their customs as the 
reason for the Yuan collapse. In the minds of early Ming rulers, the Yuan fall came about 
because of rather “traditional” failings on the part of its state and statesmen: avarice and the 
inability to govern. A 1379 decree from the Hongwu emperor admonished his own 
administration for his shortcomings and drew direct parallels between his subordinates and the 
Yuan court: 
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元本胡人起自沙漠一旦據有中國混一海內建國之初輔弼之臣率皆賢達進用
者…以政治翕然可觀及其後也小人擅權奸邪競進舉用親舊結為朋黨中外百司
貪婪無話由是法度日弛紀綱不振至于土崩瓦解卒不可救今創業之初若不嚴立
法度以革奸弊…故必選賢能以隆治化爾等有所荐引當慎所擇 
 
The hu [胡] who established the Yuan arose from the desert and in a short time 
amalgamated China with the whole world [中國混一海內]. At the founding of the 
country the assisting officials generally attained use. . . Thus government was 
harmonious and ordered. [But] petty men accumulated power and craftily competed for 
advancement; they selected relatives and friends for positions and produced cliques. 
Officials at home and abroad were avaricious and without shame. Because of this, laws 
became loosened on a daily basis and the code lacked vitality. Finally as a result, [the 
dynasty] collapsed—soldiers could not save it. 
 
Now at the beginning of our great venture it is like [we too] are not strict, and that laws 
are passed through wickedness and treachery. . . . In this instance we must select the 
sage-like through a renovation of great government. You, the officialdom, to some extent 
ought to carefully select [in this manner.]286 
 
According to the Hongwu emperor, the great accomplishment of the Mongols was to bring 
together the entire world, and to subsequently govern in a “harmonious and ordered” fashion. 
Over time, however, the Yuan administration became corrupt, ineffective, and factionalized. The 
Hongwu emperor saw the same pattern occurring within his state apparatus and sought to stamp 
out such practices before they could become entrenched. His concern was great enough that he 
often repeated them to his court, and similar pronouncements are found elsewhere: 
自古聖賢之君不以祿私親不以官私愛惟求賢才以治…元朝出於沙漠惟任一己
之私不明先王之道所在官司輒以蒙古色目人為之長但欲私其族類羈縻其民而
矣非公天下愛民圖治之心也…末年以來其弊尤甚以致社稷傾危而卒莫之救卿
等宜以為戒選官之際慎擇其人而用之勿徇其弊也 
 
Since ancient times, the sagacious ruler would not selfishly [benefit] himself with salary, 
or selfishly love [himself] through government. . . . When the Yuan came from the desert 
they only took responsibility for their own personal gain, and did not illuminate the way 
of the former kings. The government and ministries abruptly employed Mongolians and 
Central Asians. They only desired selfish gains for their clansmen and to tyrannize over 
the people. They did not have the intention of benevolent rule over all under heaven, [nor 
did they] love the people or consider the heart of governance. . . . From the last years of 
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the dynasty this abuse became especially pronounced. Consequently the state collapsed 
and all was in peril, and among the soldiers none saved it. The ministers should have 
assumed to warn against [this]. [Thus I instruct:] establish your officials’ boundaries. 
Carefully select your men and employ them [properly]; do not give in to this sort of 
abuse.287 
 
It was not demeaning to make these comparisons, because the Yuan held a place in imperial 
history. In the end, according to Hongwu, it was the classic encroachment of ineptitude that had 
brought down the Yuan state, not its Mongol origins. 
The Hongwu emperor’s son and third ruler of the Ming dynasty, the Yongle emperor, is 
often presented in modern historiography as a pragmatic sovereign who utilized Mongols in his 
court and army when they proved useful.288 Like his father, he understood the place of the 
Mongols in both the Ming empire during his reign, and in the dynasty’s imagining of its imperial 
past. Particularly, referencing his Mongol predecessors, he noted that, “The Yuan used the 
northern barbarians to rule the Chinese [元 以 胡 人 主 中 夏].”289 This curious wording makes 
a clear distinction between the Yuan dynasty state (or court) and the huren, a term traditionally 
used to describe nomadic horse-riding peoples living north of China. It was the Yuan state that 
received Heaven’s Mandate to rule, and the Mongols who were a tool deployed to achieve that 
purpose. No doubt the Yongle emperor understood that the Yuan dynasty was dominated 
politically by Mongols, but he chose to deculturalize the Yuan state as a means of shamelessly 
incorporating the Mongols into the legitimizing history he referenced. 
Early Ming emperors were also quite conscious of the historical dangers of military 
weakness, particularly lambasting the Song dynasty for its failures. They were astute in their 
knowledge of the reasons for Tang and Yuan military superiority, praising their military 
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pragmatism and effective organization of armed campaigns. Under the Yongle emperor’s 
scrutinizing eye, this deployment of comparative military history was particularly judicious: 
自古國家盛衰存亡未有不係於武備之張弛漢唐世遠置不言近代宋太祖太宗受
天命將勇兵強削除暴亂四海晏然及其子孫弗率武備不修醜虜僣竊至海內分裂
宗社… 
 
世祖時戎部嚴整甲兵強…數世嗣主荒淫王綱紐軍致廢弛…我皇考太祖高皇帝
受天命定天下于時將帥效忠士卒奮勇肅清奸宄遂建洪業 
 
朕嗣位以來夙夜惕厲唯恐蹈宋元覆轍以墜皇考丕緒 
 
Since ancient times the country has flourished and declined, living and dying. [This] has 
never been unconnected to the tension and relaxation of defensive preparations. The 
ancient Han and Tang put [such measures] into place. [The same] cannot be said of recent 
times. Song Taizu and Taizong received the Mandate of Heaven and through armed 
strength, suppressed rebellion. All within the four seas were at peace. But their 
descendants did not command the military and did not study their enemies, who 
overstepped their boundaries, secretly encroached upon the whole world and divided up 
the broken royal house. … 
 
During Kublai Khan’s time, the military offices were ordered and armor and weapons 
were strong. . . . [However], successive kings were licentious, and the army fell into 
neglect . . . . Our great founder [Ming] Taizu, the high emperor, received the Mandate to 
rectify all under Heaven.  At that time the generals vowed loyalty and the soldiers were 
dauntless to purge evildoers; they thereupon established this great undertaking [i.e. the 
Ming empire]. 
 
Since I [the Yongle emperor] have inherited the throne, day and night I have been on 
guard for fear that [we] will follow in the footsteps of the disastrous policies of the Song 
and Yuan and collapse the founder’s great undertaking.290 
 
Here we see a series of judgments. The Han and Tang were to be presented as repositories of 
strong policy. The Song was to be considered a failure for its unwillingness to “study its 
enemies”—the steppe-and-forest Khitans and Jurchens. The Yuan was to be admired for its 
strong military but regarded as a warning for its failure to manage the excesses of its ruling elite 
and to control its military forces. Such references to the duty of soldiers and the place of military 
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power in the Chinese order appear frequently in early Ming records as ideals and policies to be 
reinforced. Modern scholastic notions of China and its Confucian civil tradition as pacifistic 
cannot be said to hold water.291 The Ming emperors harboured disgust with Song weakness and 
admiration for Khubilai Khan’s strength, and actively abandoned Song dynastic models.292 
 
 
 
D. CONCLUSION 
 
 
If we combine these two discussions – one of spatial representations of empire and the other of 
Ming treatments of the Mongol Yuan – a picture of parallel imperial constructions between the 
Yuan and Ming emerges. Instead of a sharp break from Mongol practices, ideas, and imperial 
visions, we see a continuation of those elements through the first half century of Ming rule, at 
least until 1449. Understanding that martial values remained vibrant and strong among Ming 
rulers in the early years of the dynasty clarifies why the Amalgamated Map overlaps Yuan 
realities with Ming depictions. 
A few problems remain: These are merely Ming depictions and ideas, and do not describe 
the real territorial extent of the Ming empire. However, these observations serve to place the 
early Ming years in a larger context. While scholars have suggested that the northern border was 
firmly entrenched as early as the late fourteenth century, I believe that these arguments are 
premature. Zhao Xianhai has pointed to the early Ming princedoms and the Taiyuan garrison, 
established during the Hongwu reign after the end of campaigns in 1372, as the foundations for 
the construction of the Great Wall, but this is a teleological argument that anticipates the 
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construction of the Wall a century before Ming court bureaucrats and emperors imagined it as a 
single defensive concept.293 It seems more likely that the early Ming fortifications were intended 
to extend Ming power into the steppe, an intention later redoubled with the Yongle emperor’s 
movement of the capital to the edge of the frontier at Beijing.294 This is not to say that the reality 
of Ming empire extended significantly beyond the defensive arrangements on the frontier, but the 
expression of Ming military authority and ability was much more fluid until the mid-fourteenth 
century, and only truly became intellectually and physically congealed after 1449. Zhao is 
otherwise correct to point out that after 1372 Ming expeditions and diplomatic endeavours 
focused on the northwest and northeast, rather than Mongolia itself, in an effort to outflank 
Mongol power, but I would also note, perhaps speculatively, that this mirrors Mongol attempts to 
outflank the position of the Southern Song in the mid-thirteenth century.295 
This argument is intended to treat the first century of Ming rule not as a military-despotic 
anomaly, but as a period of time that demonstrates temporal and intellectual overlap with the 
Yuan dynasty. It also suggests that the early Ming era should not be ignored in favour of rushing 
to discuss the entanglement of Ming state and society with the early-modern world economy. 
This examination of Ming martial values and ambitions serves to recalibrate Ming historiography 
and seek a place for an ambiguous era. 
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IV. CHAPTER 3: STRATEGIC IMPERATIVES ON THE STEPPE FRONTIER IN 
THE YUAN AND MING 
 
 
 
 
Historians have long observed the parallels between the Yuan and early Ming states, particularly 
with regards to the organization of military structures and strategic concerns on the agricultural-
steppe frontier zone. The Mongol empire and its successor in China, the Yuan Dynasty, looked 
southward across that frontier and over Yangtze River as it attempted to outflank and defeat the 
Southern Song. The Mongols wished to govern the south from the north, but the Song, 
diminished yet economically vibrant and possessed of a formidable array of defensive 
fortifications and natural barriers, resisted the Mongols’ attempts at conquest for forty years. 
Over a century later, the early Ming state expanded at the expense of the collapsing Yuan and 
looked north across the agricultural-steppe frontier. Its first and third emperors wished to 
reconstitute the territory of the old Yuan empire under the Ming banner, and govern the north 
from the south. 
Beyond a cursory overview of centralized military systems, however, there are few 
studies that compare the personalized policies and decisions of Mongol and early Ming rulers. 
Timothy Brook offers an innovative approach to Yuan-Ming studies in The Troubled Empire by 
examining how the courts and literati of these two dynasties recorded and explained large-scale 
crises, particularly macroenvironmental changes and social upheaval. This chapter aims to forge 
a similarly uncharted path and make new, fruitful comparisons between three major imperial 
phenomena in each empire. The similarities between these phenomena are not just ephemeral, 
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but represent the similar strategic problems, imperatives, and solutions that the Yuan and Ming 
states faced. 
The first is a comparison between the Mongol arrangement of the appanage and the early 
Ming princely estates. In short, the Mongol appanages were gifts of territory and households 
granted by the Mongol khagan or other members of the Chinggisid lineage to successful or 
favored subordinates, most often military commanders. The Ming princely estates were small 
“fiefs” of territory located in strategically important regions of the empire, in which the first 
Ming emperor enfeoffed his sons and charged them with maintaining defensive preparations and 
undertaking military campaigns when ordered. I disagree with previous assertions that the Ming 
princedoms were incomparable to the Mongol appanages.296 They are only incomparable if we 
confine our consideration to the limited authority that Ming princes exercised under royal law. 
Once we understand that the Ming princes accumulated powers, privileges, and authority far 
beyond those delineated by the Ming founder, the Hongwu emperor, then we can imagine the 
early Ming princes and their estates as functionally similar to Mongol appanage-holders and their 
appanage territories. 
The second phenomena this chapter examines is the relocation of dynastic capitals. Two 
emperors of the Yuan-Ming era beg parallel examination: Khubilai Khan, the fifth kaghan of the 
Mongol empire and the founder of the Yuan Dynasty; and Zhu Di, later the Yongle emperor, 
third ruler of the Ming Dynasty. Scholars have compared Khubilai and the Yongle emperor 
before, particularly in the arenas of military action, diplomatic relations, naval expeditions, and 
eventual imperial overreach.297 I propose to analyze the political and strategic reasons for which 
both emperors moved their capitals to what is today Beijing. Khubilai Khan relocated his capital 
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from Shangdu, a site about 150 miles north of Beijing. The Yongle emperor moved the capital of 
the Ming Dynasty from Nanjing in central China, a distance of about 720 miles. The Beijing site 
is 80 miles from the coast of the Yellow Sea and is not connected via river to the major 
riverways of central and south China. It is not easily supplied, and the logistics involved in 
building, populating and feeding the city under both Khubilai and the Yongle emperor were 
extraordinarily challenging. These two imperial rulers selected the Beijing site for its strategic 
importance in the Yan region, the ancient name for an amorphous and loosely defined yet 
historically important area roughly encompassing the northern half of modern Hebei and the 
western half of Liaoning. 
The third phenomenon this chapter examines is the redeployment of Yuan military 
organizational structures by the early Ming state. Beyond simply observing that the organization 
of the early Ming military was similar to that of the Yuan, I suggest that Ming emperors adopted 
Yuan military organizational models because the emperors understood the efficacy of those 
systems. The Mongol conquest of much of Eurasia introduced new methods of military 
organization to numerous polities, who assimilated and adopted those methods. Chinese rulers 
after the Yuan fall did the same. The Confucian veneer that the Hongwu emperor espoused in 
Ming records was a rhetorical curtain that obscured the Yuan-style structural foundation of the 
Ming Dynasty’s heavily militarized founding decades. Confucian literati did benefit greatly 
under the Ming regime, as they were once again allowed access to the highest official posts that 
had been off-limits under the Yuan, but they still contended politically with the prestige, power, 
and wealth of military officers, who enjoyed rewards, titles, and meaningful political purpose 
during the Hongwu and Yongle reigns. By drawing and explaining connections among all three 
of these phenomena between the Yuan and Ming, I will demonstrate that these states found 
136 
 
reason to use similar approaches to deal with similar military and territorial problems, and drew 
from the same repository of military and state-building strategies. 
 
 
 
A. FUNCTIONAL SIMILARITIES BETWEEN MONGOL APPANAGES AND 
MING PRINCEDOMS 
 
 
1. MONGOL APPANAGES 
 
 
The unit of the “appanage” was only one part of a larger Mongol administration. It was also 
irregular in the sense that the circumstances and traditions surrounding the creation, 
management, and responsibilities of appanages were not consistent or standardized. However, in 
terms of how they managed territory and assigned political positions, the Mongol court was not 
as hands-off as scholars have previously thought.298 The appanage did serve as a territorial prize 
that the khagan could reward to loyal subjects who rendered service to the empire, but the 
purpose and use of the appanage as an imperial resource was not left entirely to the appanage-
holder. Rather, the appanage as a reward served as one of the khagan’s most powerful political 
tools while also functioning as a semi-autonomous source of food, financial resources, and 
manpower for the Mongol empire at large. 
In order to discuss similarities between Mongol and early Ming princely estates, we must 
know what an “appanage” was in the Mongol world, how they were assigned, and what role they 
played in the political landscape of the Mongol empire. In the simplest terms, the appanage 
(Chinese: touxia 投下, weixia 位下, fenti 分地, aima 愛馬; Mongolian: ayimagh), sometimes 
called “fief,” was an inheritable territorial award – including the population therein – granted to a 
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noble of the Mongol empire as a reward for service to the empire.299 Where did the appanage fit 
into Mongol administration? To summarize the overview of Mongol historian Timothy May, the 
appanage was a local reflection of the relatively decentralized  nature of the highest levels of 
Mongol government. At the empire’s political apex resided the kaghan, who theoretically held 
absolute power and whose Chinggisid lineage technically possessed all land and people within 
the empire. The kaghan’s center of power, the ordo, was a camp – often nomadic – of military 
guards, administrators, servants, and kinsmen that functioned as his administrative capital. The 
major Chinggisid princes underneath the kaghan also maintained smaller ordo of their own in the 
expanding frontiers of the empire, and their sons and grandsons maintained even smaller ordo. 
When the Mongol empire fractured in the mid-thirteenth century, the princely ordo became the 
highest centers of power within the four post-imperial khanates, in effect assuming the role of the 
kaghan’s ordo. A given ordo might have a very different administrative structure from any other 
ordo, as a given Chinggisid prince had virtually limitless authority to decide how he would staff 
and manage his own camp. The kaghan, and princes of khanate ordo, could also hand out parcels 
of territory as rewards for service to members of the royal family, distinguished military 
commanders, and loyal civil officials; these parcels of territory were what we call the 
appanage.300 
Appanages varied in size and importance depending on the relative standing of its holder. 
There remain unresolved historiographical questions over how interchangeable the above terms 
are for “appanage,” the degree to which appanage-holders operated within regularized “legal” 
limits laid out by the empire’s central administration, and how the privileges and powers of 
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appanage-holders changed over time.301 However, we can outline some generalities. The kaghan 
and his princes had ultimate authority to hand out appanages to subjects in return for rendered 
services, most frequently after a significant campaign that involved territorial conquest, from 
which the kaghan carved appanage territory.302 Appanage-holders often fielded their own armies, 
collected their own taxes, and in the early decades of the Mongol empire were not strictly 
beholden to the kaghan’s fiscal oversight.303 Appanage-holders also had significant authority to 
appoint their own officials (if they were inclined to operate a bureaucratic administration), and 
could conduct law and punish offenders with considerable leeway.304 The material goods, 
households, and people granted to appanage-holders (particularly during the Mongol conquest of 
northern China) were considered the property of the holder and were not recorded in central 
registrars; later efforts by the Mongol court to re-register northern Chinese households for tax 
purposes met opposition from appanage-holders.305 In the broadest sense, the pre-Yuan Mongol 
administration valued the people of a territory more than the territory itself, especially as a 
source of manpower for the production of food and conscription of soldiers. The military 
contributions of an appanage-holder and the political capital the kaghan generated by rewarding 
territory were more important than the prospect of the kaghan holding direct power over the 
territory itself. This diminished the incentive for the kaghan and his court to retain personal 
control over all conquered territories.306 
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Despite this loose system of administration, appanage-holders did not enjoy complete 
control of their territories at all times, and their privileges waned over the course of the thirteenth 
century. In general, the kaghan’s administration monitored the general status of appanages, and 
if a prince or noble had grossly mismanaged his or her appanage, responsible officials could 
notify the kaghan who, as the theoretical owner of all imperial territory, could intervene to halt 
mismanagement if he so desired.307 In the early-thirteenth century the second Mongol kaghan 
Ögedei (r. 1229-1241) began to rescind the rights of appanage-holders. He restricted their ability 
to collect impromptu taxes, and implemented loose tax regulations, while in return issuing 
regular stipends to appanage-holders as a means of controlling their financial resources. Under 
the fourth kaghan Möngke (r. 1251-59), princes could no longer collect taxes ad hoc without 
prior approval from the kaghan’s court, and the kaghan’s court replaced all princely taxes with a 
unified imperial tax code.308 By the reign of the fifth kaghan and founder of the Yuan Dynasty in 
China, Khubilai (r. 1260-1294), Mongol officials understood that it was more lucrative and 
reliable to encourage and tax agriculture than it was to destructively loot agricultural regions. 
The Mongol court took measures to promote the cultivation of fertile land, and created an 
agricultural department which was responsible for disseminating agricultural techniques in Yuan 
China.309 
Khubilai’s reign marks the most thorough and well-recorded attempts by the Mongols to 
control appanages. In his efforts to regularize administration, Khubilai ensured that that the 
centers of political decision-making, particularly the Yan region of northeast China, were 
separated from the arbitrary power of appanage-holders: 
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詔諸投下毋擅勾攝燕京路州縣官吏. 
By imperial order: the appanages shall not exert influence over or assimilate the officials 
of the Yan capital region.310 
 
The Yan region, a province-sized area of land centered on modern Beijing, has been a 
contiguous territory governed by various independent states as early as the eleventh century 
BCE. The region became geopolitically important in the tenth century CE when the Song 
Dynasty in China had to interact as an equal with new empires situated in northeast Asia: the 
Khitan Liao and later the Jurchen Jin. The emergence of large, imperial powers in northeast Asia 
transformed the Yan region from a remote peripheral zone to a contested frontier with enormous 
strategic value.311 The Mongol conquest of the Jin Dynasty, Korea, and Khubilai Khan’s 
attempted invasions of Japan further ensured that the Yan region was the crossroads of major 
movements of supplies, soldiers, and imperial endeavors. 
As part of his consolidation of power, Khubilai also attempted to consolidate appanages 
into regularized administrative divisions, manage local official appointments, and streamline 
household registration: 
詔：「諸路州府，若自古名郡，戶數繁庶，且當衝要者，不須改併。[…] 各
投下者，併入所隸州城。其散府州郡戶少者，不須更設錄事司及司候司。附
郭縣止令州府官兼領。括諸路未占籍戶任差職者以聞。」 
 
Imperial pronouncement to all circuits and prefectures: ever since ancient times, named 
counties and populous household regions have been treated as important locations, and 
how they are assembled should not be altered. […] All those in appanages shall be 
attached to a prefecture or city. As for those few who are scattered and far from a 
prefecture or county, they shall not be placed under the watch of the Municipal Affairs 
Officer or Municipal Police. Suburban counties shall cease appointing prefectural 
officials to multiple posts at once. This includes all circuits that have not yet created 
household registries or assigned officials to conduct registration.312 
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These efforts represented the centralization of Mongol power and a reduction of the arbitrary 
power of entitled nobles, a process that the court struggled to continue through the Yuan 
Dynasty. Ultimately, however, the Mongol (and later Yuan) court never removed the appanage 
as an important unit of political power, a frustration that inhibited the late Yuan state from 
curbing corruption and quashing rural rebellion.313 Certain aspects of the original appanage 
system remained during Yuan times, including the valuation of people as manpower: Yuan state 
stipends granted to appanage-holders were handed out as both silver and manpower, 
“distributing conquered peoples or tribes as shares.”314 
In China, the Mongol court issued appanages primarily in the north, which Elizabeth 
Endicott-West suggests was a conscious decision intended to avoid disrupting the complex, 
burgeoning economic activity of southern China.315 The militarized nature of northern China 
during the Mongol-Jin and Mongol-Song wars explains why administration was often left in the 
hands of nobles instead of court-appointed officials: the imperial Mongol court valued military 
ability, and trusted appanage-holders to support the empire’s military campaigns rather than live 
as isolationist lords (a personal relationship between court and noble that finds its ideal model in 
Khubilai Khan’s early history, detailed below).316 Appanages assigned to members of the 
Chinggisid lineage, such as Khubilai’s appanage in northern China, functioned as a foundation 
for the extension of military power and a means of handing over administrative authority to 
trusted kinsmen, particularly in the expanding frontiers of the empire.317 For instance, fourteen 
appanages in northern China, northeast Asia and Yunnan – all frontier regions – served as 
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centers of warhorse-breeding for the purpose of supplying horses for military campaigns, postal 
stations, and the kaghan’s personal stables.318 
 
2. EARLY MING PRINCELY ESTATES 
 
The early-Ming princely estates, like the Mongol appanages, were only one part of a larger 
administration, and like the appanages, the estates overlapped irregularly with formal 
bureaucratic territorial divisions – in this case, the province (sheng 省) and prefecture (fu 府). 
Like the appanages, the princely estates had two primary functions: to provide foundations for 
military preparedness, and to hand over military-administrative authority to trusted members of 
the imperial lineage. In the years following the defeat and expulsion of Mongol Yuan forces, the 
Hongwu emperor’s strategic decisions reflected two goals: 1) to create a robust network of 
security in northern China to deal with Mongol conflicts, and 2) to balance the distribution of 
military power between the center and periphery in order to avoid a concentration of armed 
strength under any one individual.319 Hongwu found his solution to these problems in the 
princely estates. In order to understand the nature of the estates, it is necessary to briefly go over 
the military history of the early Ming. 
Following the formal establishment of the Ming Dynasty in 1368, the Ming re-conquest 
of northern China was not complete or straightforward. Mongol Yuan military forces remained 
coherent and powerful, and the most successful late-Yuan general, Kökö Temür, controlled 
significant territory in modern Gansu and Shaanxi. Between 1368 and 1370, Kökö Temür 
continued to score victories against Ming forces and raided southern Gansu as far south as 
Pingliang and west into Lanzhou. The uncertain military situation in northwest China only 
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swung in favor of the Ming when a Ming army stationed near modern Dingxi in Gansu repelled 
one of Kökö Temür’s last great offensives, and only at great cost.320 Political infighting among 
Kökö Temür’s political overlords and erstwhile subordinates then forced him to abandon Gansu 
and retreat into Mongolia, but he remained a military threat to the Ming, and loyal to the last 
Yuan emperor. Later Ming expeditions into the Mongolian heartland failed to decisively defeat 
the Mongols, and often met with disaster. In 1372, the Hongwu emperor’s most decorated 
general, Xu Da (then undefeated), marched from northern Shanxi into Mongolia with as many as 
150,000 infantrymen, where Kökö Temür crushed his forces. This defeat marked the last Ming 
attempt to push into Mongolia for the remainder of the decade. 
As the Hongwu emperor crystallized the permanent administrative structures of the Ming 
empire, he created two levels of military elites in order to formalize a new military arrangement. 
The first level consisted of the military commanders who had served under him during the 
tumultuous final years of the Yuan. Once enthroned, the Hongwu emperor granted them formal 
titles, commands, and monetary rewards, while also elevating them above the civil 
officialdom.321 Military service was virtually the only way to enter this level of nobility.322 
Above them, the Hongwu emperor began to transform his male offspring into “the highest 
stratum of the military nobility” by grooming them under the tutelage of his military officers, 
enfeoffing them in regional commands, and, once mature, granting them command of military 
units and charging them with the defense of their respective regions. The most heavily 
militarized zones were on the northern frontier, and the princes in the north were charged with 
curtailing Mongol raids and, when issued imperial orders, launching counter-offensives into the 
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steppe. The emperor’s second, third, and fourth oldest sons began to personally exercise the 
management of their northern military commands in the late 1370s, and eventually became the 
most powerful of the princes: Zhu Shuang (1356-95), enfeoffed near modern Xi’an; Zhu Gang 
(1358-98), enfeoffed in central Shanxi; and Zhu Di (1360-1424), enfeoffed in Dadu (renamed 
Beiping, and later Beijing), the former capital of the Yuan Dynasty.323 By the 1390s the Ming 
princes held a monopoly on military power and control over military resources in the most active 
zone of conflict: northern China.324 
Through imperial decrees we know the actual and nominal authority that the princes had 
over their estates, the limits of that authority, and the ways in which princes often circumvented 
the emperor’s proscriptions. The first emperor frequently revised and reissued a document 
entitled the Imperial Ming Ancestral Injunctions (Huang Ming zu xun 皇明祖訓), which served 
as a theoretically enforceable code of conduct for his statesmen, successors, and imperial 
relatives. The majority of the Injunctions dealt with princely behavior, and a plurality of its 
princely behavioral laws governed quotas and limits on the princes’ military and security 
forces.325 In geographic terms, the estates themselves began as territorially delineated “fiefs” that 
the Hongwu emperor granted to his sons when they turned twenty years old. Each son received a 
fixed stipend and an inheritable piece of land, rather like the appanages under Ögedei Khan. A 
retinue of officials, statesmen, and military officers assisted the prince in the management of his 
estate’s affairs. Princes initially held authority to exercise military command over delineated 
units in times of conflict and lead troops into battle, but over time they also assumed peacetime 
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management of the soldiers stationed in and beyond their described estates, including provincial 
armies.326 Nominally each prince only had the legal authority to permanently command three 
princely guards, or a few hundred to three thousand men, a limit set by strict imperial order:  
…置親王護衞指揮使司每王府設三護衞衞設左右前後中五所所千戶二人百戶
十人. … 
 
…[This order] establishes departments of personal guards for the princes. Each princely 
estate will set up three guards with a lefthand, righthand, rear, front, and central suo 
[military units]. Each qianhu [suo] unit shall have two [officers], and each baihu [suo] 
shall have ten [sub-commanders].”327 
 
However, the location of the most powerful princes on the northern frontier meant that they 
commanded as many as 15,000, even when not actively on campaign.328 The Ancestral 
Injunctions also permitted princes to take as many military officers and soldiers as they liked 
whenever they departed from their fief,329 a stipulation that appears at odds with the Injunctions’ 
obsession with controlling princely movement. Outside of military affairs, the princes had 
“virtual sovereignty” over their estates: they could punish the infractions of those living on their 
estates; recruit, reward, dismiss, and punish officials; assign military officers and organize their 
own small bureaus.330 They could also award their sons and grandsons smaller parcels of 
inheritable land.331 
Over the course of the Hongwu emperor’s reign, the princes’ authority changed, 
expanding in some capacities while retreating in others. For instance, by the final 1395 edition of 
the Injunctions, the princes could no longer appoint and dismiss estate officials at will, but rather 
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had to await approval from the emperor’s court in Nanjing.332 However, the princes actively 
expanded personal authority over their soldiers by ignoring longstanding rules. The princes were 
only supposed to personally keep a small, permanent escort guard of a few hundred men, and 
only command regional military forces when the emperor’s court issued orders to conduct a 
campaign or military exercise. They were also not supposed to use soldiers as labor for 
unauthorized projects, an occurrence that was nonetheless common enough that the Hongwu 
emperor reprimanded several of his enfeoffed sons for their mismanagement. One such entry in 
the Ming Shilu records the emperor berating Zhu Gang, the Prince of Jin, for using soldiers as 
labor: 
…征伐之事不可輕舉向命爾與燕王各統將校出塞以振揚威武禦備胡寇燕王深
入虜庭掃清沙漠爾不及而還.  
 
Dispatching soldiers is not a matter to be taken lightly. I order you, together with the 
Prince of Yan [Zhu Di] to gather your men and depart for the strategic passes, exercise 
your military might, and prepare for hu raids. The Prince of Yan has led distant 
expeditions to capture prisoners and sweep clean the desert, but you fall short of this 
standard.333 
 
Despite the emperor’s admonishments, some princes, notably Zhu Gang and Shuang, continued 
to violate the imperial laws designed to constrain their activities and ostentations.334 By the 
1390s, the three eldest princes – Zhu Shuang, Gang, and Di – absorbed regional military soldiers 
into ever-swelling personal escort guards, creating a concentration of power that the elderly 
Hongwu emperor recognized as threatening but did not or could not prevent. Zhu Di, the Prince 
of Yan, was only supposed to command three guards, or 3,000 men, but as his estate was located 
in Beiping, in reality he exerted influence over all six guards stationed in the city, and the five 
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additional regional branch guards nominally commanded by the bureaucratic Beiping Military 
Commission.335 Like the later Mongol kaghans, near the end of his reign the Hongwu emperor 
attempted to monitor and fix the princes’ stipends in order to control them, an effort that 
ultimately failed.336 His court realized this as the source of potential future crises as early as the 
1380s, but the Hongwu emperor’s decrees intended to remove military authority back to 
centrally-appointed officials failed to address the underlying problem, as the princes often came 
to influence and control these officials.337 Why the Hongwu emperor did not address this 
problem further may be explained by his favorable attitude towards Zhu Di, who Hongwu trusted 
as the commander most capable of managing the northern frontier.338 The emperor was fond of 
saying, “The Prince of Yan is he who will clear the desert.” (上喜謂群臣曰清沙漠者燕王也).339 
The authority of the Injunctions appeared to completely collapse upon the Hongwu 
emperor’s death. His successor and grandson, Zhu Yunwen (reign title Jianwen), surrounded 
himself with experienced court advisors who were wary of the princes’ influence, while at the 
same time the most powerful prince, Zhu Di, began to deliberately violate the codes of the 
Injunctions. When Zhu Di attempted to visit his father’s tomb, the new Jianwen Emperor barred 
him and his large armed guard from attending the ritual funeral. Zhu Di’s effort to render filial 
obeisance to his deceased father actually violated one of his father’s decrees in the Ancestral 
Injunctions: princes were not permitted to leave their fiefs and visit the capital unless expressly 
instructed by the emperor.340 The episode, along with Zhu Di’s efforts to create a second court in 
Beijing in direct violation of the Injunctions, demonstrates that he no longer considered the 
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337 Mote, Imperial China, p. 585. 
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Injunctions legally or morally binding, thus rendering the only real checks on princely conduct 
ineffective without direct court intervention, and theoretically creating an unlimited political 
space in which Zhu Di could exercise power in his estate. We will see in the next section how the 
unchecked power of the princes created Mongol-style tanistric strife at the end of the fourteenth 
century. 
Perhaps the most notable differences between the authority of Mongol-era appanage-
holders and the princes was that the Ming princes’ status and power were much more dependent 
upon the emperor in Nanjing. The enfeoffment of Ming princes in their estates was only made in 
one direction: from emperor to prince, and only to the emperor’s immediate offspring.341 While 
both the kaghan and Mongol princes could issue appanage rewards to subordinates, in early 
Ming China only the emperor held the authority to issue and organize the princely estates, 
because the whole arrangement was his deliberately-designed brainchild. As the founder of a 
new dynasty, the Hongwu emperor had a long history of empire-building and a huge canon of 
political philosophy from which he could draw administrative examples and precedents. As we 
saw in Chapter 2, he frequently chose primarily to pull inspiration and political structures from 
Tang and Yuan models, rather than Han and Song models. His overriding concerns were the 
military security of the new polity, and the allegiance of those to whom he gave command of 
Ming military forces. These priorities are reflected in some of the limits of the princes’ power: in 
regards to criminal issues relating to the mismanagement of military supplies and arrangements, 
the dynasty’s official judicial apparatus superseded princely authority.342 However, in the event 
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that military inadequacies or violations were discovered in a princely estate, the princes 
themselves were not questioned or held accountable, and local civil officials were responsible for 
conducting the investigation.343 Naturally, given the influence that more powerful princes held 
over the officialdom in and around their estates, these regulations amounted to an extremely 
weak form of oversight that a prince could easily circumvent. The Hongwu emperor’s 
enfeoffment system trapped him between ensuring military preparedness and monitoring the 
conduct of his princely sons. 
The formal boundaries of Ming estates were also much smaller than Mongol-era 
appanages. According to Dreyer, the estate stipends and allocations were, “ideally ten thousand 
shih [of rice annually] and one thousand ch’ing [of land],” or a few square miles, “though the 
amounts varied according to imperial favor.”344 However, if we consider the authority that the 
princes held over provincial military armies near the end of Hongwu’s reign, then the 
geographical and numerical extent of the princes’ power is greatly expanded. The fact that 
Mongols measured appanages in households rather than territorial units would seem to 
complicate the comparison, but the number of people and soldiers a Ming prince could command 
lends credence to a comparative exercise. The eleven guards of the Beiping locality under Zhu 
Di’s command, or about 11,000 men plus Mongol auxiliary units, would per weisuo regulations 
and modern household calculations draw from about 3,000 households.345 This is comparable in 
scale to, if smaller than, the 10,000 household Khubilai Khan held across all his appanages 
before his Dali campaign. 
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Both Dreyer and Langlois observed the contradictions created when the Hongwu emperor 
created the princely estates: the emperor wished to simultaneously move the princes away from 
the capital to prevent them from possibly accumulating political power in the event of the 
emperor’s illness, but he also empowered them with military and civil authority to defend and 
maintain the frontiers. We can resolve this apparent contradiction if we imagine the princely 
estates as an echo of the Mongol appanage system – the Mongol Yuan court was also concerned 
with centrifugal tendencies of power, but entrusted military authority to many princes; in fact, 
the Hongwu government and subsequent emperors managed to centralize authority better than 
the Mongols did for a considerable length of time, until conflict upon the Hongwu emperor’s 
death erupted, caused by an uneven balance of power in the Ming enfeoffment arrangement. This 
suggests that, if we think about the Ming princedoms as the evolution of Mongol appanages, then 
the early Ming state represents the evolution of the Yuan state and an attempted solution to the 
political tensions that tore it apart. 
What about earlier enfeoffment arrangements, such as those employed in the Zhou, Han, 
and early Tang? The decentralization and enfeoffment of nobles during the Zhou and Han was 
necessitated by the inadequate administrative technology of the time, and the inability of a single 
imperial center to rule such a vast polity.346 By the time of the Mongols and the Ming, however, 
the administrative and technological ability to rule a large empire from a single center did exist – 
as the Song Dynasty and post-Yongle Ming Dynasty demonstrate347 – and yet the Mongols and 
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early Ming rulers specifically chose to decentralize the military apparatus of their respective 
empires. Mongol appanages functioned not only as a means of ensuring military preparedness 
but also as a method of rewarding loyal service to the empire and placing military resources in 
the hands of trusted members of the imperial lineage. Mongol appanages, particularly in the 
Yuan, were not required or designed to administrate the majority of the empire’s non-military 
needs, as the lack of appanages in the rich south and the Yuan dynasty’s efforts to re-assimilate 
appanage resources and prevent the centrifugal distribution of power demonstrate. Similarly, the 
early Ming princely estates were designed to place military resources in the hands of trusted 
royal family members, with some modifications intended to ensure that the center retained 
ultimate military authority, essentially distributing the burdens of military maintenance and 
operational command to subordinates while maintaining true power in the center. 
This is in contrast to the negotiated foundation of enfeoffment arrangements in the Zhou 
and Han, in which nobles (or confederates during unification wars) were granted large, sweeping 
powers to govern sizable territories on behalf of the center, because of the center’s inability to 
manage huge swathes of territory, or because the center owed rewards to those who had helped 
the central ruler achieve power.348 Neither the Mongol nor Ming arrangements were intended by 
the center to be negotiations – i.e. give-and-take between the center and enfeoffed nobles – as 
they were in the Zhou and Han. Instead, they were designed to be strictly controlled 
arrangements and delegations of particular powers, the levers of which were all theoretically in 
the hands of the center at all times. In this administrative structure, the privileges granted to or 
claimed by Mongol appanage-holders and Ming princes were compensatory for their prestigious 
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role in the military apparatus of the empire, and often could be exercised without the center’s 
permission, but were ultimately not intended to be autonomous from the center. 
According to this interpretation, the Ancestral Injunctions as a document was supposed to 
act as the binding, enforceable codification of this arrangement, essentially a legal stopgap for 
the obvious and historically demonstrable problem of slippage of power towards the enfeoffed 
peripheral nobility. The Ancestral Injunctions was intended to be a strictly codified solution for 
the centrifugal tendencies that plagued the Yuan Dynasty and its lack of a universal legal code, 
but the ultimate inability of the Injunctions to stop the Hongwu emperor’s fourth son, Zhu Di, 
from launching a tanistric civil war and seizing the emperorship indicates that the Confucian 
legal differences between the Mongol and Ming arrangements were merely superficial. 
Afterwards, Zhu Di as the Yongle emperor followed in Tang Taizong’s footsteps and succeeded 
where Khubilai Khan failed as he consolidated power in his own administrative stronghold 
(Beijing) and finally dismantled the enfeoffment arrangement, thus removing remaining potential 
sources of centrifugal conflict. We will see the beginnings, consequences, and strategic problems 
surrounding these processes in the next section below. 
 
 
 
B. MOVING THE CAPITAL: STRATEGIC CONCERNS AND THE YAN REGION 
 
 
1. KHUBILAI KHAN AND DADU 
 
 
The story of Khubilai’s decision to move the Mongol capital to Dadu begins before his ascension 
to the throne as kaghan of the Mongol empire. From a young age Khubilai’s center of political 
power resided in the North China Plain: Khubilai’s uncle and the immediate successor of 
Chinggis Khan, Ögedei (r. 1229-41), granted Khubilai the region of Xingzhou (modern Xingtai, 
153 
 
Hebei) as his personal appanage, a territory of about 10,000 households.349 Khubilai’s territory 
grew during the reign of Khubilai’s elder brother, Möngke Khan (r. 1251-59), who ordered 
Khubilai to lead the Mongol conquest of the kingdom of Dali, situated in modern Yunnan 
province. Möngke’s strategic goal was to outflank Southern Song riverine defenses and provide 
another base of operations for future wars against the Song. Khubilai used the task as a chance to 
demonstrate his military ability and strategic foresight. After Khubilai successfully subjugated 
Dali in 1253, Möngke granted him additional appanage territory in Shanxi and Hebei. Khubilai 
then spent the next several years consolidating his rule over his appanage by establishing a 
regularized government, deploying Chinese-style tax laws, and surrounding himself with a 
variety of religious and political experts. Ostensibly upon the advice of a trusted Buddhist monk, 
Khubilai built a new capital on a site about 150 miles north of modern Beijing; this would 
become his summer capital, Shangdu, on the frontier between the steppe and agrarian worlds.350 
The Mongol empire survived as a single administrative entity only through the end of 
Möngke’s reign. Although Möngke had presided over the expansion of Mongol territory into 
western Asia, Korea, and southwest China, he failed to clearly designate a successor and prepare 
for an orderly transfer of power to whomever followed him. After his death, the empire fractured 
into four autonomous khanates: the Chagatai Khanate in Central Asia, the Il-Khanate in Persia, 
the Kipchak Khanate in northwest Asia (also called the Golden Horde), and the direct domains of 
the khagan in Mongolia and northern China (which would later become the Yuan Dynasty).351 
As soon as Möngke died, his brothers Arigh Böke and Khubilai each assembled a separate 
princely diet (kurultai), and both assemblies declared their respective patrons the kaghan of the 
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Mongol empire. Historians have characterized the subsequent civil war as a conflict between 
Arigh Böke’s Mongol “traditionalists,” who wished to preserve Mongol laws across the empire 
and maintain the empire’s center of power in Mongolia; and Khubilai’s faction, which was more 
inclined to adopt and deploy Chinese political and social practices in order to more effectively 
rule the economically rich regions of China.352 
 The Kipchak Jochids and the Chagatai Khanate supported Arigh Böke, while the Il-
Khanate nominally supported Khubilai, but the Il-Khanate ruler Hülegü was unable to send 
military aid to Khubilai due to Kipchak disruption. Khubilai therefore relied heavily on the 
resources (in the form of money, food, and conscripted soldiers) of northern China to support his 
struggle for the Mongol throne, and throttled Arigh Böke’s access to supplies, already thin after 
the relationship between Arigh Böke and the Chagatai khan Alghu deteriorated.353 These 
resources, drawn from his appanage which extended across the North China Plain, the Beijing 
region, and Shanxi, included 10,000 horses purchased from horse-rearing regions in China, 
100,000 piculs (shi) of rice, and 150,000 infantry.354 Unable to best Khubilai in military 
engagements, Arigh Böke surrendered in 1263 and later died in captivity. 
Now the master of the eastern section of the formerly united Mongol empire, Khubilai 
was faced with the challenge of consolidating his rule and managing his empire’s affairs. 
Shangdu would no longer suffice as the capital, given its remote location relative to the North 
China Plain, and in 1267 he ordered the construction of a new capital, Dadu, where modern 
Beijing stands. In the history of nomadic and semi-nomadic peoples of continental East Asia, 
including the Mongols, permanent walled capitals tended to function as centers from which 
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rulers governed agricultural regions. The Liao and Jin states managed their respective empires 
with multiple capitals – five in the case of Liao – an innovation borrowed from the Balhae 
people of northern Korea/Manchuria. No distinction existed between the civil and military 
administrations of these capitals, and nomadic rulers, including the Mongols, often moved their 
court from one city to the next, either to rotate the center of power or maintain seasonal 
migration patterns crucial for the pasturage of horses.355 
Khubilai’s decision to move his capital from Shangdu to Dadu followed some of this 
historical precedent. The site itself was the location of the Liao “Southern Capital” (Nan-ching 
南京)356 and the Jin “Central Capital” (Zhongdu 中都), and under those regimes it had served as 
the administrative center overseeing the sedentary agricultural regions of northern China. In this 
sense, the movement of the capital to Dadu indicated that Khubilai, now kaghan, imagined “his” 
empire as encompassing both Northern China and Mongolia. Perhaps most importantly, this 
decision moved the center of the Mongol world into the region where Khubilai held the most 
military and political power, his appanage. From Dadu, he could draw upon the resources of 
China while keeping tabs on Mongolia, from which the greatest political threats against his rule 
spoke.357 John Dardess summarized the problems facing Khubilai upon his ascension to the 
throne of kaghan: “Was it more advantageous to control the agrarian regions from a power 
center in the steppes, or to control the steppes from a power center in the agrarian realms?”358 In 
Dardess’ analysis, Arigh Böke represented a Chinggis Khan-style political order that wished to 
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preserve arrangements of power and resource extraction that benefited Mongolia, while Khubilai 
represented a Mongol empire based in, focused on, and more closely aligned with the political 
traditions of China. Khubilai’s triumph over Arigh Böke quashed this contest temporarily, but 
did not eliminate the underlying problem completely. Instead, it created a tension between 
Mongolia and the Yan region that remained throughout the Yuan Dynasty, and in the mid-
thirteenth century contributed to the centrifugal forces that tore apart the factional alliances 
keeping the Yuan state together, ultimately leading to the dynasty’s collapse at the hand of 
peasant insurrectionists.359 
The costs of maintaining Dadu were enormous. It served as the center for Khubilai’s 
Chinese-style administration, and the farmlands around Dadu could not support its population of 
government officials and retainers.360 Under the Liao Dynasty in the early twelfth century, the 
Nan-ching circuit on the same site (南京道) supported a population of about 100,000.361 In the 
Jin Dynasty, Daxing prefecture (大兴府), which contained the city of Zhongdu, was home to 
225,000 people.362 In 1270 the population of Dadu circuit (大都路) was between 400,000 and 
500,000, and by 1330 it had reached approximately 1 million, second on a global scale only to 
Hangzhou in southern China.363 The Dadu/Beijing site does not reside on a river network 
naturally connected to southern China, and it is relatively far from the coastline (nearly 100 
miles), so it was necessary for Khubilai to ship huge quantities of grain from central and 
southern China in order to feed his capital. This prompted him to order the re-dredging and 
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reconstruction of the Sui-era Grand Canal, a project that required three million laborers and 
nearly a decade to complete.364 In 1286, three years before the Canal was opened to traffic, the 
Yuan state shipped by sea to Dadu 300,000 piculs of rice, or about 23 million kilograms.365 
Khubilai Khan formally founded Great Yuan in 1271, signaling that he intended to 
govern continental East Asia as a Chinese-style dynasty, complete with a bureaucratized 
administration, patronization of Confucian scholarly schools, reintroduction of Chinese 
monarchical rituals, state integration of Confucian political and moral ideals, implementation of 
agricultural policies, and a rationalized tax code that tempered the ad-hoc methods of extraction 
and authority commonplace in the pre-Yuan Mongol empire.366 He also oversaw the construction 
of Dadu along Chinese patterns of imperial urban planning. Never before had the Mongols built 
a city outside the Mongolian steppe. The basic plan was intended to invoke the capital of the 
ancient kings of the Zhou Dynasty, with a central square around which all walls were supposed 
to be equidistant. Three rings of walls surrounded Dadu, a protective arrangement modeled after 
Liao Nan-ching, Jin Zhongdu, and the Northern Song capital Bianjing (modern Kaifeng). The 
layout of Dadu’s roads and placement of imperial temples for dynastic sacrifices followed a 
different architectural lineage, that of Chang’an, the Tang capital. Shangdu, Khubilai’s former 
capital and the base from which he fought Arigh Böke, was constructed under the supervision of 
a Chinese architect, but it had been a fusion of Mongolian and Chinese styles.367 
All of this indicates that Dadu was not only intended to be a decidedly Chinese city, but 
also a center of rule deep in the heart of Khubilai’s power base, from which he could turn his 
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attention to China while marginalizing Mongolia and maintaining a watchful eye on it as a 
source of political challenges. If Shangdu served as a bridge between the Mongol and Chinese 
worlds, then Dadu firmly placed Khubilai’s regime in China. In the Yuanshi, the History of the 
Yuan written in the early years of the Ming, Khubilai’s movement of the capital is frequently 
associated with the reunification of China and the creation of proper offices. 
中統元年，世祖遷都中興，始置宣慰司都元帥府. 
In the year of unification, Khubilai Khan moved the capital and [initiated] a resurgence, 
beginning with the establishment of the Pacification Commissions.368 
 
The association of bureaucracy with the Yuan did not extent to the Liao or Jin, however, 
indicating either a desire on the part of Ming court officials to match their dynastic predecessor 
with “proper” civilization, or a special observance of Khubilai Khan as an enlightened monarch 
in the Confucian sense: 
大都路，唐幽州范陽郡。遼改燕京。金遷都，為大興府。元太祖十年，克
燕，初為燕京路，總管大興府。太宗七年，置版籍。 
 
世祖至元元年，中書省臣言：「開平府闕庭所在，加號上都，燕京分立省
部，亦乞正名。」… 四年，始於中都之東北置今城而遷都焉 
 
In Tang times, Dadu circuit was called Fanyang county in You prefecture. During the 
Liao its name was changed to Yanjing.369 The Jin moved the capital there and named the 
prefecture Daxing. In the tenth year of the reign of Yuan Taizu [Chinggis Khan], he 
conquered the Yan region and named the circuit Yanjing, and placed it in charge of 
Daxing prefecture. In the ninth year of the reign of Yuan Taizong [Ögedei Khan], he 
established a household registry. 
 
In the first year of the reign of Shizu [Khubilai Khan], the Central Secretariat suggested: 
“At the site of the Kaiping prefecture imperial hall, we gave it the name Shangdu [Upper 
Capital]. Yanjing, having separate provincial departments, also begs a proper title.”… In 
the fourth year of Khubilai’s reign, he began to construct the site of the modern city just 
northeast of Zhongdu, and named it Dadu [Great Capital].370 
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One hundred and thirty years after construction on Dadu began, another dynastic emperor moved 
his capital to the same site, and for similar reasons: the Yongle emperor of the Ming Dynasty. 
 
2. THE YONGLE EMPEROR AND BEIJING 
 
 
When the Hongwu emperor founded the Ming Dynasty, he established his capital at modern 
Nanjing in the Yangzi River Delta. Upon his death in 1398, his fourth son Zhu Di, stationed in 
what had been Dadu, now Beiping, was the most politically powerful of his enfeoffed sons, but 
he was not the designated heir. The eldest prince and heir apparent, Zhu Biao, had predeceased 
Hongwu in 1392, leaving Zhu Biao’s eldest surviving son, Zhu Yunwen, to ascend the throne as 
the Jianwen Emperor. The new emperor and his court advisors understood the extensive military 
power that his uncles in northern China held, and perceived their status as a threat, while the 
enfeoffed princes sensed the weakness of the new regime. This tension manifested in the earliest 
days of the Jianwen Emperor’s reign. In his first year on the throne, the emperor’s court began to 
systematically dismantle the power of extant princes and laid out new rules to ensure future 
princes would not assume so much authority. The princes were barred from conducting civil or 
military affairs without orders, limited in how often they could leave their estates or visit other 
princes, and were forbidden from amassing additional soldiers without the express instructions of 
the court. Zhu Di had the most to lose from these stipulations, as he maintained the most 
important strategic estate in the Yan region, and had not only assumed command of the region’s 
provincial armies, but also had attached numerous auxiliary units to his forces, including a 
regiment of Mongol cavalry.371 
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 Within a month of enthronement, the Jianwen Emperor took the first overt steps towards 
dismantling his uncles’ positions. Hongwu’s fifth son, Zhu Su, the Prince of Zhou (modern 
Kaifeng, Henan), was arrested and charged with treason. The emperor and his court shortly 
thereafter ordered the arrest of Zhu Fu, Bo, Gui, and Bian, the seventh, twelfth, thirteenth, and 
eighteenth sons, respectively.372 Only Zhu Di’s prominent and entrenched position stayed 
Nanjing’s attempts at removing him as well. As these political maneuvers removed potential 
challengers to the Jianwen Emperor, Zhu Di began to build his own “court” of advisors, 
bureaucracies, and departments in Beiping.373 Then, in 1399 Zhu Di launched a rebellion against 
the Jianwen Emperor and the court in Nanjing, ostensibly to remove the corrupting influence of 
the “evil advisors” at the emperor’s side. The ensuing conflict raged for three years, until Zhu 
Di’s armies defeated his nephew’s forces and Nanjing surrendered. The fate of the Jianwen 
Emperor remains undocumented, but it seems likely he perished in a palace fire during the final 
days of the war. 
We can see parallels between the two civil wars detailed above: the tension between the 
Jianwen Emperor in Nanjing (Yangzi delta) and Zhu Di in Beiping (North China Plain), and the 
tension between Arigh Böke in Karakorum (Mongolia) and Khubilai Khan in Shangdu (North 
China Plain). Both conflicts involved one party located in the original center of the empire, intent 
on maintaining the existing political order (Karakorum and Nanjing); and the other party located 
on the periphery, drawing resources, soldiers, and position from an established fringe power 
base. These challengers’ peripheral bases had emerged from a deliberately decentralized 
arrangement of political and military power, first designed under an expansionist authority (the 
Chinggisid lineage and the Hongwu emperor) who created each empire’s respective arrangement 
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as a means of maintaining military security and expanding martial strength beyond existing 
borders. 
 Like Khubilai, Zhu Di assumed the mantle of emperor, or huangdi, once the conflict was 
behind him. He took the reign title Yongle, or “everlasting happiness.” In 1403, the second year 
of his reign, he re-named Beiping (“Northern Peace”) to Beijing (“Northern Capital”), creating a 
second center of power where he firmly controlled the “phantom” court he had set up there, and 
did not have to worry about hidden Jianwen loyalist holdouts who might have still felt 
resentment towards the usurpation. Historians have alleged that the Hongwu emperor also 
wished to locate his capital at Beiping in order to better monitor and command frontier armies, 
but his advisors may have dissuaded him from doing so.374 Thus Yongle probably had several 
reasons for moving the capital: to consolidate his power base, to prioritize his father’s imperial 
policies of security and expansion on the northern frontier, and to consolidate the bureaucratic 
apparatuses of the empire under his influence while reducing the influence of Nanjing’s officials. 
Nanjing remained an auxiliary capital during Yongle’s reign, but over the next two decades its 
status and administrative power vis-à-vis Beijing declined. 
 The logistical problems that Khubilai and his court faced in supplying Dadu had not 
changed in the century-and-a-half between 1263 and 1403. Largely intact but depopulated after 
the Yuan fall, Dadu/Beiping/Beijing remained far from the sea and difficult to supply. Now, 
under the Yongle emperor, it once again became the administrative center of a vast empire and 
needed to house the civil officials, departments, laborers, and military units necessary to staff, 
protect and maintain the city. The emperor forcibly relocated 10,000 households from Shanxi to 
fill out the city’s population, and brought thousands of workers and artisans to construct the 
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necessary state structures. Grain shipments from the south were also increased, and the Yongle 
emperor, like Khubilai, had the Grand Canal redredged and rebuilt to streamline the delivery of 
food supplies.375 The total costs associated with the movement of the capital and the construction 
of the Forbidden City, the Yongle emperor’s palace, were so great that they drew criticism and 
protests from his own officials.376 In the late 1370s to 80s, when the Yongle emperor was still the 
Prince of Yan, the population of Beiping prefecture (北平府) hovered around 190,000, much 
diminished from its mid-Yuan height of one million by the conflict of the Yuan-Ming 
transition.377 When the Yongle emperor permanently moved the capital to Beijing in 1420, its 
population had reached 700,000.378 
 The strategic importance of the Yan region and Beijing was not lost on early Ming 
emperors. In one of his final imperial orders before his death, the Hongwu emperor emphasized 
the importance of the Yan region and Zhu Di’s command of Beijing as integral to the empire’s 
frontier defense. He dispatched a high-ranking official as a military commander to assist Zhu Di 
in maintaining defensive preparations: 
勑左軍都督楊文曰兵法有言貳心不可以事上疑志不可以應敵為將者不可不知
是也朕子燕王在北平北平中國之門戶今以爾為總兵往北平參贊燕王以北平都
司行都司并燕谷寧三府護衛選揀精銳馬步軍士随燕王往開平隄備. 
 
By imperial order to the commander of the Lefthand Army, Yang Wen: The Art of War 
says that if you have two intentions, you cannot serve your superiors, and if you doubt 
your will, you cannot face the enemy. A general must know these things. My son is the 
Prince of Yan in Beiping, and Beiping is the gateway into the Central Kingdoms. Now, 
you [Yang Wen], gather soldiers and embark to Beiping. With the military offices of 
Beiping, combine the three guards of Yan, Gu and Ning, select your best soldiers and 
officers, and follow the Prince of Yan to guard Kaiping.379 
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In this order, we see that the Hongwu emperor not only named Beiping as a crucial lynchpin of 
defense, but also Kaiping prefecture, the location of Khubilai Khan’s first capital of Shangdu. 
The Hongwu and Yongle emperors had extensive geographic knowledge of the region as a center 
of military action. Beiping was the primary urban center of the region, and, while remote, could 
be resupplied with supreme planning and effort, while old Kaiping/Shangdu was on the transition 
zone between the agricultural Yan region and the steppe proper.380 The Yongle emperor drew 
upon the resources of China in order to maintain his costly capital and launch military 
expeditions into the steppe. Beijing, like Dadu for Khubilai, was the fulcrum of the his political 
and military might, and the means by which he could both control China and manage military 
matters in the steppe world. If his campaigns into Mongolia had succeeded and he had fulfilled 
his father’s visions of a dynasty that recaptured the entirety of the old Yuan, then Beijing, like 
Dadu, would have likely been the center of an empire that straddled both worlds. 
 
 
 
C. YUAN MILITARY ORGANIZATION AND THE EARLY MING PERIOD 
 
 
When Zhu Yuanzhang formally founded the Ming Dynasty and took the reign title Hongwu, he 
and his advisers faced the challenge of transforming his rebellion into a proper, functional 
imperial state. Early Ming state rhetoric, as we have seen in previous chapters and will see 
below, highlighted the Confucian source of Ming legitimacy and blamed the Yuan Dynasty’s 
decayed morality and lack of civil efficacy as the causes of its fall. However, a century of 
Mongol rule had introduced structures of military organization that had proved to be extremely 
potent tools for conquest and pacification. The Mongol empire’s expansion across Eurasia 
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disseminated effective military-bureaucratic structures and techniques of warfare that the 
Mongols’ enemies and subjects rapidly adopted and deployed as Mongol authority over Eurasia 
declined. China under the Ming was no different. The Hongwu emperor appropriated numerous 
formal political structures that the Yuan itself had used to manage its occupying military forces. 
He also injected a martial ethos into a bureaucracy that was, in theory, governed by a newly 
liberated Confucian gentry. His son, the Yongle emperor, continued Hongwu’s martially-focused 
policies and political arrangements in an effort to maintain a militarily powerful empire that 
could ensure its own security and launch campaigns into the Mongolian steppe. 
 
1. MILITARY ORGANIZATION SYSTEMS: WEISUO AND TUNTIAN 
 
 
The bloody campaigns of the Ming founding years help explain the development of the military 
situation on the northern frontier and how that situation evolved over the first five decades of the 
dynasty. Prior to the Ming founding, the Hongwu emperor commanded an enormous number of 
troops, and those numbers swelled as he defeated his rivals and accumulated resources and 
territory. Once he had defeated the last Yuan armies in China, mass demobilization of his forces 
might have caused considerable social unrest, but the taxes required to support a large peacetime 
army would have been an onerous burden on the peasantry.381 The emperor and his advisors 
appropriated two military organizational systems from the Yuan experience, weisuo and tuntian, 
to reorganize and sustain the hundreds of ad-hoc rebel units that were to function as the formal 
Ming army. 
Weisuo (literally: guard garrison) was a method of formally structuring the military into 
distinct and regular command units. It divided the military into groups of 5,000 to 5,600 men 
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called guards, or wei, which were subdivided successively into qianhu suo units of 1,000 to 
1,120 men, baihu suo units of 100 to 112 men, 2 zongqi banners, 10 xiaoqi sub-banners, and 10 
man squads.382 In the 1350s and 60s, during the late Yuan rebellions, the future emperor’s 
military was largely made up of disaffected peasants and of soldiers enlisted from the ranks of 
defeated enemies. However, enemy commanders who surrendered to Hongwu often did so on the 
condition that they retain their soldiers. Thus surrendered units and their leadership were a 
“nontransferable corps of regimental officers,” inflexible and with little personal loyalty to the 
Hongwu emperor when he and his court advisers were still building the Ming state.383 He had to 
win the loyalty of his subordinate commanders through continued success and victory.384 Once 
his rebellion had begun to consolidate and operate more as a state than as a rebellion, the 
Hongwu emperor gained the authority to reorganize the military along formal lines. In 1363 
when the future emperor defeated and killed a major rival, another anti-Yuan rebel warlord Chen 
Youliang, the pre-Ming rebel state annexed the rich and populous territory on the upper Yangzi 
River. Thereafter he could conscript armies far larger than those that remaining warlord states 
could bring to bear. As a result the Hongwu emperor began to adapt the weisuo system to his 
soldiers in 1364, and in 1365 moved to annex the densely populated Yangzi River Delta, where 
the warlord Zhang Shicheng ruled. By 1367 Ming armies had eliminated Zhang and all Chinese 
rivals south of the Yangtze. The weisuo system itself “arose from the need to establish regular 
procedures for processing the large numbers of troops gained [through conquest],”385 and 
Hongwu’s complete victory over his rivals both generated from and enabled its use. Chen 
Youliang’s defeat gave the Hongwu emperor the prestige and men he needed to enact a major 
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formal reorganization like the weisuo system, while incorporating the populous Yangtze Delta 
region required such a thorough reorganization. 
Supplying the early Ming armies required millions of piculs of rice annually; it was 
expected that one picul (about 71.5 kilograms in Ming measurements) would feed one soldier for 
one month.386 Given the estimated size of the Ming military in the 1390s at 1.2 million men, this 
would amount to a total yearly consumption of 14,400,000 piculs of rice, or 1.03 billion 
kilograms.387 This would have likely been an inordinate burden on the farming peasants of 
China, particularly in the war-torn and depopulated north. The Ming state organized most of its 
soldiers into farming colonies, called tuntian (literally: soldier-farming), an organization in 
which the state military commissions assigned each wei of the weisuo system state-appropriated 
farmland. Out of every ten soldiers, 5-8 farmed at any one time, while the remaining 2-5 men 
remained on active duty. This system functioned with reasonable results and the wei guards 
produced enough foodstuffs to support themselves.388 Naturally, logistical preparations for 
offensive campaigns necessitated additional levies, but tuntian, as the early Ming state’s solution 
to the taxation problem, allowed the Ming under the Hongwu emperor to maintain a powerful 
and reasonably fiscally responsible military during the first half of his reign.389 
Neither the weisuo nor the tuntian systems were Ming inventions. Weisuo came about 
during the Yuan as bureaucratized version of Chinggis Khan’s decimal organization of his 
soldiers. Its structure, already tried and tested, served the purposes of the Hongwu emperor, who 
could employ former Yuan technical experts familiar with how it functioned. When the Mongols 
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conquered the Southern Song, they left civilian systems of government intact in southern China 
but completely replaced and supplanted old military structures. The Jurchens had done the same 
when they conquered North China in 1127, as would the Manchus in their conquest of the Ming 
in 1644.390 Organizing all of the dynasty’s armed forces on tuntian farmlands was a Yuan 
innovation. The Han and Tang dynasties had also maintained military colonies similar to tuntian, 
but only on the frontiers. Jurchen Jin generals individually organized tuntian systems but no 
central state initiative required or encouraged its military commanders to do so. The Yuan state 
organized all of its soldiers stationed in the agricultural regions of China on tuntian military 
farms. The Ming recycled tuntian to ease the burdens of military demobilization and grain 
production across the empire.391 Furthermore, the state labeled households that supplied soldiers 
as “hereditary households,” and a soldier’s descendants were also obliged to serve in the 
military. The whole system was designed to be as self-sufficient as possible and to perpetuate the 
conscription of soldiers over several generations. 
 
2. BUREAUCRATIC SYSTEMS: MILITARY PATHS TO OFFICIALDOM AND HIGH 
OFFICE 
 
 
Song Dynasty-style meritocratic bureaucracy did not survive under the Yuan. While Confucian-
educated literati maintained a measure of social status during the Yuan, they no longer held a 
monopoly on high court positions. As we saw in Chapter 2, Southern Chinese in particular were 
denied access to any but the most lowly of official posts, and military and pragmatic concerns 
became the bedrock for state personnel positions. The willingness of the Mongols to fill posts 
with clerks, military officers, and other technical experts who did not necessarily have formal 
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Confucian education fundamentally changed paths to officialdom in China. When the Ming 
Dynasty defeated and supplanted the Yuan, it appeared as though the Hongwu emperor would 
return educated Confucian elites to the pinnacle of power. Nominally, this did occur, but the 
existential importance of an experienced body of military officers to maintain dynastic security 
ensured that military commanders remained influential and well-rewarded for the first fifty years 
of the dynasty. 
As we have seen, Yuan administration did not functionally separate military and civilian 
offices or affairs, and throughout the century of Yuan rule military prestige remained an 
important avenue to official service.392 The Yuan position of darughachi (governor of a darugha, 
a centrally-managed territorial unit of the Mongol Empire, particularly in southern China) began 
in pre-Yuan years as a loosely defined lower army office obtained through standard military 
advancement. By the Yuan imperial period it had transformed into a civilian office (in theory 
open only to Mongols and Central Asians), its holders tasked with governing counties alongside 
Chinese magistrates. However, one could still access the darughachi office through military 
accomplishment or by demonstrating knowledge of military technology.393 Imperial decree also 
permitted darughachi to carry weapons while Chinese magistrates could not, though the extent to 
which this decree was enforced is questionable (perhaps because in later years both Han Chinese 
and Mongols staffed darughachi offices).394 Similarly, the branch secretariats (xing 
zhongshusheng), officials who oversaw the macropolitical affairs of multiple provinces, 
possessed both civilian and military responsibilities and managed the logistical matters of 
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imperial garrison troops.395 The Mongols themselves placed a premium on those with practical 
knowledge and skills rather than Confucian bureaucrats. Therefore, the most common routes to 
official career ran through the military and clerkly professions.396 
Another method for attaining office was through recommendation privilege, known as 
yin, which was usually exercised by high-ranking officials who nominated family members, 
friends, or protégés to lower official positions. Despite the suggestions of his Confucian court 
advisers, Khubilai Khan did reintroduce the examination system, and it was not reinstated until 
1313 under Yuan Rezong (Buyantu Khan, r. 1311-1320). This allowed the practice of yin to 
become widespread and entrenched, primarily because its patrimonial and nepotistic 
appointment practices meshed well with Mongol social, economic, and political customs.397 The 
Yuan court exempted Mongols from yin nomination requirements (usually apprenticeship), and 
both Mongols and Central Asians could legally forgo the exams altogether once they were 
reinstated. The Yuan government restricted direct hereditary inheritance to offices to ensure 
established Chinese literati families would not monopolize posts. However, Chinese of all 
origins probably outnumbered Mongols in the government simply because Mongols only made 
up a small fraction of the Yuan Dynasty’s population.398 Native Chinese aspirations to office 
remained intact even after the Mongol conquest despite the fact that it was more difficult to 
exploit standard paths via exhibition of Confucian values.399 Given the existence of alternate 
avenues to civilian office, traditional paths to officialdom were thus underused. The military 
                                                 
395 Yuan administrative levels in descending order were as follows: branch secretariat, circuit (dao 道), route (lu 路), 
prefecture (fu 府), subprefecture (zhou 州), county (xian 县). 
396 Endicott-West, Mongolian Rule in China, p. 111. 
397 Ibid, p. 65. 
398 Estimates vary, but there seem to have been about 400,000 Mongols in China after the conquest of the Song 
Dynasty, or 3% of the total population. 
399 Ibid, p. 85. 
170 
 
nature of both low and high office allowed those with martial expertise to quickly advance 
within the bureaucracy. 
The Hongwu emperor had the opportunity to realign the Ming government along more 
traditional Confucian lines, but the Ming bureaucratic apparatus bore striking similarities to its 
Yuan counterpart. As mentioned previously, the Hongwu emperor’s authority was entirely 
dependent on continual military success until he defeated the other major rebel leaders active in 
the last years of the Yuan. Once assured of his supremacy in the Yangtze region, he initiated 
deep reforms designed to reorganize his state into a full-fledged imperial dynasty. He could, and 
did, set about ordering a disordered world. After he founded the Ming Dynasty he issued a 
decree: 
天必命中國之人以安之夷狄何得而治哉予恐中土久汙膻腥生民擾擾故率群雄
奮力廓清志在逐胡虜除暴亂使民皆得其所雪中國之恥爾民其體之如蒙古色目
雖非華夏族類然同生天地之間有能知禮義願為臣民者與中夏之人 
 
How can Heaven necessarily order the people of China to use peace to bring order to the 
barbarians? I feared that China’s territory has long been soaked in the rank odor of sheep 
flesh [i.e. corrupted by barbarian customs], causing distress to the people. Thus I led 
heroes and spared no effort to sweep these things away. My aspirations resided in 
expelling the barbarous enemy and quelling rebellion, and allowing the people to wipe 
out China’s shame. The Mongolians and Central Asians – although they are not people of 
China – are nonetheless also born between Heaven and earth, and among those who can 
know righteousness and wish to become subjects, fostering them is no different from 
fostering the people of China.400 
 
It appeared that Hongwu believed that Mongol customs were responsible for the late-Yuan chaos 
and collapse, and that those customs constituted a “shame” (chi) that required removal. Before he 
founded the Ming Dynasty Hongwu had turned to Confucian scholars for learning and guidance. 
As he gained power in the south many scholars saw him as the one ruler capable of 
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reestablishing order amidst late-Yuan chaos.401 He eagerly sought out Confucian advice and 
asked questions about proper methods of governance. When he became emperor, he professed 
his desire for a return to pre-Yuan models. His words were not, on the surface, empty: once in 
power he established a nine-rank system of officials similar to the one used during the Tang 
Dynasty and gave his government institutions Han and Tang labels. In many cases he even 
decided that returning to Han and Tang models was not sufficient, and that the pre-imperial Zhou 
Dynasty should serve as the ideal, a goal to be accomplished through the “restoration of 
antiquity” (fugu).402 He stylized himself a sage-king of the ancient sort and often spoke of 
correcting the world and the role of Confucian scholars as teachers and educators.403  
The emperor’s proclamations indicated he would transform his regime into a civil 
bureaucracy governed by officials drawn from the Confucian community, but in 1370, after he 
established Ming control over the North China Plain, he granted his top military generals noble 
titles and formalized their official status. This stratum of military nobles, which we briefly 
touched upon in the previous section, also possessed state responsibilities. In addition to the 
nobles’ standard military obligations, the Hongwu emperor expected them to establish and 
manage tuntian colonies, organize famine relief efforts, and inspect the regions they governed. 
They all reported directly to the emperor. Hongwu placed other military men in top levels of 
civilian administration throughout the early Ming, and assigned those with experience from the 
mixed civil-military Yuan state to official posts. He saddled the commanders of the chief wei 
guards with administrative tasks. Hongwu’s institutions, including the nine ranks, took after 
Yuan models of officialdom, and sons could inherit the military officer ranks of their fathers in 
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the Yuan fashion. He also rewarded and promoted former Yuan generals who surrendered to his 
forces.404 
The early Ming state recycled a Yuan frontier prefectural system, known as tusi (土司, 
“indigenous office”), in which the Ming emperors granted formal Ming titles to local leaders of 
non-hua ethnic groups living on the edges of the empire, in exchange for nominal submission.  
The Mongols had adapted tusi from a similar Tang-Song system, jimi fuzhou (羈縻府州, “horse 
and bridle government”).405 The Yuan differentiated operation and acquisition of tusi offices for 
civilian and military tusi. Yuan and Ming military tusi, established in northern and southwestern 
frontier zones, were physically and bureaucratically remote from the central court. They had 
more power, autonomy, and greater freedom to pursue land policy. They possessed different 
customs and enforced different laws from interior provinces, and were generally accommodating 
to non-Han peoples and practices. These offices “were quite different from the jimi fuzhou” in 
their strict separation of military and civilian ranks, and were the foundation for Ming and Qing 
frontier offices.406 “[T]he Ming empire,” writes Edward Dreyer, “was thus Mongol in form and 
structure; it was only Chinese in rhetoric and personnel.”407 
 Ming civil offices, naturally, were open to and dominated by classically educated elites, 
and there is no doubt that the opportunities available to Ming literati were much more numerous 
and liberated than those offered to those living under the Yuan. Although Hongwu had recruited 
many Confucian literati as tutors and educators, once enthroned he became increasingly 
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suspicious of the men who became his officials. The court literati demanded the imposition of 
ethical controls, and they maneuvered to act as the emperor’s advisers. Hongwu viewed the 
government hierarchy in a different manner. He believed his officials existed to carry out his 
commands and provide occasional advice, not to guide him in all aspects of governance. This 
friction culminated in the infamous mass purges of the 1380s, during which Hongwu ordered the 
execution of some tens of thousands of officials and their families. He also abolished the highest 
civilian post of chancellor (zaixiang) and reorganized the government so that, “no one but him 
had significant personal power.”408 Scholars and officials had demanded a ruler who would 
reorder the post-Yuan world, and in the warlord years Hongwu had emerged as a strong figure 
that was capable of such a feat. Hongwu’s purges remained well within what John W. Dardess 
calls the “ethically oriented world view that [the Confucian scholars] had developed in 
conjunction with [their] demands.”409 Thus Confucian scholars were unable to reassert 
themselves as a group, despite their desire to exert moral influence on the new emperor. Though 
they enjoyed a higher status than they did during the Yuan, they could only watch as the central 
government handed rewards and recognition – traditionally granted to effective civil bureaucrats 
– to the Yuan-like military elite.410 
 
 
 
D. CONCLUSION 
 
 
In the Yuan-Ming era, rulers made great logistical efforts to ensure the strategic security of their 
empires in China. Mongol appanages and Ming princedoms existed and operated under very 
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different formal arrangements, but the centrifugal tendencies of power in both circumstances 
ensured that Ming princes exercised levels of power similar to those of Mongol appanage-
holders. The efforts of central imperial institutions – the Mongol kaghans and Ming emperors – 
produced mixed results and met with resistance when they attempted to limit the civil and 
military authority of these peripheral, autonomous territories. The necessity of maintaining order 
and security in crucial frontier zones, however, in both cases produced a simultaneous and 
opposite trend in which the center was somewhat willing to permit continued excesses of power. 
When power struggles did emerge from these tensions – as in the case of the conflict between 
Arigh Böke and Khubilai Khan, and between the Jianwen Emperor and Zhu Di – the peripheral 
victors relocated the center of imperial power to better suit their own political needs, strategic 
visions, and military institutions. Underpinning these transformations and tensions, the basic 
organizational structure of the military remained remarkably stable from the Yuan to the Ming. 
For the founding figures of each empire – Chinggis Khan’s Yuan successors and the Hongwu 
emperor – the innovations of Chinggis himself and the early Mongol kaghans provided an 
effective military foundation upon which the Yuan and Ming both constructed dynastic armies. 
These conclusions suggest that the classic, Confucian-centric government in the early decades of 
the Ming Dynasty was built around much longer-term political and military phenomena: namely, 
the formalization of patrimonial military relationships, the new geo-strategic importance of the 
Yan region beginning in the tenth and eleventh centuries, and the crucial role of military 
experience (and the military officers who possessed it) in maintaining imperial security. In order 
to solve very similar strategic problems – managing security in northern China, and preparing to 
simultaneously rule two very different geographic zones – the Yuan and Ming employed similar 
military and state-building techniques 
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V. CHAPTER 4: POLITICAL RHETORIC, THE TUMU CRISIS, AND WALL-
BUILDING, 1424-1505 
 
 
 
 
This study has thus far concerned itself with the early “martial” years of the Ming dynasty, or the 
fifty-six years between its traditional point of founding in 1368 and the death of the Yongle 
emperor in 1424. If we mark 1424 as the “end” of the Ming “martial” period, then we must 
suppose that the era between 1424 and the Tumu Crisis of 1449 is a period of shrinking imperial 
vision as military preparedness declined. However, as this chapter argues, it is more accurate to 
say that Ming imperial visions of Yuan-style empire remained quite strong, while military ability 
did not keep up with those visions. This dissonance ultimately culminated in the Tumu Crisis 
itself, which I characterize as the meeting of far-reaching imperial visions and inept leadership. 
The crisis did not merely re-align imperial visions with military ability, but completely changed 
Ming attitudes towards the Mongols and open visions of empire. These cornerstones of Ming 
imperial rule were not latent Chinese Confucian attitudes suppressed by the charisma and 
military goals of the first and third emperors, but new formulations resulting from disastrous 
defeat and political crisis. 
The Tumu Crisis had two major effects on Ming attitudes towards the Mongols living 
both within and without the Ming empire. The first is that the court language surrounding 
Mongols changed, a transformation reflected in two terms used to describe the Mongols: hu and 
lu. Hu 胡 (or huren 胡人, literally “hu people”) was used in Ming discourse as a traditional 
descriptor of Mongols and other nomads who originated from the steppe belt immediately north 
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of China. Hu also applied to Mongols living under Ming rule, either as soldiers under Ming 
military command or as settled non-military subjects. As such, it could be considered an ethnic 
label, or a label that had become ethnic by the Ming era as discussed in Chapter 2. Hu did not 
necessarily have a positive or negative connotation beyond the fact that the labelled party was 
considered “barbarian.” Being a “barbarian” in Ming discourse did not signify that the Ming 
court thought of the labelled subject as inherently hostile or a hopeless target of “civilizing” 
endeavors. Rather, it distinguished them from hanren 漢人, or settled subjects from the core 
provinces of the Ming empire who practiced agriculture. The second label, lu 虜, was much more 
derogatory and politically charged. Lu literally translates as “prisoner” or “slave,” and was 
universally applied to steppe raiders and other Mongols who were part of steppe polities in 
conflict with the Ming state. When Mongol horsemen attacked the Ming frontier under the 
banner of the Northern Yuan, its fractured successors, or Esen’s Oirat Mongol polity, Ming court 
records almost always label them lu. This was true for the Hongwu and Yongle reigns as well, 
but in those decades the Ming state applied lu to the targets of Ming campaigns, and relaxed its 
use when the frontier was relatively peaceful. 
The court language used to describe Mongols remained ethnically and politically flexible 
between 1424 and 1449. Ming emperors and high-level statesmen consciously separated the 
terms hu and lu, usually using the former to describe submitted or subject Mongols, and the latter 
to describe Mongols living outside the Ming who conducted raids into Ming territory. When in 
the 1440s the Ming court realized the threat Esen posed, and when Esen defeated and captured 
the Zhengtong emperor in what came to be called the Tumu Crisis, both terms started to mean 
one and the same thing. The hu became lu, and the lu became hu. This reflected the Ming court’s 
adoption of a siege mentality. Ming court bureaucrats immediately became suspicious of all 
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Mongols, including those who were nominally Ming subjects. The scholars David Robinson and 
Frederick Mote have observed the political consequences of this change, as described later. This 
chapter adds to the intellectual and linguistic angle, arguing that the change in court language 
used for Mongols marks the end of a territorially open and inclusive empire in the Yuan style. 
The second major effect of the Tumu Crisis was the decision by Ming ministries and 
rulers to enact large-scale constructions of heavy fortifications along the frontier, the results of 
which we call the Great Wall. Scholars including Arthur Waldron, Leo Shin, and Mote have 
traced the development of Ming wall-building projects over the last half of the fifteenth century 
to a great degree. This chapter briefly adds to their contributions by pointing to the specific 
linguistic phenomena in Ming state orders issued to initiate wall-construction. In particular, these 
orders are overwhelmingly concerned with lu incursions in an almost paranoid fashion, and they 
specifically instruct local military garrisons to build fortifications out of brick, stone, and iron, 
rather than the more common rammed-earth method. 
 In order to build the foundation for these arguments, this chapter begins with an overview 
of the history and scholarship of defensive fortifications and wall-building in Ming China 
between 1368 and 1500. Then it offers a brief history of Ming military and imperial affairs 
between the death of the Yongle emperor in 1424 and the aftermath of the Tumu Crisis. Then I 
present an analysis of various excerpts from the Ming shilu on the subject of Mongols, hu and lu, 
raids, attacks, defensive preparations, and wall-building projects. While the selection of excerpts 
presented jumps from one reign period to another and covers a significant length of time, the 
excerpts reflect the current state of scholarship and add another crucial dimension to our 
understanding of the Ming dynasty’s relationship to its Mongol subjects and enemies. This 
chapter is also intended to be paired with Chapter 1, which discusses Ming wall-building and 
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Confucian attitudes towards nomads as a Eurasian phenomenon, rather than a uniquely Chinese 
one. 
 
 
 
A. WALL-BUILDING IN EARLY/MID-MING CHINA 
 
 
As we discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, fortifications and military stations along the northern 
steppe frontier served as the backbone of political security in the Ming empire. Forts, passes, and 
the princely fiefs all served a role in a larger protective arrangement. As in much of the rest of 
early-modern Eurasia, forts served as supply depots for campaigning armies and functioned as 
strongholds from which stationed soldiers could extend force. In the early Ming dynasty, the 
most crucial forts were the eight outer garrisons, built far beyond “interior” lines of defense. 
Fortified passes functioned as vital chokepoints where it was difficult for nomadic militaries to 
apply their major advantages in speed and mobility. The princely fiefs were intended to function 
as extensions of imperial power and authority, and were expected to retain loyalty to the throne 
while also independently managing security affairs in their fiefs and regions of military 
command. Of all these security arrangements, the most visible among them, the Great Wall, did 
not exist in the early Ming era. The Ming constructed it in fits and starts in the late fifteenth 
century, in response to the declining ability of the Ming military to operate offensively in the 
steppe, and the increasing unwillingness of Ming statesmen to treat diplomatically with lu: 
Mongols. Locally-constructed models, like those overseen by the official Qiu Jun (1421-1495), 
served as successful models of static defense.411 
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Given the importance of these fortifications, one of the more perplexing issues facing 
Ming historians today is why the Yongle emperor, the most militarily aggressive Ming ruler, 
ordered the dismantling of the eight outer garrisons that served as the first screen of protection 
against nomadic incursion.412 Given that forts both protected and served as resupply points, the 
issue is a vexing one. My own speculation is that Yongle understood that on the flat plains of the 
Mongol steppe, static defense was an ineffective tool of war against mobile Mongol cavalry 
forces, and decided that a sparse network of resupply forts rather than a robust network of 
defensive structures was more cost-effective. As discussed in Chapter 3, the Yongle emperor 
went to great lengths to procure great numbers of warhorses for the Ming military, and to 
maintain the administrative structures necessary to feed, train, and deploy those warhorses. It 
seems likely that he knew that as long as the Ming military possessed a robust, mobile cavalry 
force to respond to Mongol raids, static forts would be less useful, and the state could forgo the 
expense and hassle of maintaining forts far afield. 
Regardless of if my speculations on Yongle’s motives are correct, we do know that large-
scale fortifications like the Great Wall proved to be costly and cumbersome solutions to the 
problems of Mongol incursion, especially when compared to diplomatic solutions (again, like 
those the Yongle emperor deployed). It seems that the military lessons of the Yongle era were 
lost in the years following his death. What changed? To put it simply, the eroding efficacy of the 
Ming military precluded offensive campaigns. Then, in 1449, something dramatic happened: the 
Zhengtong emperor chose to personally lead an army afield to defeat the Mongol ruler Esen, but 
suffered a massive defeat. Esen captured the emperor, plunging the Ming court into a military 
and succession crisis. The installation of Zhengtong’s half-brother as the Jingtai emperor staved 
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off political collapse, but the Ming military never again operated in the steppe with success. The 
Tumu Crisis marked a turning point in the military-intellectual ethos of Ming rulers and 
statesmen. After the crisis, the boundaries of the Ming empire solidified rhetorically and in 
reality, and the mental divides between the steppe and sedentary worlds congealed. 
 Part of this discussion surrounding the decline of Ming military preparedness is 
necessarily related to the treatment of the Ming bureaucracy, the Ming military establishment, 
and the Ming imperial lineage in modern political histories. Many historians (admittedly myself 
included) tend to fall into the trap of describing the levers of power in the Ming government and 
court as a spectrum, one that shifted away from the emperors and the military towards the civil 
scholar-bureaucracy over the course of the Ming period. David Robinson reminds us that the 
capital court was far more complex. It included scholars and soldiers, but also “religious 
specialists, palace women, and entertainers,” all seeking influence and power.413 Moreover, civil 
bureaucrats did not constitute a single coherent body, and different scholarly factions emerged 
and dissolved as interests changed and political alliances shifted. During the Hongwu reign, 
Beijing was not the capital but a frontier military city named Beiping, and the military’s 
entrenched role as both the city’s defenders and participants in imperial rituals ensured its 
officers and nobility could make their suggestions, ideas, and grievances known to Ming rulers. 
They were “visible symbols not only of the empire’s power but also of the emperor’s role as 
supreme military leader” whose purpose was to maintain security, project awe, impress foreign 
envoys, and remind scholar-officials of the connections between dynastic legitimacy and military 
strength.414 The most visible legacy of the civil bureaucracy’s influence on our perception of 
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Ming military and imperial attitudes comes through the court records that are also our most 
straightforward resource. Civil officials naturally compiled and transcribed these records, so a 
simplified view indicating a shift away from military wu rule towards proper, Confucian civil 
wen rule naturally jumps from the page.415 
The takeaway is that no single, simplified narrative sufficiently characterizes Ming 
attitudes towards the steppe. As scholars have demonstrated over the past several decades, the 
Ming dynasty was certainly not isolationist. We also cannot bifurcate it into two distinct, 
opposing parts. Suggesting that the early Ming up to 1424 is strictly wu, or martial, and the later 
Ming after 1424 is strictly wen, or civil, conceals the complexities of court politics, of Ming-
Mongol relations, of intra-Mongol relations, of imperial attitudes, and of the military situation on 
the northern frontier. We can still examine the highest court records, which are also the most 
rhetorically charged and injected with over simplified self-characterizations of the Ming empire 
and its relationship to the Mongols (and non-Chinese peoples), but as this study has done in 
previous chapters, we must cut through rhetorical language to uncover the structural 
underpinnings of Ming state policy. One way we can do this is to examine how supposedly 
timeless rhetorical language changed before and after periods of political evolution and major 
events. The intent of this chapter is to suggest that the era between 1424 and 1449 was one in 
which language was fluid, and only shifted in response to major crisis, rather than “reverting” to 
some level of “normal” Confucian rhetoric. 
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B. MILITARY AFFAIRS AND THE NORTHERN FRONTIER, 1424-1449 
 
 
The fifteenth century enjoys significantly less coverage in overviews of Ming history when 
compared to the tumultuous fourteenth century and the economically vibrant sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries. In the seventh volume of the Cambridge History of China, the Yongle 
reign (1402-1424) alone occupies seventy pages, while the combined reigns of Hongxi and 
Xuande (1424-1435) only occupy twenty-nine, the combined reigns of Zhengtong, Jingtai, and 
Tianshun (1435-1464) forty-eight, and the combined reigns of Chenghua and Hongzhi (1464-
1505) sixty-two. Yet the period between the death of the Yongle emperor and the Tumu Crisis 
and its aftermath covers an era in which expansive imperial ideals remained strong, but military 
ability declined. In order to understand how Ming perceptions of empire became limited and 
bound, it is necessary to briefly outline Ming political and military history between 1424 and 
1449. 
The Hongxi emperor (personal name Zhu Gaochi) was the oldest of Yongle’s sons. 
During the Yongle reign, Zhu Gaochi often took up the administrative roles of the ruler when his 
father was away on Mongolian campaigns. When the Yongle emperor died, Zhu Gaochi, now the 
Hongxi emperor, released the high official Xia Yuanji, a minister who Yongle had imprisoned 
for objecting to the Mongolian campaigns and oceanic voyages of Zheng He. This was the first 
indication that the Hongxi emperor’s attitude towards foreign relations would break from his 
father’s precedents. He also cancelled Zheng He’s next voyage and closed down the steppe-
frontier horse trade markets. The heavy taxes and labor requisitions imposed upon the northern 
provinces to pay for military campaigns were reduced. The only major military affair in which 
the Hongxi administration took great interest was unrest in Vietnam, which the Ming military 
had invaded and annexed during the Yongle reign. In 1425, the Hongxi emperor prepared to 
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move the Ming capital back to Nanjing, a move that would have clearly shifted Ming priorities 
away from the northern frontier and towards domestic issues, but his premature death halted 
those plans.416 
 The Ming dynasty under Hongxi’s, successor, the Xuande emperor, (1425-35) continued 
the pattern of reorienting administration towards solving fiscal, bureaucratic, and infrastructural 
problems. Internal unrest further distracted efforts to reinvigorate the northern military 
campaigns. Upon Xuande’s ascension to the throne, his uncle Zhu Gaoxu (Yongle’s second son, 
who had military experience from steppe campaigns) launched an armed rebellion to take the 
emperorship for himself. The incident recalled memories of the Yongle emperor’s own 
insurrection against his nephew, the Jianwen emperor, and indeed, Zhu Gaoxu repeated many of 
the charges Yongle had levied against Jianwen as justification for his rebellion. This time 
however, the incumbent emperor’s forces defeated the insurrection, and Xuande retained the 
throne. Xuande himself took command of the army that defeated and captured Zhu Gaoxu, 
suggesting that personal imperial force and military prowess remained valid identifiers of the 
ruler’s legitimacy. Vietnam, however, remained an intractable thorn, and after Ming armies 
suffered a series of defeats, the Ming state under Xuande’s orders withdrew Ming armies from 
Vietnam, and later re-confirmed a member of the Lê dynasty as a formal king rather than an 
“administrator.”417 
 The most important change to the Ming military that took place during the Xuande reign 
was the gradual growth of civilian control over the military apparatus. In 1430 the emperor 
ordered handpicked officials to tour frontier provinces and zones known for unrest, in an effort to 
reduce corruption and maintain central oversight in distant regions. At first these dispatches 
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remained irregular, but they soon became a formalized part of the bureaucracy, and in 
conjunction with the slow erosion of the military nobility and the reduced independence of 
frontier commanders, the civil bureaucracy took an increasing interest in military affairs. At the 
same time the emperor took a personal hand in maintaining military cohesion and morale, 
parading troops in Beijing and bringing soldiers with him on hunting expeditions.418 
In the Yongle era, the northern frontier had been a constant source of tension and 
diplomatic jockeying as the emperor and his bureaucrats played Mongol groups off one another 
and coaxed some into participating in the horse fairs. Even though the Hongxi emperor 
discontinued the horse fairs, the frontier remained stable and peaceful, in part thanks to the 
Yongle emperor’s successful attempts to keep the Mongols disunited. Minor Uriyangkhad raids 
enjoyed little success, and the emperor himself again personally commanded a cavalry army that 
repelled one such raid near the capital. However, over the course of the Xuande reign Ming 
military commanders slowly retracted Ming frontier garrisons and defenses towards the cities, 
leaving critical strategic regions farther into the steppe like Kaiping unguarded, a process that 
increased Ming vulnerability to concentrated incursions.419 It was also in the Xuande years that 
the Oirat Mongols, whose leader Esen would capture the Zhengtong emperor in 1449, became 
ascendant. 
The Ming military’s ability to operate in the steppe had deteriorated since 1424. The 
Yongle emperor’s onerous campaigns into Mongolia had been costly on the depopulated north, 
and the weisuo and tuntian systems that had organized and maintained the two-million-strong 
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Ming army eroded after the 1420s.420 The expensive postal relay system, vital for 
communications during deep steppe campaigns, fell into disrepair, limiting the ability and 
willingness of the Ming court to dispatch expeditionary forces.421 The reduction of Ming 
operations in the Mongolian steppe and interference in Mongol politics allowed the resurgence 
of Mongol power under new warlords, particularly the Oirat general Esen.  
Xuande’s successor, the Zhengtong emperor, inherited the Ming throne at eight years old, 
making him the youngest ruler of the Ming dynasty. His inheritance revealed structural 
weaknesses in the bureaucracy, which had heretofore relied extensively on the formal power and 
personal charisma of the ruler.422 Thus during the emperor’s formative years, an informal 
regency ruled, made up of his grandmother, high officials, eunuchs, and influential military 
commanders related to the imperial family. The classical account of Ming history suggests that, 
when the emperor came of age and various members of the regency passed away in their old age, 
the eunuch Wang Zhen gradually accumulated power and influence over the emperor. Those 
classic accounts suggest that it was on Wang Zhen’s insistence that the emperor led his ill-fated 
campaign into the steppe, and that Wang’s concern for his baggage train left the emperor’s army 
out in the open when Esen’s army attacked. Regardless of the personal motivations or faults of 
Wang Zhen, the Zhengtong emperor increasingly relied on – and trusted – his eunuch staff and 
bodyguards, an insular system that strangled meaningful communication between the ruler and 
his bureaucracy. 
In the Zhengtong years, the Ming military dealt with numerous uprisings and periods of 
unrest in north and central China, largely owing to floods, epidemics, and famine. In southwest 
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China, border states invaded Yunnan several times, requiring nearby provinces to dispatch 
soldiers and provisions for campaign in a logistically unfavourable corner of the empire. These 
campaigns did little to suppress unrest in the long-term, and were expensive. In the north, Esen’s 
father died, leaving Esen the ruler of the Oirat Mongols. Under Esen, the Oirat broke the relative 
peace of the Xuande era and began raiding Ming territory, invading modern Xinjiang, and 
attempted to win over Mongol soldiers serving the Ming as garrison forces in Gansu.423 After 
arranging marriages and alliances with other Mongol tribes, Esen brought the Uriyangkhad under 
his control, effectively eliminating the last Mongol group willing to treat diplomatically with the 
Ming dynasty. 
While Esen’s political power in the steppe grew, the military situation in the Beijing had 
declined considerably. As Twitchett and Grimm argue, the withdrawal of the defensive line 
under Yongle left northern China more exposed to incursion, especially in the absence of the 
early-fifteenth-century horse procurement system and offensive steppe campaigns, but given that 
the purpose of the withdrawal was to concentrate on defending the capital it “had therefore some 
sound reasons.”424 Between 1424 and the late fifteenth century, defenses were rather light: 
It must be remembered that at this time the border itself was marked only by a line of 
beacon fires which had been extinguished since Yung-lo times and was simply patrolled 
by Chinese cavalry. There was no Great Wall until the late 1470s; the only solidly built 
wall protecting Peking was the brick-faced city wall itself which, with its nine fortified 
gates, had been completed only in 1445.425 
 
The armies responsible for defense of the northern Beijing passes were concentrated in Xuanfu 
and Datong, which in the mid-fifteenth century consisted together of some 125,000 soldiers. The 
main problem with Beijing’s defenses was that they possessed no “defense in depth.” The Ming 
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state had withdrawn many frontier garrisons, and many others were below-strength. Other than 
the armies in Xuanfu and Datong, the nearest reinforcements served in the mountains south of 
Beijing, and in Henan. Any potential defense of Beijing “depended upon quick and efficient 
counterstrikes in case of an enemy attack, a feasible scheme perhaps under efficient command … 
and competent leadership… In 1449, when an attack actually came, neither of these requirements 
was met.”426 
 When Esen launched his attacks on the Ming, he hit three points: Liaodong, Xuanfu, and 
Datong. Court records tell us that when Ming forces at Datong suffered defeat, the emperor’s 
eunuch Wang Zhen urged Zhengtong to lead his army afield, over the objections of his 
bureaucratic advisors. The army left Beijing in August with Zhengtong in command, and by 
early September suffered the defeat called the Tumu Crisis. The initial reactions in Beijing, and 
the negotiations between Esen and Beijing, encompassed ransom demands, territorial 
concessions, possible royal marriage between Esen and the Ming dynastic family, and even the 
Ming court’s retreat to Nanjing (echoing the Song retreat during the Jurchen invasion). Powerful 
figures in the ministerial government, particularly the vice-minister of war Yu Qian, insisted on 
remaining in Beijing, enthroned Zhengtong’s half-brother, and had many of Wang Zhen’s 
eunuch associates executed. The new Jingtai emperor and pro-Jingtai court advisors immediately 
bolstered the defenses, soldiers, and military stockpiles of the capital region. Esen thereafter lost 
or abandoned his military initiative and retreated to the steppe, launching only raids into northern 
China. By 1450, Esen’s captive ex-emperor had become something of a hindrance and was 
greatly reduced in political value. Esen released Zhengtong back into Ming custody, where the 
new Jingtai emperor ceremonially welcomed Zhengtong’s return and subsequently put him under 
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luxurious house arrest. Seven years later, with loyalist officials and soldiers at his side, 
Zhengtong would launch a coup of sorts and retake the throne under the reign title Tianshun, or 
“obeying heaven.” 
 
 
 
C. CONSEQUENCES OF THE TUMU CRISIS 
 
 
The Ming dynasty had not faced a political catastrophe of this kind in its eight decades of 
existence. Ming armies during the Hongwu reign suffered defeat when operating in the steppe,  
and the Yongle emperor’s campaigns failed to achieve the goal of eliminating the Mongol threat 
entirely, but never before had a Ming emperor been captured, or the Ming capital threatened with 
conquest from an outside source (excepting Yongle’s rebellion against the Jianwen emperor). 
Given the dissonance between Ming imperial visions and the capacity of Ming military forces, 
the sudden confirmation that Ming armies and Ming leadership were not up to the task of 
protecting the integrity of the polity sent shockwaves through intellectual and political circles. 
Imperial visions and dreams shrank in a matter of years, replaced with the rhetoric that mid-
twentieth-century scholars attributed to isolationist attitudes. 
The Tumu Crisis was carved into the memory of Ming bureaucrats, elites and rulers long 
after the incident itself, and became a byword for disaster, misfortune and caution, lamented as 
the “Tumu hardship” (Tumu zhi nan 土木之難), the “Tumu calamity” (Tumu zhi hai 土木之害), 
and the “Tumu defeat” (Tumu zhi bai 土木之敗).427 It fundamentally challenged Ming 
intellectuals’ relationship with Song Confucian precedents, called into question Yongle-era 
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standardizations of Neo-Confucian texts and interpretations, and complicated the relationship 
between adherence to orthodox philosophical models and effective government.428 As de Heer 
notes, into the sixteenth century the crisis was cause for political disturbance when the Zhengde 
Emperor (r. 1505–21), known for his impetuous behavior, wished to lead an expedition against 
the army of Dayan Khan, but met opposition from an official who was willing to disobey his 
emperor and physically block the emperor’s passage in order to prevent a repeat of the Tumu 
Crisis.429 
We can see the effects of the Crisis beyond the traditionally political sphere as well. The 
number of court artists in the imperial painting academy increased dramatically after the Crisis, 
and again after the Zhengtong emperor retook the throne from his half-brother in 1457. When 
Esen first captured Zhengtong, most of the emperor’s men were massacred, including many non-
military advisors and courtiers who had attended the mission, expecting no real battle or a quick 
victory. After Zhengtong’s coup, many of those who pledged their support were granted 
inheritable status and honors, some of which included positions in the court painting academy.430 
Eunuchs at court suffered without imperial patronage, and an emboldened group of officials 
stubbornly insisted of the Jingtai emperor that he punish Wang Zhen’s family, while others beat 
several court eunuchs to death.431 The Crisis, then, called into question accepted imperial and 
Confucian norms, destabilizing Song-era philosophical precedents while at the same time 
cementing a theretofore fluid frontier along the lines of the existing fortifications and, by the end 
of the fifteenth century, the Great Wall itself.432 We can conclude that the legacy of the Yuan 
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imperium remained strong in the early Ming regime, and Ming ambitions to incorporate the 
former Yuan heartland lingered in the dynasty’s founding decades, but after 1449 these 
ambitions largely dissolved. 
The place of Mongols in the eyes of the Ming state changed to a considerable degree over 
the fifteenth century. We can identify three periods that, in broad terms, reflect different Ming 
attitudes towards the Mongols. The first, roughly encompassing the reigns of the Hongwu and 
Yongle emperors, was one of inclusion. As the previous chapters have argued, the Yuan dynasty 
enjoyed a significant place in Ming rhetorical historiography as a legitimate dynasty, one that 
Ming rulers measured alongside previous “Chinese” dynasties, and one from which the Ming 
drew its imperial ambition and imperial structures. Mongols served the Ming state as rightful 
subjects, and though they practiced crass customs and wore improper clothing, were nonetheless 
welcome into the new world-empire that the Hongwu emperor had rhetorically built. The second 
period, between 1424 and the Tumu Crisis in 1449, was one in which Ming rhetoric towards the 
Mongols and the Yuan stepped into a more familiar framework: Ming rhetoric treated Mongols 
both within and without the empire as simply one kind of “barbarian” among many, capable of 
cultural reform but often recalcitrant and disobedient inside the Ming geopolitical sphere. As we 
will see below, the language in Ming records concerning Mongols retained a “fatherly” tone, 
discussing the use of “punishment” and “forgiveness” in response to various “crimes” 
perpetrated by Mongols, including raids on the Ming frontier. The third era, after the Tumu 
Crisis in 1449, constituted a far more disjointed break than the shift from the first to second 
period around 1424. Suspicion about the motivations of Mongols exploded, and both emperors 
and bureaucrats argued that they were fundamentally incapable of reform. Perhaps most telling, 
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the use of the derogatory term “lu” 虜 (“prisoner,” “slave,” or “northern barbarian”) to describe 
Mongols increased significantly. 
Mote has argued that the Crisis “served to shake the Chinese government free from its 
incompetent and demoralizing eunuch management and to bring able and aggressive leadership 
to the fore.”433 It is more apt to say that the moment of catastrophe permitted some within the 
Beijing court to take executive action beyond their prescribed roles, and to overrule the personal 
power invested in eunuchs. The fact that central leadership “slunk” back into one of 
“incompetence” and “demoralization” with the Zhengde period suggests that the actions of vice-
minister Yu Qian and his colleagues was a temporary instance of dynamic decision-making. 
 Past scholars have noted that the Tumu Crisis marked a shift in military policy from 
offensive to defensive strategies. The Ming “had behaved like the Yüan, or even the Han or 
T’ang rulers” but “incompetent application of that policy” resulted in disaster.434 While this 
policy shift was almost immediate, the tangible formulation of it – the construction of walls – 
took quite a while. The first walls built as part of a coherent defensive strategy emerged in 1474, 
and the more robust walls that exist today were not laid down until decades later.435 This shift 
towards an almost exclusively defensive posture gained intellectual support during the late 
fifteenth century. Qiu Jun 丘濬, an official who commented frequently on the recovery of the 
Ordos region, wrote a treatise on statecraft titled Da xue yan yi bu 大學衍義補 or “Supplement 
to the Extended Meaning of the Great Learning,” a collection of commentaries on a text written 
by the Song dynasty scholar and statesman Zhen Dexiu (1178-1235). In his Supplement, Qiu Jun 
was perhaps the most vocal official to push for a fundamentally defensive strategy to deal with 
                                                 
433 Mote, “The T’u-mu incident of 1449,” p. 265. 
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Mongol incursions.436 Both Zhen Dexiu’s original work and Qiu Jun’s commentary discussed 
defensive arrangements and fortifications: in Zhen Dexiu’s case, to prepare against Jurchen 
attacks. Qiu Jun used the history and military situation of the Ordos region as a microcosm for 
the Ming dynasty’s strategic problem. The Ordos was difficult to defend from northern invasion, 
given the lack of natural barriers between the Ordos and Mongolia, but it could be protected if 
the state constructed fortifications to “extend” the natural barriers, mountains, and rivers that 
protected other stretches of the northern frontier.437 Reaching back to precedents established by 
Cai Yong, Qiu put forth that “extending” natural barriers with man-made walls simply confirmed 
pre-existing divides between sedentary and nomadic, between civilized and barbarian. 
 Qiu Jun had been a student in Beijing during the Tumu Crisis, and the political and 
military panic that had ensued after the Zhengtong emperor’s capture influenced his perception 
of Ming-foreign relations, including with the Mongols.438 Immediately after the loss of the 
emperor, Qiu wrote a treatise on the “defense of the boundaries between hua and yi.”439 Decades 
later, when he presented his Supplement to the Hongzhi emperor (r. 1487-1505), he argued that 
the rulers of zhongguo had always maintained territorial separation between the civilized and 
barbaric, and that past rulers had decided to avoid integration in the interests of maintaining 
peace. As we have seen in Chapters 1 and 2, Qiu’s memory appears to be selective, as the Tang 
and early Ming regimes invested political time and energy into assimilative practices. 
Nonetheless, Qiu recommended that the Ming state maintain and expand the “natural” 
boundaries between the civilized hua and non-civilized yi and man, both in the north and the 
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south.440 He argued that border troubles stemmed from the failure of past regimes to reinforce 
peripheral frontiers.441 This attitude stands in stark contrast to the proclamations of the Hongwu 
and Yongle emperors, a shift so complete that, according to historian Leo K. Shin, “by the mid-
fifteenth century the political confidence that had accompanied the rise of the Ming had clearly 
been replaced by an acute sense of vulnerability,” largely thanks to the Tumu Crisis.442 
 There were certainly officials and emperors who clung to an assimilative or open 
imperial attitude. Yao Mo 烑鏌 (1465-1538), one of Wang Yangming’s predecessors, argued for 
older jimi styles of “barbarian” management, including the retention of local chieftains and the 
gradual replacement of their rudimentary administrative structures with robust Ming-style 
bureaucracy.443 The statesman Lü Kun 呂坤 (1536-1618) attacked the practice of wall-building, 
not necessarily because he believed in an open empire, but because he thought them ineffective 
and the ministers in charge of defense too preoccupied with maintaining a rigid border.444 And as 
mentioned, the Zhengde and Wanli emperors maintained some level of militarist ethos, and the 
option to use offensive military force against Mongol nomads remained a tempting option. 
However, the prevailing feeling of empire had become less expansive and more limited. 
Militarily, the Crisis formalized the defensive line of what would become the Great Wall. 
The state abandoned the remaining outposts in the steppe frontier region and withdrew to more 
geographically defensible regions. Societies living along the frontier developed an “atmosphere 
of tension” and became more militarized, as Qiu Jun’s experience suggests. In Mote’s view, anti-
                                                 
440 Ibid, p. 123. 
441 Ibid. 
442 Ibid, p. 121. 
443 Ibid, p. 124. 
444 Alexander Woodside, “The Centre and the Borderlands in Chinese Political Theory,” in The Chinese State at the 
Borders, ed. Diana Lary (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2007), p. 17; and Chen Zilong, ed., 
Huang Ming jingshi wenbian (Taibei: Guofeng chubanshe, 1964), 416: 1-22b. 
194 
 
Mongol sentiment also originated in the last half of the fifteenth century. Mongols living in 
northern China were seen as less worthy of trust and respect, and the “anti-alien” and “anti-
Mongol feelings” sometimes attributed to the rhetoric of the early Ming period in fact emerged 
only after 1449. These anti-Mongol attitudes were relatively new phenomena that were absent 
even during the Yuan era, but rather the creation of a new history and a new attitude towards the 
Yuan period in the minds of late Ming scholars. The revelation that northern China was 
extremely exposed in the face of a united Mongol polity was profoundly unsettling, and 
considering that the capital was situated right on the frontier itself thanks to Yongle’s strategic 
policies, impacted the attitudes of those at the empire’s helm.445 
 
 
 
D. THE EVIDENCE FOR CHANGING MING RHETORIC ON MONGOLS, 1400-
1449: HU AND LU 
 
 
Beginning with the Yongle reign, Ming court language surrounding the Mongols was defined 
largely by two topics: raids and tribute. In the fourth year of the Yongle reign (1406), Zhu Su 朱
橚 (d. 1425), Hongwu’s fifth son enfeoffed as the Prince of Zhou, submitted a memorial to the 
throne on the problem of rebellious huren, or Mongols, near the horse market cities on the Gansu 
frontier. The emperor’s response indicated that he viewed the problem as a minor one, and that 
his solution of using horse markets to placate the Mongols, and approaching the Mongol 
“younger brother” as an “elder brother” was the correct policy: 
胡人難服易叛昔有降虜居大寧因邊將市馬拂其所欲即叛而去今西比諸胡兄盡
心撫綏又屢…數年之間來者日眾邊境遂以無事今賢弟雖 … 此盖邊境安危所
係賢弟已之可也. 
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The huren can be quick to revolt. In former times we invited submitted barbarians to 
settle on the frontier in Daning and [participate in] horse markets, thereby curbing their 
desire to revolt. Now, in the west we have defeated the barbarians, and in the manner of 
an elder brother have pacified them again and again. … In the intervening years, the 
barbarians have come to the frontier daily in great numbers. They are satisfied and have 
no cause to attack. Now they are worthy of [being called] a younger brother. … Closing 
the border is a matter of [balancing between] safety and danger. We can treat them like a 
younger brother.446 
 
It is clear that the Yongle emperor viewed repeated military clashes and unrest among frontier 
Mongols as a problem, but not a cause for major concern. To close the border at the slightest sign 
of trouble would be a kneejerk reaction. Long-term security in the north was better achieved with 
a careful, diplomatic approach couched in the Confucian rhetoric of brotherly relations, 
alongside the massive military campaigns to punish aggression. This is in keeping with the 
attitudes, policies, and imperial visions of the Hongwu and Yongle periods, which imagined the 
Mongols as part of a greater Ming empire. 
 The horse-markets and Mongol tribute missions remained problematic throughout the 
early part of the fifteenth century, but again, the Ming court appeared to consider the problems 
that Mongols caused as relatively minor, in contrast with the later, post-1449 attitudes that 
viewed Mongols on northern frontier as a grave threat. The lack of immediate concern continued 
into the brief Hongxi reign, characterized by a report submitted by the Ming Ministry of War on 
the growing costs of hosting Mongol tribute missions to the capital: 
他人馬來貢既名貢使得給驛傳所貢之物勞人運至自甘肅抵京師每驛所給酒食
芻豆費之不少比至京師又給賞 … 此胡人慕利往來道路貢無虗月緣路 
 
They [Mongols] ride on a tribute mission, and declare they are bringing horses as their 
tribute. [Our] laborers must transport them from Gansu to the capital, supplying each 
with food, drink, fodder, and beans. The cost is not small. Then when they arrive in the 
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capital, we give them a reward. … These huren admire profit, coming and going along 
[the tribute] roads. There is not a month in which they do not have cause to travel. …447 
 
The report goes on to detail the precise cost for each mission, reckoned in provisions and 
personnel. While the image this report paints of the Mongol tribute missions and their 
motivations is not flattering, it is also hardly politically alarmist, and only demonstrates concern 
on a financial level. Despite the fact that the Hongxi emperor’s father had engaged in military 
campaigns into the steppe, it does not appear that the Ming court was seriously concerned with 
the security of the empire and the northern frontier. The use of the relatively neutral term huren 
suggests that the court did not consider the exploitive activity of the Mongols a new or 
unexpected development. The negative description of Mongol motivations as “admiring profit” 
(mu li) 慕利 falls within standard Confucian moral structures. Nonetheless, in the Hongxi 
emperor’s single year on the throne, northern barbarians still had a place within the Ming 
political sphere: Hongxi permitted a troupe of seventy to come and pay respects at the tomb of 
Prince of Zhuang of Su 肅莊王 (d. 1419), who had been enfeoffed on the Shaanxi frontier.448 
This obeisance of a “barbarian” people to a Ming imperial price fit within the Yuan-style 
imperial sphere imagined by Ming rulers and officials. 
  We know that negative attitudes towards particular Mongol groups were not universal or 
entirely racial, because the Ming shilu contains entries through the subsequent Xuande reign that 
praise various Mongols serving the Ming empire, particularly in military fields. One such 
commemoration lauds the long service of a deceased Mongol officer named Huo Lidai 火里歹. 
The use of huo (lit: “fire”) in the officer’s Sinicized surname, and dai (lit: “evil, bad, wicked”) in 
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his given name is commonplace for Sinicized foreigners, but his commemoration was quite 
positive and only mentions Huo’s nomadic origins once: 
本遼陽胡人初名火里歹及貴始改今姓名洪武中襲父職為新安衛千戶以功陞指
揮同知永樂五年調甘肅備禦七年陞陜西行都司都指揮僉事八年充驃騎將軍從
征北虜以功陞都指揮同知後復從征北虜洪熙元年陞右軍都督府 … 上遣官賜
祭 
 
Originally a huren from Liaoyang named Huo Lidai, he reached noble status. In the 
middle of the Hongwu reign, he inherited his father’s post as a weiqianhu commander in 
Xin’an [modern Henan], where he served with merit and was promoted. In the fifth year 
of the Yongle reign, he was transferred to Gansu where he defended [the region] for 
seven years and was promoted to regional commander of all military affairs in Shaanxi. 
For eight years he commanded soldiers, and led attacks on the northern Mongols [lu]. He 
was again promoted and brought on steppe campaigns. In the first year of Hongxi he was 
promoted to commander-in-chief of the righthand army branch… The emperor dispatches 
an official to confer sacrifices [upon his grave].449 
 
This commemoration is one of the few Ming entries to use both huren and lu to describe the 
Mongols. It affixes the neutral huren to Huo, and the derogatory lu to the Mongol enemies 
against whom the Yongle emperor launched his campaigns. Here, lu does not carry a universal 
racial component, but more a political one, indicating the rebellious refusal of the independent 
Mongol tribes to recognize Ming suzerainty. It consciously separates the hu subjects who serve 
the emperor and the enemy lu who defy him. 
 In a sense, the disappointed language used in the post-Yongle court does reflect a more 
negative reflection of Mongols, a pattern of “soft” reversion to general Confucian rhetoric that 
permeates the Hongxi and Xuande records. Again, however, existential concerns are not 
apparent in these court entries. When the Xuande emperor ascended the throne, he cautioned 
against the “profit-seeking motives” of the “yi and di” who came to present tribute, and 
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suggested keeping a close eye on the frontier, but his overarching concern was still to reduce 
expenses and retain financial responsibility: 
夷狄獸心難以德服其曰歸誠朝貢實皆慕利 … 來朝者或三年五年一至其餘悉
且禁止則送往迎來免困民力府庫之財不至妄費 
 
It is difficult for barbarians to serve with moral virtue. They say they have recovered 
sincerity and come to present tribute, but in reality they covet profit … As for those who 
come tomorrow, or for the next three or five years or beyond, we must make [this matter 
of the treasury] clear. Moreover, we should prohibit those who come continually to seek 
profit from the national treasury. After all, it is not a limitless source of wealth.450 
 
Such an attitude continued even during times of strife and conflict. When Mongol raids on the 
frontier increased, the Xuande emperor’s language lamented the fact that the raiders had 
squandered the Yongle emperors “kindness,” and focused on tribute exchange and the frontier 
markets as a source of both cooperation and conflict, but he specifically forwent the option of 
retaliating militarily: 
我皇祖太宗皇帝大恩積有年矣朕即位以來上體皇祖之心加意撫綏屢勑邊將毋
肆侵擾 … 今邊將屢請發兵勦捕朕慮大軍一出 … 良善之人必有受害者茲特
遣人齎勑諭爾宜互相勸戒 … 朝貢往來相通買賣優游足給豈不樂哉 
 
My imperial ancestor Taizong [Yongle] generated great kindness over many years. Since 
I succeeded the throne, I have paid special attention to my ancestor’s wishes, and 
repeatedly pacified the frontier. Yet harassment continues. … Now the frontier generals 
continue to ask me to dispatch an army, and I have considered this very carefully … [If I 
were to dispatch an army], many good people would become casualties. Thus I will 
dispatch a special envoy to present my orders, urging the soldiers to be on guard … 
When tribute comes and goes, and the [frontier] markets are bustling… how can the 
[barbarians] be unhappy?451 
 
The Xuande emperor’s “soft” reversion to classic Confucian rhetoric on the barbarians stretched 
to individual incidents, and did not reflect a feeling of imperial insecurity. Rather, it reflected a 
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disappointment with the northern nomads and the continuing possibility of bringing them back 
into the fold of Confucian civilization. In 1431 a series of Mongol raids on Ming-controlled parts 
of southern Mongolia left several Ming subjects dead. Officials blamed the local commander, a 
Mongol named Kun Jilai 困即來, but the emperor passed off the raiders’ conduct as stemming 
from ignorance: 
固無知然事亦須審實遂敕困即來察之如果革古者等所為即追還之而宥其罪 … 
彼既為盜不可復容宜驅而出之使歸本土仍戒約之再犯必不宥 
 
The barbarians are undoubtedly ignorant of proper proceedings, and we must investigate 
the truth of this matter [of raiding and plundering]. We shall order Kun Jilai to examine 
the incident, and if the culprits are found, to take reparations from the perpetrators and 
forgive them. … Those who stole cannot be allowed to repeat their crime. If they do, it is 
suitable to expel them and force them to return to their country. Repeat offenses cannot 
be forgiven.452 
 
Examining the early years of the Zhengtong reign before the Tumu Crisis shows that this 
rhetorical pattern continues. Huren remains a relatively neutral term, and court-level concerns 
about the huren are primarily logistical, financial, and cultural, not related to military security or 
political suspicion. An excerpt from the pre-1449 Zhengtong period reflects the larger 
characterization of huren in court records. The excerpt below is an imperial order issued to a 
qianhusuo commander named He Fu, who oversaw Mongol soldiers in the Ming military who 
had been resettled in key military locations: 
近制歸附胡人驗口給糧今年久弊滋多買漢人詐為己子冐支糧餉請令歸附年久
已成家業者戶止一人給糧餘悉停止其所買漢人令歸本籍從之 
 
Strictly control the provisions given to huren who have submitted [and been resettled]. 
This year abuses have increased. Hanren have concealed this graft purchase of grain from 
army supplies. Tell those [huren] who submitted years ago and became merchants to halt 
this practice. [Even] if only one person has given away grain, then all must know that it is 
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prohibited. As for those hanren who purchased graft grain [from the resettled huren], 
they must return to their place of origin.453 
 
While this excerpt may seem unremarkable, it suggests that cultural and proto-ethnic 
classifications inherited from prior dynasties remained a structural component of the emperor’s 
vision of his realm. However, even as it distinguishes between huren and hanren, it also 
classifies them together as subjects of the Ming empire with the appellation ren 人, a suffix 
rarely applied to the more derogatory and politically-charged lu.454 By classifying huren and 
hanren together, the emperor suggests that both are contained within his political power to issue 
imperial orders within the framework of Ming structural systems. 
What happened to Mongols in China after the Tumu Crisis, and how did Ming attitudes 
towards Mongols transform? We can observe how the relationship between the Ming state and 
Mongols changed by looking for ways in which Mongol self-awareness about their place in the 
Ming empire changed, and also by studying how Ming court language about Mongols became 
more rhetorically negative. David Robinson has shown the former in great detail with examples 
drawn from political incidents and discussions in Beijing: in addition to becoming targets of 
suspicion by Ming intellectuals, Mongols serving in the Ming military and court became more 
acutely aware of their tenuous position. Thanks in part to the Hongwu court’s attempts to entice 
Mongols to settle in northern China and accept the new Ming regime, large-scale migration of 
Mongols into Ming territory had continued throughout the first century of Ming rule.455 
Certainly, while some officials and intellectuals retained suspicion of Mongol subjects, it was not 
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until the Tumu Crisis that suspicion boiled over into action. One Ming statesman, Liu Dingzhi 劉
定之 (1409-1469) suggested that Mongols living in the north and those with court positions 
should be relocated, separated, and have their salaries and commensurate political influence 
reduced.456 Liu directed many of these suggestions at Mongols serving in the Ming military. The 
long-term result was an increasing feeling of isolation and self-dependence among these court 
Mongols. In 1461, when a Ming general named Cao Qin launched an attempted coup intended to 
replace the newly-restored Zhengtong emperor (now Tianshun), numerous Mongol officers 
supported him because they believed Cao was more amiable towards Mongol interests.457 Given 
that some of Liu’s resettlement policies were carried out, including the resettlement of Mongol 
soldiers in southern China and the confiscation of the property of several Mongol officers, their 
decision to support Cao Qin made political sense.  
In the Ming shilu entries following the Tumu Crisis, a “siege mentality” began to 
overtake discussions of Mongols and their fundamental ability to become civilized. The term zei 
賊, which means “thief,” “criminal,” or “traitor,” begins to appear much more frequently as a 
descriptor of Mongols, sometimes in the form of the compound zeilu. Immediately following the 
Zhengtong emperor’s capture and his half-brother’s enthronement as the Jingtai emperor, the 
panic that overtook the capital bled into the rhetorical language of Mongol relations: 
近日遼東報聲息此必因徵調遼東軍馬其守將瞰境外一二達賊往來即詐稱虜寇
數千犯邊以上其問調之軍甘肅寧夏大同宣府亦然且遇賊十餘人輒稱見賊數
千 …  
 
皇上臨御凡天下祀典並令有令脩舉矧今方將奮揚神武復仇雪恥滅彼賊虜以成
中興之功 … 
                                                 
456 Liu Dingzhi, “Jianyan bianwu shishi shu,” Liu Wenan zoushu, in Huang Ming jingshi wenbian, ed. Chen Zilong 
et al. (1638: rpt. Taibei: Guolian chuban youxian gongsi, 1964), 48.8b-9a. 
457 For a comprehensive study of the attempted coup, see: David Robinson, “Politics, Force, and Ethnicity in Ming 
China: Mongols and the Abortive Coup of 1461,” in Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 59.1 (1999): pp. 79-123. 
202 
 
 
In the past few days, Liaodong [garrisons] have reported [the presence of Mongols]. This 
must be cause to recruit and transfer soldiers to Liaodong. The military generals guarding 
the frontier must carefully watch the border. Even if only one or two [Mongols] come and 
go, it may conceal an invasion of thousands of lu or more [i.e. as a scouting party]. They 
ask for additional soldiers. Gansu, Ningxia, Datong, and Xuanfu also make similar 
reports. If they meet several tens of them, it may conceal several thousand thieves 
[zei]. …  
 
[After hearing this report], the [Jingtai] emperor made sacrifices. He instructed the 
generals to exert themselves in the manner of great conquerors, to avenge [the Tumu 
disaster], and to extinguish the zeilu, thereby bringing about restoration.458 
 
The term lu increases in frequency as a primary descriptor of Mongols. At the same time, while 
both huren and lu appeared as terms for northern Mongols during and after the Yongle reign, 
after the Tumu Crisis hu was increasingly in conjunction with, and not separate from, lu and zei, 
suggesting that Mongols were inherently criminals and enemies of the Ming state: 
敕言備邊 … 築立團堡鑿塹置橋一聞有警驅人畜入堡虜雖來寇將無所掠此不
戰而勝之之道也又胡虜技藝雖便於騎射而謀畧終下於漢人莫若 … 又北虜入
寇必以中國被虜之人為鄉導臨敵之際必令當先我軍殺傷多中國之人宜於胡人
經行要路立牌時諭若有漢人被虜能棄甲來歸或斬首來獻或密報虜情者重加官
賞 … 
 
[An imperial order to the commanders of the Shanxi passes:] Prepare the frontier. 
Construct earthworks and moats and install a bridge. When you hear news of an attack, 
drive your men and livestock into the fortifications. Although the lu will come to invade, 
they will have no means to take over the garrison. This is the way of avoiding combat but 
achieving victory. Although the hulu are skilled in horseback archery, they cannot plan in 
the manner of hanren. … Moreover, when the northern lu invade, they muse use captive 
Chinese to guide them to their enemies, and will kill many of my soldiers. We should set 
up barricades along their main routes [of invasion]. If captive hanren can discard their 
armor and return to us, or kill their captors and flee, or transmit secret reports on the 
situation of the lu, they shall be promoted and rewarded. …459 
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This passage is indicative of the increasingly common practice of heavily fortifying key 
locations along the northern frontier, such as the Great Wall, and it also distinguishes between 
hanren and lu in a stark manner. No longer are the hu “people” (ren), but rather they are 
barbarians who kill, invade, and take Chinese captive. Interestingly, this passage refers to captive 
Chinese with lu (“prisoner”) but as an adjectival indicating an unwilling status (zhongguo bei lu 
zhi ren 中國被虜之人, or “Chinese who have been enslaved”) rather than a title or name as it is 
applied to Mongols. This language carried over to post-Tumu state discussions of defensive 
preparations, and the planning of the first brick-and-stone fortifications that eventually became 
the Great Wall: 
己卯六部會議甘肅宣府廵撫官所陳事宜一莊浪西寧二衛乃虜必犯之地見儲粮
芻不足三月之用雖已召商中塩緣其地荐罹災傷粮值騰踊無應召者第恐秋高馬
肥胡人入寇 …  
 
… 關東水口可通人馬北虜近欲從此入貢不為無意一旦竊發長驅為患非小請令
分守參將督守備官軍修築墻壕務在高厚闊深仍以磚石甃塞關東水口量留小門
或間以銕窗石條則地方可保無虞 …  
 
A meeting of the six Ministries discussed the arrangements in Gansu, Xuanfu, and Xunfu. 
The two guards at Zhuanglang and Xining will certainly be where the lu invade. 
Provisions there are insufficient for three months, even though they have called for salt 
merchants [to provide additional provisions]. As a result, commodity prices have soared. 
The [merchants] who do not respond to these calls are afraid that the huren will invade in 
autumn. … 
 
The waters in the northeast are still passable by men and horses. The northern lu nearby 
are desirous [of profit], and their attempts to enter to bring tribute are not accidental. We 
must expel them to prevent robbery. [We] order the military garrisons there to build walls 
and trenches in appropriately high and deep terrain with brick [i.e. as opposed to rammed 
earth] and wall up the passes. In the places along the water where gaps remain, construct 
[barriers] with iron and stone. In this way the region can be protected, and [its people] 
will no longer worry.460 
 
                                                 
460 MSL, Xianzong, juan 79, p. 1527. 
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In the later years of the fifteenth century, the derogatory use of the label lu on northern Mongols 
briefly declined, corresponding with a short period of relative peace and stability on the frontier 
during the Hongzhi period (r. 1487-1505). The same Mongols who captured the Zhengtong 
emperor under Esen and conducted numerous raids into Ming territory had been lu immediately 
following the Tumu Crisis, but became huren again in the 1490s.  
西域胡人成化中嘗進獅子等獸為中國害今聖明臨御復 … 皇上嗜好冀遂其往
來互市之圖若不抑之於始四夷聞之必相率來貢蠹耗中國無有窮已乞如周武
王 … 漢文帝 … 
 
In the Chenghua reign, the western huren tried to encroach upon the Central Kingdoms 
and cause harm. Now, our enlightened sage-like emperor resists and turns them back… 
The emperor’s kindness has satisfied them, and they come and go to the market cities 
with mutual benefit. We do not restrain them. The four yi have heard of this, and they 
come to present tribute …but the emperor [refuses] in the manner of King Wu of Zhou … 
or Emperor Wendi of Han … 461 
 
However, the volatile nature of post-Tumu frontier politics soon reverted to the use of lu.462 
While this might suggest that the use of lu and hu changed flexibly in tandem with the frontier 
situation even after 1449, it better reflects the Hongzhi emperor’s attempts to paint himself in the 
manner of the earlier Ming emperors. Hongzhi himself was one of two post-Tumu emperors (the 
other being Wanli, r. 1572-1620) who admired the large-scale campaigns of the early Ming 
dynasty.463 
The change in Ming court language for Mongols reflects the sudden meeting of broad 
imperial visions with inadequate military ability to realize those visions. The early Ming ideas of 
empire, which embraced a Yuan-style open imperial space, ended when a united Mongol policy 
under Esen became an existential threat to the Ming empire and its highest figure, the emperor. 
                                                 
461 MSL, Xiaozong, juan 34, p. 749. 
462 MSL, Xiaozong, juan 183, p. 3378. 
463 Smith, “Impressions of the Song-Yuan-Ming Transition,” p. 84. 
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Ming ideas of an empire inclusive of the steppe and Mongols were terminated. Mongols became 
inherently untrustworthy, regardless of if they had lived under Ming authority for decades. The 
frontier transformed from a transient zone where imperial authority was military-based but 
expansive, into a closed frontier that necessitated constant supervision and robust defensive 
preparations. Court attitudes towards recalcitrant Mongols, once characterized by relatively 
minor concerns over hidden motives and finances, overnight became focused on military defense 
and exclusion. These patterns were also true for the change in the tone of court discussions and 
imperial orders on the subject of defensive preparations. The open Ming empire, whether it had 
existed in reality or only in the minds of Ming emperors and bureaucrats, now closed to the 
steppe. 
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VI. CHAPTER 5: NEW NARRATIVES OF THE MING DYNASTY, LATE 
IMPERIAL CHINA, AND WORLD HISTORY 
 
 
 
 
In the first chapter, I laid out a chronology of China’s history of empires that makes room for 
non-Chinese states – like the Northern Wei, Liao, and Jin – and highlights nomadic influences on 
patterns of state-building in China. I ended that chronology with what I called the “classic 
narrative” of the early Ming dynasty, in which the collapse of the Yuan and expulsion of the 
Mongols ejected Inner Asian and Eurasian influences from China. The most recent decade of 
work in Yuan-Ming studies has questioned this chronology but has not yet written an alternative 
narrative. Now, having discussed how Mongol Yuan practices and visions of empire influenced 
those of the early Ming, mapping these discussions atop one another builds an alternative early-
Ming chronology (or chronologies). To put it succinctly, the arguments laid out in previous 
chapters of this dissertation together make two major historiographical claims: 1) that we cannot 
fully understand the early Ming without first understanding the Yuan, and 2) if we want to do 
early-Ming history from a world-historical perspective, we cannot ignore cross-Eurasian 
connections. Accordingly, this chapter tackles three remaining issues. First, when considered 
together, what kind of early-Ming chronology (or chronologies) do the previous chapters point 
toward? Second, how should historians approach state-building in Eurasia in the wake of the 
Mongol empire? Third, how do these arguments change our perspectives on late-Ming, Qing, 
late imperial, and world history? 
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A. A NEW CHRONOLOGY FOR THE EARLY MING DYNASTY 
 
 
1. THE YUAN FALL AND THE HONGWU REIGN, 1350-1398 
 
 
Edward Dreyer wrote that Zhu Yuanzhang was a man of the Yuan dynasty.464 I propose a slight 
modification: Zhu Yuanzhang was a man of his time. Certainly, the child from an impoverished 
farming family who became an orphan was not born with premonitions of his future status as 
emperor, or with visions of restoring sacred Chinese antiquity as part of a plan to remove the 
historical anomaly of the Yuan, which had interrupted the proper dynastic succession. After the 
other members of his family died of disease and starvation, he entered a monastery to feed 
himself, not necessarily to learn Buddhist teachings for the explicit purpose of one day 
commanding a millenarian sect; and he only joined the Red Turban rebels after that monastery 
could no longer support their lay members, and so Zhu was forced to leave and find livelihood 
elsewhere. It seems entirely possible that, if one thing or another had worked out differently, Zhu 
Yuanzhang may have continued laboring as a subsistence farmer for the remainder of his years, 
or settled into life as a monk, or died of starvation, or been killed in battle as a foot soldier in one 
of the numerous rebel military forces marching across China in the fourteenth century. The point 
is that Zhu Yuanzhang was one of many millions experiencing the tumultuous events of mid-
fourteenth century China. His experience, and the experiences of others, were colored by a 
lifetime as subjects of the only state authority they had ever known, as well as the chaos 
surrounding the end of the Yuan dynasty. 
The Yuan fall, however, began in the 1350s, before Zhu became an important historical 
figure. The Yuan slowly collapsed due to all of the reasons laid out in chapter 1: loss of control 
                                                 
464 Dreyer, Early Ming China, p. 155. 
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over military forces, court infighting, and politically-motivated dismissals of competent 
commanders and administrators, all of which hamstrung the state’s ability to rectify local 
problems and put down numerous rebellions. Many of these causes mirror the oft-cited reasons 
for the fall of the Ming dynasty in the seventeenth century – and other, earlier dynasties.465 As 
Yuan authority disintegrated, so did the coherence of its local structures, which inhibited 
attempts to manage natural disaster, famine, and flooding. The loss of life must have been 
immense: on the eve of the Jin invasion of the Song, China’s population stood at 120 million, but 
by the beginning of the Ming, it had fallen to about 70 million. While few records remain to 
suggest in what portions these losses were due to the Jin invasion, the Mongol conquests, the 
chaotic Yuan-Ming transition, or simply poor census-taking, contemporary accounts suggest life 
was fleeting and few could count on Yuan protection to ensure their safety. Localities organized 
their own ad-hoc governments to manage policing, protection, and administrative needs.466 Many 
of these local regimes came to be ruled by military strongmen, or charismatic and clever 
individuals who became military strongmen through necessity or political maneuvering. The Red 
Turban rebellions, however, had something else to draw support and adherents from disaffected 
workers and farmers: a millenarian message that went beyond simply protecting local 
populations or denouncing the failing Yuan dynasty, but promised the return of the Buddha 
Maitreya, who would bring about a world of bounty and peace. I have used the plural 
“rebellions” deliberately, because “Red Turban” describes a large number of quasi-independent, 
Buddhist-affiliated clandestine groups who popped up all across northern and central China in 
                                                 
465 See: Ray Huang, 1587: A Year of No Significance: The Ming Dynasty in Decline (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1982), especially chapter 1. 
466 Mote, “The Rise of the Ming Dynasty,” pp. 11, 29. 
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response to famine and flooding, and who did not formally coalesce under a single organizing 
structure until the late 1350s. 
Zhu Yuanzhang was one of the central figures in centralizing the various sectarian 
rebellions and morphing them into the basis for a dynasty. Even so, it seems likely that any of his 
competitors, like Zhang Shicheng or Chen Youding, could have done the same, or perhaps have 
resisted Zhu Yuanzhang’s armies and thereby ushered in another era of multistate equilibrium in 
continental East Asia. Zhu, however, initially proved himself not as a future emperor but as the 
most militarily and politically adept commander of the various infighting rebels. It was not until 
1368 that he formally declared that he had received Heaven’s mandate to rule and claimed the 
title of huangdi, emperor, to succeed the Yuan. His reign title, Hongwu, announced the military 
ability that would guard and extend his realm. The Hongwu emperor gave his new dynasty a 
name – Ming – an ideological concept that followed naming precedents established by Khubilai 
Khan a century earlier, and a concept that would guide dynastic naming in the mid-seventeenth 
century when the Manchus formally established the Qing dynasty. Beyond the dynastic name, 
the Hongwu emperor borrowed major foundational structures from the Yuan: he organized the 
Ming military and administration on Mongol Yuan models, incorporated Mongols into his 
military forces, and awarded members of the imperial clan enfeoffments across the empire as a 
means of both keeping them far from the center of power (the capital at Nanjing) and ensuring 
Ming security. But perhaps most importantly, the Hongwu emperor ruled as directly and 
personally as any of the greatest Mongol qans, demanded subordination (rather than advice and 
guidance) from his Confucian advisors, and issued sweeping decrees intended to rebuild and 
maintain exact control over a war-torn realm.467 
                                                 
467 Dardess, Confucianism and Autocracy, pp. 1-12, and chapters 2 and 4. 
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The immediate challenge facing the new dynasty was the goal set by the old: the Yuan 
had managed to conquer and unify not simply northern China but also the Mongol steppe, 
Manchuria, and the southern, subtropical regions of China that had always been loosely 
governed by past dynasties. The thirty years of the Hongwu reign witnessed numerous attempts 
to diplomatically and militarily reconstitute the old Yuan empire and the larger Mongol ecumene 
of influence in East Asia. The emperor sent imperial decrees to every state in continental East 
Asia with whom the Yuan had established relations (or invaded, or attempted to invade). In these 
decrees he announced that the Yuan had fallen to his mighty armies, and he expected every 
kingdom that had paid obeisance to the Yuan would also do so to the Ming, under threat of 
invasion. He boasted of his impending conquest of the steppe, the last major obstacle to 
reunifying the old Yuan realm. However, the actual military attempts to reconstitute the Yuan 
empire failed – in the late 1360s and early 1370s, Ming armies met defeat on the steppe and were 
forced to withdraw, and the Hongwu emperor suspended further planned campaigns, leaving the 
responsibility of securing depopulated northern China and guarding against remnant Northern 
Yuan forces to his sons, especially his fourth son, Zhu Di, enfeoffed in modern Beijing as the 
Prince of Yan. Despite the failure of these campaigns, grand visions of empire remained vibrant 
in Ming circles of power. The Da Ming Hunyi Tu map, probably created in 1389 (and perhaps 
inspired by nonextant Yuan source maps), depicts the Great Ming empire as one that dominated 
Eurasia, including the Mongolian steppe, and no transition zone marked the frontier between the 
steppe and China. This vision represented a stark break from Song self-imaginations of empire, 
which on maps terminated at steppe-line fortifications. Other major military campaigns in the 
later years of the Hongwu reign were intended to maintain the status, glory, and security of the 
Ming empire, to pacify Manchuria, to strategically outflank the Mongols in the steppe 
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immediately north of China, and to finally complete the intended reunification of former Yuan 
territories, but the death of the emperor in 1398 curtailed these imperial ambitions for the time 
being. 
 
2. TANISTRIC CONFLICT AND MILITARY CAMPAIGNS, 1398-1450 
 
 
Upon the Hongwu emperor’s death, the Jianwen emperor’s ascendance to the Ming throne 
immediately stoked the beginnings of a political crisis. Some narratives suggest that Zhu Di, the 
founder’s fourth son enfeoffed in Beijing, wanted (or even expected) his father to grant him 
inheritance of the throne, even though such a move would violate classic principles of 
primogeniture.468 It seems possible that Zhu Di saw himself as his father’s proper successor 
regardless of arbitrary inheritance rights, very much in a Mongol fashion. He was politically 
adept, diplomatically clever, personally charismatic, an excellent military leader, and 
commanded the loyalty of a court of subordinate officials and thousands of soldiers. What 
ultimately matters is that all of Zhu Di’s elder brothers predeceased him, leaving him as 1) the 
most powerful general of the most heavily militarized region in the Ming empire, the northern 
frontier; and 2) the oldest remaining son of the Hongwu emperor. The only legal or moral 
obstacles to Zhu Di’s inheritance of the throne were his late father’s admonitions in the Ancestral 
Injunctions and the existence of his nephew, the Jianwen emperor, who was the first son of 
Hongwu’s first son. This situation reflected the unstable state of the imperial throne for much of 
the Yuan dynasty after Khubilai’s reign: a young, inexperienced ruler at the empire’s helm, 
surrounded by politicking officials, with powerful imperial relatives in the margins harboring 
their own ambitions and acting upon those ambitions with force. Zhu Di’s decision to go to war 
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against a member of his own family in order to seize the empire made perfect sense in a world 
the grand and powerful Mongol empire had ruled just thirty years prior. Zhu Di launched his war 
on the Nanjing court on a flimsy pretext (that corrupt officials were leading his nephew astray), 
and after four years, eventually won thanks to his superior military leadership, the large number 
of experienced Mongols in his army, and the loyalty of competent commanders. Zhu Di, now the 
Yongle emperor, erased his nephew from the official Ming records and fabricated four additional 
years of his father’s reign in order to historiographically mask what had been a tanistric effort to 
take the throne by force. 
Zhu Di saw himself as another Khubilai Khan and made many moves similar to those 
that Khubilai made, for similar reasons. He centralized military power and curtailed the 
autonomy of his enfeoffed relatives to eliminate the risk that someone would do precisely what 
he had done – turn to infighting for the throne. He moved the capital to the steppe frontier at 
Beijing to oversee the empire’s military security, draw from his established base of political 
operations, and reduce the importance of the old center of power (Nanjing in Yongle’s case; 
Karakorum in Khubilai’s). Finally, he launched and led massive military campaigns intended to 
complete the reunification of the Great Ming. The greatest of these campaigns were those that 
invaded the steppe, huge endeavors that severely taxed northern China in terms of manpower and 
food. They occasionally succeeded at breaking up Mongol power and ensuring no single Mongol 
group could conquer the rest and pose a unified threat to the Ming, but they did not successfully 
defeat or capture the last pretenders of the Yuan, or successfully conquer the steppe. Yongle 
likely intended to fully incorporate the Mongolian steppe into the empire, a move signaled by his 
retraction of many key defensive garrisons along the northern frontier that his father had 
established. The men and supplies of those garrisons would go towards offensive campaigns, and 
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the garrisons would ultimately be useless in an empire where the frontier divide no longer 
existed. The Ming also launched campaigns on other fronts, notably in Vietnam, where the Trâ’n 
dynasty, a former tributary of both the Yuan and Ming, was ousted and the Dai Viet throne 
seized by the Hô’. Ming armies invaded Vietnam to reinstate the Trâ’n and occupied the region 
for twenty years, another step in reconstituting the thirteenth- and fourteenth-century political 
order of East Asia. Beyond overland campaigns, Yongle commissioned the famous maritime 
voyages of Zheng He, which travelled as far as the eastern coast of Africa. The purpose of these 
voyages was to announce to the entire world the glory, power, prestige, and wealth of the Ming, 
and especially the emperor at its political apex, who wished to match or exceed the reach and 
voice of the Mongol empire, and also cement his legitimacy after having seized the throne 
through civil war. 
When the Yongle emperor died in 1424, his son reigned for one year as the Hongxi 
emperor. He wished to move the capital back to Nanjing, a maneuver that may have been carried 
out had Hongxi not prematurely died less than a year after his enthronement. This turn of events 
extended one of the several Ming connections to the old Yuan capital for the remainder of the 
Ming dynasty and the following Qing, and beyond to the present day. The 1420s, 30s, and 40s 
witnessed the decline, but not disappearance, of the Ming state’s desire to interfere in Mongol 
steppe politics and launch large military campaigns. While the period after Yongle’s death is 
often characterized as the beginning of the slide of power away from emperors and back to the 
Confucian officialdom, this did not mark an end in military interests. The Ming continued to 
occupy Vietnam until 1427, and advised friendly Mongol commanders when they fought with 
other, hostile Mongol groups. Nor did Yongle’s death mark a turn towards blatant anti-Mongol 
rhetoric, as though the emperor’s whim alone kept back a surge of Ming nativism. The language 
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of Ming court documents and diplomatic communication made clear distinctions between 
political enemies to the Ming and ethnic Mongols – being a Mongol did not immediately place 
suspicion on one’s head, at least not until the attempted coup of 1461, in which several Mongol 
officers participated.469 The unification of the Mongols under the Oirats, however, spurred the 
Ming to act. Endeavoring to replicate the glory of Yongle’s campaigns, the Zhengtong emperor 
personally led his own army afield into Mongolia, only to meet disaster. The Ming discovered 
that its military forces had greatly weakened. Factions within the capital court argued for, once 
again, moving the capital back to Nanjing, but Beijing’s frontier location passed the test a second 
time. With few good options to appease frightened officials in the capital, deal with Mongol 
threats, and avoid the manpower and monetary expense of further campaigns, the Ming settled 
on a grand project of strategic wall-building to assist in protecting northern China. 
 
 
 
B. NEW APPROACHES TO STATE-BUILDING IN POST-MONGOL EURASIA 
 
 
While cultural, regional, and ethnic contingency certainly did affect the reconstitution of empire 
in various parts of Eurasia after the Mongol collapse, the argument laid out here suggests that 
China’s state-building experience in post-Mongol Eurasia was not as unique as historians have 
assumed, or to put it another way, that experience was unique in unappreciated ways. It seems 
likely that this was also the case for other Eurasian polities like Muscovy and the early Ottoman 
empire. Ming rulers imagined a complicated relationship with the Mongol past, and lauded the 
many expansive accomplishments of the Mongol Yuan, attitudes that translated into early Ming 
projects to territorially rebuild the old Yuan empire and incentivized Ming state actors to adopt 
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successful Mongol administrative and military practices. In Ming China, as elsewhere in Eurasia, 
the Mongols introduced useful organizational techniques, especially in areas of military 
application. The same is true of Ming reactions and decisions made in the face of continued 
Mongol threats long after the Yuan collapse. The Great Wall stands as a unique Chinese 
monument to ingenuity, engineering, and occasionally folly, but Muscovy’s similar strategy of 
wall-building along the steppe frontier not only demonstrates that it was not a uniquely Chinese 
approach to managing steppe incursions, but that wall-building was not an inherently flawed 
strategy. Muscovy (and later the Russian empire) used strategic walls and fortifications to 
successfully warn against, curtail, and repel Crimean attacks, and eventually extended those 
walls for the purpose of protecting an expanding empire and to corner steppe nomadic polities. In 
the Ming case, the Great Wall was not used as a strategic offensive tool, but the Ming dynasty 
faced different military imperatives and dealt with different domestic considerations. First, as 
Nicola Di Cosmo has noted, Ming defenses along the Great Wall were not antiquated or 
representative of obsolete tactics, but remained quite robust, and the Ming made vigorous 
attempts to update its military arsenal and technological capacity.470 Second, not only had 
offensive strategies become diplomatically untenable after the mid-fifteenth century, but once 
visions of reconstituting the Yuan empire had faded, there was no impetus to extend Ming 
territory north or northwest. After Esen, the Mongols never posed an existential threat to the 
Ming again. The uniqueness of the Ming experience instead derives from the events surrounding 
its fall: it was the Manchus who became the Ming’s main concern. The Manchus – unlike the 
Crimeans, Kalmyks, or Kazakhs facing Russia, or the fractured Timurid factions facing the 
Ottoman empire after Tamerlane’s death – emerged as a vibrant, motivated state and society with 
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the means and ambition to establish a vast new empire. The Manchus posed an altogether more 
dangerous threat to the sedentary Ming empire, especially when compared to virtually every 
other post-Mongol nomadic or semi-nomadic group across Eurasia, save perhaps the Mughals in 
India. From the reverse perspective, the Manchus and Mughals were the only post-Mongol 
nomadic polities to successfully build another lasting empire in the Mongol fashion. 
Direct comparative work is another simple yet underused tool in the arsenal of the post-
Mongol world historian. If the experiences of post-Mongol empires are not obfuscatingly and 
incomparably unique, then comparative work is the easiest way to expand this field. Wall-
building is just one example. The state’s long-term response to catastrophic defeat in battle 
against nomadic groups and the capture of the ruler is another (i.e. the case of Ottoman sultan 
Bayezid and Ming emperor Zhengtong). Where else might historians look for lucrative 
comparative studies? Early-modern European empires provide the subjects for countless volumes 
of comparative work, on topics ranging from political economy to the imperial practices of 
colonial empires.471 Often, comparative work involving post-Mongol Eurasian empires involves 
juxtaposing overland Eurasian empires with maritime European empires, and asking why the 
latter came to dominate the world and the former did not.472 Where are the works that compare 
post-Mongol Eurasian empires for their own sake? Burbank and Cooper devote a chapter to the 
matter, and Christopher Beckwith does examine Eurasian-wide developments before and after 
the Mongol empire.473 It is clear more can be done. Asking why different post-Mongol polities 
did or did not adopt Mongol administrative practices, military techniques, or visions of empire 
                                                 
471 For a handful of examples, see: Sophus A. Reinert and Pernille Røge, The Political Economy of Empire in Early-
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473 Burbank and Cooper, “Chapter 7: Beyond the Steppe: Empire-Building in Russia and China,” in Empires in 
World History, pp. 185-218; Christopher Beckwith, Empires of the Silk Road: A History of Central Eurasia from the 
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covers the physical, spatial, and intellectual dimensions of the Mongol legacy. Understanding the 
differences in various empires’ state-building strategies elucidates the particularities of Mongol 
practices of rule as much as the unique circumstances in conquered regions. The “Mongol 
moment” was not a simple process of annexation, rule, and dissolution that left the conquered 
region in the same condition it had been prior to the thirteenth century, but part of an extended 
transformative era in Eurasian and world history. 
In long-term perspective, historians should define the era of the Mongol empire and the 
rule of its various successor khanates as not merely the sudden, unexpected Mongol eruption out 
of Inner Asia, but as the largest, most tumultuous, and closest phase of interaction between 
sedentary agricultural and nomadic-pastoralist societies. In East Asia, this is a phase that began 
not with Temujin’s election as Chinggis Khan in 1206, but with the formation of the Khitan Liao 
state in 907. The emergence of the Liao alongside the Song transformed China’s northern and 
northeastern frontiers from the simple logistical limit of agricultural settlement into arenas of 
interaction between competing empires in a multistate system. The Jurchen Jin conquest 
redefined the steppe frontier zone further: it became, once again, the marker of agriculture’s 
limit, but within, rather than at the margins of, a single state, and therefore also a marker of 
administrative divisions. Then, the Mongol conquest and the establishment of the Yuan 
completed the process and folded China, the steppe frontier, and Inner Asia into a single region 
of interactivity and rule. This long-term process of construction, collapse, and recapitulation was 
reflected in other areas as well, such as the formation of legal ethnic categories, and the depiction 
of imperial limits and visions on territorial maps. The collapse of the Mongol Yuan reverted the 
steppe frontier to a boundary between competing states, but not necessarily a boundary or limit 
of imperial visions, as the Ming attempted to do precisely what the Mongols had done, except 
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this time from the south instead of the north. These Ming attempts met some success initially, but 
domestic economic concerns and the reunification of a single Mongol state under Esen to 
challenge Ming unipolarity aborted the process. Ultimately, the Mongol style of imperial 
reconstitution disappeared in the late fifteenth century, rather than the mid-fourteenth, and 
returned with the Manchu Qing. From this perspective, the Ming dynasty remains part of the 
post-Mongol story rather than apart from it, and moreover, the Liao and Jin remain part of 
China’s chronology rather than outside of it. 
 
 
 
C. LATE IMPERIAL CHINA: THE LATE MING AND QING IN THE NEW 
NARRATIVE AND WORLD HISTORY 
 
 
By considering the era between 1368 and 1450 as, in many ways, an extension of the Mongol 
period that transitioned naturally (rather than abruptly) into the later Ming, the entire narrative of 
the late imperial period changes. First, the two centuries between 1449 and 1644 become an 
anomaly. This directly disagrees with older arguments that the Yuan was the anomaly in China’s 
history, and creates a smoother continuity between the Yuan, Ming, and Qing that is less 
concerned with ethnic difference or adherence to classical Chinese Confucian culture, and more 
concerned with how Mongol and Inner Asian influences affected China and other parts of 
Eurasia. In this sense, between the founding of the Yuan and collapse of the Qing, for 430 years 
imperial states in China followed or borrowed from Mongol Yuan patterns of legitimization and 
state-building. Furthermore, if we take the case that the late Ming was not one of military 
weakness but of innovation and adaptation, as historians like Swope and Di Cosmo have argued, 
then the late-fifteenth and early-sixteenth centuries merely mark a dip in Ming military efficacy, 
a weakness that Ming rulers, statesmen, and commanders corrected in the face of military 
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challenges posed by pirates, Japan’s invasion of Korea, and Manchu expansionism. Indeed, the 
Ming collapse does not appear to have resulted from military weakness so much as economic 
distress and administrative or financial inability to correct the problems facing disaffected 
peasants. The Yuan faced the exact same problem of disaster-induced unrest, one which the 
Mongols’ famous military strength also failed to curb. 
 However, it remains true that the Ming never conquered and ruled the Mongol steppe as 
the Yuan and Qing did, though not for lack of trying. I have spelled out the numerous ways in 
which Mongol influences remained strong in early Ming imperial visions, and how Ming efforts 
to recapture the old Yuan empire were quite real. I contend that the fact those influences 
remained active in the early Ming, and that early Ming rulers consciously created links with the 
Mongol Yuan past, is enough to maintain Yuan-Ming-Qing continuity beyond simply grouping 
them as “late imperial.” In this sense, then, “late imperial China” comes to mean more than a 
temporal collection of dynasties that roughly corresponds with the European early-modern era, 
or a time period of increasingly close contact with Europe, or merely the last pre-modern forms 
of government in China. Instead, it is the era in which China came to be influenced by Inner Asia 
more or less permanently. 
 The late Ming does complicate this narrative. Obviously, the time period between the end 
of the fifteenth century and the 1640s was an era of declining court interest in the steppe, and the 
plethora of sources on the vibrancy of Ming economic and cultural life has demonstrated that 
Ming rulers, elites, and subjects very much thought of themselves as Mingren, and not 
necessarily the inheritors of a barbarian Mongol legacy. As mentioned, this approach considers 
the late Ming an anomaly in the late imperial narrative, but just as Yuan historians have argued 
for years against sidelining the Yuan dynasty in Chinese history, the late Ming should also never 
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be sidelined (though it certainly is not in danger of that fate). It should also be placed into 
perspective. In the new narrative, the Ming dynasty represents an era of China’s history 
entangled in two worlds: the overland Inner Asian and the maritime coastal. After Inner Asian 
and Eurasian concerns lost importance, the military lessons and martial ambitions of Ming rulers 
continued, applied out of necessity to the military problems facing the Ming empire. The 
growing importance of coastal trade, and maintaining security along that escalating front and 
Korea, shifted Ming military priorities. Emperors like Wanli carried the values of military 
strength through the late-sixteenth and early-seventeenth centuries. 
 In the field of world history, this study bring the Ming back into the discussion of 
Eurasian post-Mongol empires. The Ming was one formulation, rather than a rejection, of the 
Mongol empire’s legacy. Early Ming rulers molded Mongol military and legitimating practices 
in ways that facilitated their goals, and the structures that maintained their power. Blaming 
Mongol rule and customs for the chaos of the late Yuan clearly juxtaposed the crumbling old 
model with the ordered new, and paved the way for the establishment of a new regime, but early 
Ming emperors could not afford to entirely throw away Yuan precedents. Even if they wanted to, 
or even if they knew what kinds of state-building models pre-Yuan dynasties deployed, they 
could not have simply stripped away the century of changes that the Mongols had brought to 
China. Language, customs, cultural patterns, and most importantly for this study, the grand 
empire that the Mongols established remained as important ideas in China after the Yuan fall, 
regardless of the rhetoric that the Hongwu emperor deployed to cement his claim to the Mandate 
of Heaven. This mirrors the experiences of Eurasian rim empires in the post-Mongol world, and 
is reflected in the ambiguous place of Russia between Europe and Asia; in the military and 
legitimating principles of the Islamic gunpowder empires (the Ottomans, Mughals, and Safavid 
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dynasty); and in the Ming’s own successor, the Qing. This creates new spaces to discuss early-
modern Eurasia in world history, not linked merely through the imperial maritime projects of 
Europeans, or in comparison to the European empires that came to dominate the globe in the 
nineteenth century, but through a shared Mongol legacy that changed the face of empire-building 
across the most heavily populated regions of the world. The Ming dynasty was not merely 
connected with the rest of the globe through oceanic trade, but through the nuanced 
interpretation of the Mongol past, and the institutional systems and imperial visions the Yuan 
bequeathed to China. The Mongol empire was not just a moment that dissolved with the 
resurgence of native styles of rule, but a key phase in Inner Asian interactions with Eurasian 
agricultural regions that molded patterns of state-building for the remainder of the millennium. 
 
 
 
D. CONCLUSION 
 
 
The military campaigns, administrative structures, and commissioned imperial depictions of the 
Hongwu and Yongle reigns escorted the Mongol legacy through the formative years of the Ming 
dynasty. Beginning with the decision to name the new dynasty after an ideological concept – 
Ming – rather than a place-name – such as Han, Tang, or Song – already marked this legacy. 
While no records indicate why the Hongwu emperor chose Ming as the dynastic name, I have a 
supposition that returns to my opening modification of Edward Dreyer’s observation: Zhu 
Yuanzhang was a man of his time. The only dynastic imperial state he knew from lived 
experience was the Yuan. Perhaps this is a slight overapplication of Occam’s razor – that the 
simplest explanation is often right – but the ideological pattern must mean something that 
connects the legitimating principles of the Yuan and Ming and reflects their similar imperial 
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structures. The reasons for the rhetoric in Hongwu’s imperial decrees, communications, and 
orders are more known to modern scholars, but that rhetoric is couched in Confucian language. 
Looking to China’s Mongol Yuan past helps circumvent charged Confucian language and 
understand both the administrative nuts and bolts and the visions of empire-building in the early 
Ming. Drawing on the rhetoric of Confucian antiquity and building an empire with the 
framework and vision of the Yuan provided the territorial and legitimating foundation of the 
Ming dynasty. It was not one or the other, but both. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
 
New political orders are not blank slates. Even as a state collapses, social norms, cultural values, 
and political aspirations do not necessarily disappear with it. Those things might transform or 
change in response to the whims of powerful actors, or the vagaries of contingency, but pieces or 
remnants of them in some way to influence the future. During the Yuan-Ming transition, as the 
Mongol Yuan fell and the Ming arose, the Yuan did not disappear entirely to make way for the 
recovery of pre-Mongol patterns of rule and legitimation. The effects of the Mongol conquests, 
one of the most tumultuous and impactful events in human history, did not vanish overnight. 
Early Ming rhetoric on the pollution of the Mongols was precisely that – rhetoric – and masks 
the very real ways in which early Ming rulers and statesmen borrowed from the immediate past. 
A century of Mongol rule had brought to China new state-building methods and new, grander 
visions of empire. The Mongols had connected, and devastated, Eurasia in ways its inhabitants 
had never previously experienced. When the Ming dynasty came into formal existence in 1368, 
the conquests of the early- and mid-1200s, and the Mongol rule over China from 1279, remained 
markers by which the new Ming empire would necessarily be measured. 
I have outlined how the Mongols transformed ideas of empire by tracing the origins of 
what we call “empire” in China, and analyzing the applicability of the term to China’s historical 
experience. Over the course of China’s first millennium of imperial history, nomadic political 
orders profoundly changed how empires were built, legitimized, and managed in continental East 
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Asia. Contrary to the narratives of the “conquest dynasties,” these were not necessarily the result 
of invasions, as in the case of the Northern Wei, whose Tuoba ruling elite already resided in 
northern China. By the fifth century, cosmopolitanism and merged nomadic-sedentary state-
building methods had already formed the pillars of one kind of state in China. The Tang dynasty 
signaled a redoubling of cosmopolitan state-building and an era of broad imperial visions, this 
time beginning in China and extending into the steppe. The Song sits in Chinese historiography 
as a territorially small and inward-looking polity, but by contextualizing the tenth, eleventh, and 
twelfth centuries as ones in which a multi-state East Asia emerged and a sparse frontier limit had 
become a zone of interaction between the Song, Liao, and Xi Xia, this period changes from one 
in which Chinese civilization was under siege to one that continued the construction of empires 
from multiple and mixed traditions of empire-building. The Mongols brought about the 
reunification of continental, multi-state East Asia, and ushered in an era of permanent 
reunification until the end of the millennium. Their visions and ideas of empire formed a new 
repository from which future empires (the Ming and Qing) would draw legitimating practices 
and military/administrative strategies. 
These influences are detectable in early Ming discourse, rhetoric, and representations of 
imperial power. The changing legal language on ethnicity and cultural groups, from Liao to Jin 
to Yuan, reflected a growing awareness of state-defined ethnicity as a means of categorizing and 
controlling populations. Early Ming law did the same thing, between Chinese and Mongols, an 
awareness that had not existed prior to the Liao, Jin, and Yuan. In early Ming spatial 
representations, the territorial extent of the Ming empire covers all of Eurasia, a depiction that 
mirrors Yuan rather than Song depictions, and which suggests limitless empire in the Mongol 
manner rather than limited empire in the Song. The Da Ming Hunyi Tu’s lack of a clear divide, 
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either man-made or natural, between China and the steppe indicates that early Ming rulers 
maintained an open vision of empire and intended to reconstitute the old Yuan polity. Song 
maps, and later Ming maps, consistently separate China and the steppe with walls or geographic 
features like deserts. The existence of a Eurasian-wide map dated to 1389 demonstrates the 
transference of knowledge of Eurasia from the Yuan to the Ming, and points towards the fact that 
the Mongol legacy remained strong in early Ming legitimating efforts. Ming rhetoric on the 
Yuan, and the place of the Mongols and the Yuan dynasty in Chinese history, further confirm 
that the Ming did not denigrate its immediate Yuan past wholesale, but viewed the Mongol 
century of rule in complex and nuanced ways, praising the ability of the Mongols to unify the 
whole world, and lauding Yuan military strength while criticizing the Song for its weakness and 
failure to maintain internal cohesion. 
In more direct fashion, early Ming military endeavors, military-administrative systems, 
and strategic considerations mirror Yuan precedents quite closely. The Yuan and Ming faced 
similar strategic problems – likely a result of the very different imperial order the Yuan had 
brought to China – and the Ming looked to the Yuan for solutions to those problems. The major 
difference was that early Ming rulers attempted to reconstruct the Yuan empire from the south to 
the north, rather than from the north to the south as Khubilai did. Historians before me have 
already observed that early Ming military organization systems copied Yuan models, but I take 
this pattern a step further, and argued that Ming princely enfeoffment practices were similar to 
Mongol appanage distributions in purpose and practice, even if the initial reasons for these 
enfeoffments differed (imperial decree vs. rewards to Chinggisid family members). They helped 
secure the frontier zone in advance of, and immediately following, military operations. In the 
same vein, the Yongle emperor moved the capital to Beijing for the same reasons Khubilai Khan 
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moved it to the same location at Dadu: to place the center of power on the frontier between two 
worlds (steppe and agricultural), both of which Yongle and Khubilai intended to govern. The key 
difference, of course, is that Yongle never managed to conquer the steppe. 
The era after the Yongle emperor’s death appears to signal the beginning of Ming 
institutional and imperial divergence from the Yuan model. However, that divergence did not 
become real in the rhetoric and practice of Ming rulers and statesmen until the Tumu Crisis of 
1449. Between 1424 and the Crisis, the Ming relationship with Mongol groups and the Mongol 
past fluctuated with important nuance. Ming court rhetoric on Mongols still included Mongol 
groups and the legacy of the Yuan empire as parts of the Ming empire, either intellectually or 
physically. Ming imperial ethos did not reject Mongols outright, but differentiated between 
Mongol groups who were politically friendly to the Ming from those who were enemies, and did 
not claim that the latter were enemies simply because they were ethnically different. The 
Zhengtong emperor’s decision to launch a campaign to counteract Esen’s reunification of the 
Mongol steppe was a maneuver intended to replicate the Yongle emperor’s campaigns to 
maintain a divided Mongol world amicable to Ming interests, but Zhengtong’s disastrous defeat 
was a shocking demonstration that something had gone catastrophically wrong with Ming 
military efficacy. Combined with the fear that Esen would capitalize on his victory, siege the 
capital at Beijing, and potentially recreate some form of Mongol empire all spurred the Ming to 
abandon offensive operations in the steppe and eventually led to the construction of the Great 
Wall and the cessation of offensive operations into the steppe for the remainder of the dynasty. 
The Great Wall, however, is not a uniquely Chinese phenomenon that somehow 
physically represents isolationism, nor is it a folly of expensive engineering that failed in its one 
and only purpose. Other Eurasian states, notably the Grand Duchy of Moscow (and the Russian 
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empire it became), also built long, strategic walls to manage steppe-based threats, which 
demonstrates that historians should not take wall-building alone as a marker of military 
weakness and failure, or as a uniquely Chinese phenomenon. The Tumu Crisis is the marker of 
weakness, but as the Ottoman case suggests, even militarily powerful and charismatic rulers had 
difficulty engaging powerful nomadic rulers in combat, and even disastrous defeats that ended 
with the capture of the ruler (Zhengtong in the Ming case and sultan Bayezid in the Ottoman 
case) did not forever end the possibility of military strength. The Ottoman realm rebounded, and 
the Ottomans ultimately constructed one of the largest empires in history. The Ming dynasty did 
not go on to extend Ming territory in a similar fashion, but later Ming military endeavors and 
martial innovations on the oceanic coast, in Korea, and against the Manchus tell us that the 
period between 1449 and the mid-sixteenth century constitutes an anomaly of Ming military 
weakness. While the Ming did fall to the encroaching Manchu Qing empire, in a world-historical 
perspective this seems to have less to do with Ming military inability to repel invaders and more 
to do with financial and domestic problems. It also speaks to the unique vibrancy and ambition 
of the Manchus, who were only one of two post-Mongol nomadic groups to establish a vast 
empire (the other being the Mughals), and whose empire came to be the richest state in the world 
until the nineteenth century, and which governed nearly one-third of the world’s population in 
1800. 
This dissertation has attempted to resituate the Ming dynasty along a new narrative of the 
late imperial continuum. The Yuan was not an anomaly in Chinese history, an observation of 
which historians are now well-aware. The new narratives laid out in Chapter 5 are the final 
contributions to this study’s argument: that the Yuan marked a new era, one continued in the 
Ming. I have also argued for new methods of incorporating the Ming dynasty into post-Mongol 
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Eurasian history. While the Qing is often cited as the post-Mongol imperial project in China, 
comparable to Russia, the Ottomans, and Mughals, the Ming should also be considered in the 
same light. Although not as territorially expansive, early Ming ideas of empire were profoundly 
influenced by those of the Mongols and its branch in China, the Yuan dynasty. The imperial 
visions of early Ming rulers imagined the reconquest of the old Yuan polity as the logical goal 
for ensuring Ming legitimacy and primacy for the foreseeable future. What the Mongols had 
built, the Ming would naturally recapture and improve upon. The period of declining state 
interest in the steppe, between 1449 and the 1550s, is the real anomaly in China’s history. 
Steppe-based imperial traditions remained strong in fifteenth-century China, as extrapolated and 
deployed by Ming emperors. 
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